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1974 LAND USE LEGISLATION IN COLORADO
By JoHN R. BERMINGHAM*
INTRODUCTION
The 1974 session of the Colorado General Assembly passed a
wide variety of bills affecting the environment and the use of
land.' Although some consideration will be given to House Bill
1034, "The Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of
1974," this article will focus on House Bill 1041, the bill which
received so much attention while the session was in progress.'
*Assistant to the Governor for Environmental Affairs and State Planning; member
of the Colorado Land Use Commission; B.E., 1944, Yale University; LL.B., 1949, Colum-
bia Law School.
The author assumes responsibility for all statements, but wishes to acknowledge the
invaluable assistance of many persons-too numerous to name-who have reviewed drafts
of this article. Positions taken in this article are those of the author individually and have
no official status.
I E.g., Colo. S.B. 7 (1974) (water rights-augmentation plans); Colo. S.B. 59 (1974)
(Barr Lake acquisition); Colo. S.B. 60 (1974) (county powers-floods-removal of obstruc-
tions); Colo. S.B. 86 (1974) (water pollution-hearing officers); Colo. S.B. 87 (1974) (plan-
ning districts); Colo. S.B. 91 (1974) (water pollution control facilities-funding formula);
Colo. S.B. 95 (1974) (definition of subdivision-condominiums); Colo. H.B. 1034 (1974)
(Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act); Colo. H.B. 1041 (1974) (the "Land
Use Bill"); Colo. H.B. 1084 (1974) (Conservation Trust Fund); Colo. H.B. 1140 (1974) (air
pollution-fees for permits); Colo. H.B. 1165 (1974) (geothermal resources); Colo. H.B.
1178 (1974) (abandonment of towns); Colo. H.B. 1179 (1974) (counties given control over
new municipal incorporations); Colo. H.B. 1200 (1974) (State Mapping Pro-
gram-500,000 appropriation-U.S. Geol. Survey and aerial); Colo. S.J. Res. 28 (1974)
(authorizing a study of energy resources); Colo. H.J. Res. 1008 (1974) (authorizing a study
of oil shale development); Colo. H.J. Res. 1041 (1974) (authorizing a study of new com-
munities); Colo. H.J. Res. 1042 (1974) (authorizing a study of metropolitan Denver water
problems).
2 The complete text of Colo. H.B. 1041 (1974) is presented as Appendix A to this
article.
NOTE To READER: At about the time this article appears in print, the 1973 version of
the COLORADO REvisED STATUTES will become available. Many of the chapters, articles, and
sections in this 1973 compilation will have been renumbered in the process of reorganizing
the statutes by subject area. In order to make the statutory citations herein to pre-1974
legislation useful to readers using the 1973 version of the COLORADO REviSED STATUTES, the
editors have departed from our usual footnote format in some respects and have attempted
to provide additional information so that the reader may locate pre-1974 statutory cita-
tions either in the 1963 COLORADO REvSD STATrTES and subsequent supplements, or in
the 1973 COLORADo REvisED STATUTES. Where this format is employed the statutory cita-
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H.B. 1041 is Colorado's first comprehensive land use law.
Past efforts have involved local planning acts, air and water pol-
lution control laws, and numerous pieces of land use legislation
dealing with particular problems, such as the 1972 subdivision
act.3 Following abortive attempts in both 1972 and 1973 to com-
tion initially given in the footnote refers to the 1963 COLORADO REVISED STATUTES and the
applicable supplements. In brackets following the citation to the 1963 COLORADO REVISED
STATUTES the editors have provided, in bold faced type, a citation to the statutory material
as it will be cited from the reorganized and/or renumbered 1973 COLORADO REvism
STATUTES.
The reader should also note that all 1974 legislation, including the subject of this
article, House Bill 1041, will not be included in the 1973 COLORADO REVISED STATUTES but
will first appear in the 1974 Colorado Session Laws and then, after being renumbered, in
the 1975 Pocket Part Supplements to the 1973 COLORADO REVISED STATUTES. The editors
have cited all 1974 legislation only as it will appear in the 1974 Colorado Session Laws.
I Ch. 81, §§ 1 to 10, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 498, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 106-2-9(3), (4), 106-2-33(3), (6) to (11) (1963), §§ 106-2-34(1), (3) to (5) (Supp. 1971)
and creating new sections intended to be designated under the 1963 statutory compilation
scheme as COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-2-4(9), (10), 106-2-9(3)(a), (4), 106-2-33(6) to
(11), 106-2-34(1), (3) to (8), 106-2-37, -38, 139-59-25 [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-28-
101(1), (2), (5), (6), (8), (10), (11), 30-28-105(9), (10), 30-28-110(3), (4), 30-28-133(1), (3)
to (5), 30-28-136, -137, 31-23-125 (1973)].
Other such specific legislation dealing with particular problems include: COLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. §§ 66-31-1 to -26 (Supp. 1971), as amended (Air Pollution Control Act of 1971)
[Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-7-101 to -126 (1973)]; ch. 210, § 1, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws
709, repealing COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-28-1 to -27 (Supp. 1967), as amended, and
amending and reenacting it with the intended designation under the 1963 statutory compi-
lation scheme as COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-28-101 to -704 (Colorado Water Quality
Control Act) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-8-101 to -704 (1973)]; ch. 220 § 1 [1973] Colo.
S e s s . L a w s 7 7 2 . c re a tin e n e w q Pe t ;n,,o c b c- --.t - , ... .. .. . . . ....... ...... .- vu~ wa|U i rl 196 SUa UtOry
compilation scheme as COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-44-1 to -12; and ch. 220 § 2 [1973]
Colo. Sess. Laws 772, 781, amending ch. 81, § 8 [19721 Colo. Sess. Laws 498, 504 with
the intended designation under the 1963 statutory compilation scheme as COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 106-2-37(1)(h) (Individual Sewage Disposal Systems Act) [Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. §§ 25-10-101 to -112, 30-28-136(1)(g) (1973)]; CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-26-1 to
-8 (Supp. 1965), as amended (radiation control) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-11-101 to
-108 (1973)]; CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 139-59-1 to -24 (1963), as amended (municipal
land use planning) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-23-101 to -124 (1973)1; CoLo. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 106-2-1 to -34 (1963), as amended (county and regional land use planning) [Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-28-101 to -135 (1973)]; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-3-1 to -13
(Supp. 1967), as amended (State Planning Act) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-32-201 to
-207 (1973)]; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-4-1 to -4 (Supp 1971) (establishment of
Colorado Land Use Commission [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-65-101 to -105 (1973)];
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 139-60-1 to -10 (1963), as amended (zoning by municipalities)
[Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-23-201 to -210 (1973)]; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 118-16-1
to -7 (1963), as amended (registration of subdivision developers) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 12-61-401 to -407 (1973)]; ch. 82, §§ 1, 2, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 508, creating new
sections intended to be designated under the 1963 statutory compilation scheme as COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-6-1 to -8, 139-60-13 (Planned Unit Development Act) [Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 24-67-101 to -108, 31-23-213 (1973)]; COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 120-5-1 to
-28 (1963), as amended (roadside advertising) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 43-1-401 to -
423 (1973)]; ch. 298, §§ 2 to 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 1049, amending COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 92-13-1 to -18 (Supp. 1969) (Colorado Open Mining Land Reclamation Act)
[VOL. 51
LAND USE
pile statutory lists of activities of state concern,4 the 1974 General
Assembly designated 13 types of areas and activities "matters of
state interest." Procedures for identifying and regulating specific
instances of these "matters" within each county are detailed, and
may be initiated either by any local government having jurisdic-
tion, or by the Colorado Land Use Commission. Having adopted
the subdivision act in 1972 and the land use act in 1974, Colorado
is now a national leader in land use legislation. Few other states
have moved so far.5
Environmentalists tend to belittle H.B. 1041 and lawyers
may view it as a badly battered piece of legislation. But environ-
mentalists do not yet represent the majority of Americans and
legislation is not written to please the critical eyes of legal crafts-
men. When a legislature stormily forges ahead into a new field
with hundreds of special interests pulling, tugging, and carping
in a myriad of different directions, the final product emerges as
a crude but significant expression of public feeling. This, in ess-
ence, is what has been produced by the 1974 session of the Colo-
rado General Assembly in its enactment of H.B. 1041.
Three features of the new law make it an eminently worth-
while piece of legislation. First, local governments-both counties
and municipalities-are given money, encouragement, and direc-
tion to plan for, designate, and regulate certain specified land use
[Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-32-101 to -115 (1973)]; ch. 298, §§ 1 to 20, (1973] Colo.
Sess. Laws 1046, amending COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139-59-25 (1963), §§ 106-2-5(3), 106-
12(1), 139-60-1 (1) (Supp. 1967), §§ 92-13-1 to -5(1), 92-13-5(2)(e), (f), 92-13-5 (3)(j), (k),
92-13-5(5), (6), 92-13-13(2), 92-13-15(1)(c), (e), 92-13-16, 92-13-18 (Supp. 1969), and
creating new sections intended to be designated under the 1963 statutory compilation
scheme as COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 92-36-1 to -5, 92-13-5(1), (2)(e), (f), (h) to (), 92-13-
5(3)(j) to (1), 64-1-3(3), (4) (commercial mineral deposits) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-
28-106(3), 30-28-113(1); 31-23-125, -201; 34-1-103(3), (4); 34-1-301 to -305; 34-32-101 to -
103; 34-32-106 (1)(c), (e); 34-32-107; 34-32-109; 34-32-110(1), (2)(d), (e), (g) to (i), (3)(i)
to (k), (5), (6); 34-32-111(1); 34-32-113(2); 34-32-115 (1973)].
1 When Colo. S.B. 43 (1972), the proposed "Environmental Policy Act," was killed it
specified 12 "major actions." The much debated land use bill that died on the last day of
the 1973 session, Colo. S.B. 377 (1973), specified 16 "activities of state concern."
I The only other states that have adopted noteworthy land use control legislation are
the following, and not all of these states have exerted their authority on a statewide basis:
California: CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27200 (West 1972) (Coastal Zone Act); Delaware: DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 7001 to 7013 (Supp. 1972) (Coastal Zone Act); Florida: FLA. STAT. §
380 (Supp. 1972) (Environmental Land and Water Management Act); Hawaii: HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 205-1 to -15 (1961) (Land Use Commission Act); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 683 to 688 (1971) (Land Use Commission Law); id. tit. 38, § 481 to 488 (Supp.
1973) (Industrial Site Selection); (id. tit. 12, § 4811 to 4814 (1971) (Zoning and Subdivision
Control); Oregon: ch. 80, [1973] Ore. Sess. Laws 27 (Land Conservation and Develop-
ment Act); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 to 6091 (1970) (Land Use Law).
1974
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matters that the legislatuie considers to be of critical importance
in Colorado. The State has never before given such significant
amounts of State funds to local governments for planning pur-
poses. Second, State power to intervene is no longer limited to
narrowly defined emergency situation; rather, the executive
branch is given authority to force local governments to deal with
these matters. Third, State agencies with experience in identify-
ing and managing mineral, natural resource, and hazardous areas
are brought into a coordinated program to make their information
and expertise available to local governments.
Quite a number of people will object that the first two of
these features represent an objectionable intrusion of government
into what should be an exclusively private domain. Many con-
gressmen, legislators, and local officials, representing a broad
spectrum of Americans, are philosophically opposed to land use
legislation and frequently cite the "taking clause" of the Federal
Constitution.' However, as a recent treatise on the taking clause
indicates, the barriers to land use legislation are far more political
than legal.' Public demand for land use legislation is on the as-
cendency, and if local governments fail to develop the potential
of H.B. 1041-promptly, effectively, and conspicuously-public
opinion may well react with a takeover at the state level.
HOUSE BILL 1041
A. The Structure of House Bill 1041
Prior to a discussion of details, it is appropriate to describe
the structure of the bill. Section 1 creates Article 7 of Chapter
106, a new article in Colorado's planning statutes entitled "Areas
and Activities of State Interest." This 20-page section is divided
into five parts, containing the customary section designations of
the Colorado Revised Statutes.
Part 1 (sections 106-7-101 to -108) contains general provi-
sions, definitions, some exemptions, and a section dealing with
permits issued by state agencies.
Part 2 (sections 106-7-201 to -204) lists certain items that
may be designated matters of state concern by counties or munic-
ipalities, and the criteria by which any matters so designated
must be administered. The following is a shorthand list of the
' "[Nior shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
I J. BANTA, F. BOSSELMAN, & D. CALES, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973).
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matters that H.B. 1041 focuses upon:
Mineral Resource Areas
Natural Hazard Areas (flood, geologic, forest fire)











Part 3 (sections 106-7-301 and -302) contains some general
statements concerning the duty of local governments to identify
and designate such matters, and the duty of various state agen-
cies to provide technical assistance. State agencies are now coor-
dinating their efforts. Providing local governments with informa-
tion on floodplains, geology, fire hazard areas, historical and ar-
chaeological sites, wildlife habitats, etc., will prove one of the
most significant features of H.B. 1041.
Part 4 (sections 106-7-401 to -407) specifies the procedures to
be followed in designating matters of state interest. Designation
involves a specific description of a particular area or activity, a
public hearing, and adoption of regulations consistent with the
applicable "criteria for administration." After designation a per-
mit must be issued by the local government before any develop-
ment can occur with respect to the matter of state interest. Only
a local government may actually designate, although the designa-
tion process may be initiated by either the Land Use Commission
or the local government itself.
Part 5 (sections 106-7-501 and -502) sets out the procedure
for the development permits that are required after an area or
activity has been designated as a "matter of state interest."
Section 2 of the bill is simply a single new statutory section,
section 106-3-9, which outlines the role of the Department of
Local Affairs in administering and distributing funds for the pro-
gram.
Section 3 enlarges the emergency power of the Land Use
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Commission, 8 by making it unnecessary to show "irreparable"
injury before the commission can act. Under its broadened emer-
gency power the commission can commence a procedure which
can lead to review by the Governor and ultimately, the issuance
of a cease and desist order, when "there is in progress or proposed
a land development activity which constitutes a danger of injury,
loss, or damage of serious and major proportions to the public
health, welfare or safety." This emergency power may be exer-
cised without regard to H.B. 1041.
Section 4 of the bill is a single new statutory section, section
106-4-5, which delineates the Land Use Commission's role in the
administration of "Areas and Activities of State Interest."
Section 5 of the bill contains the $2,375,000 appropriation.
The money comes in three parts-300,000 for the Land Use
Commission, $1,575,000 for division among the participating
counties, and $500,000 for distribution on a need basis to munici-
palities and participating counties. While distribution of the
$300,000 and the $500,000 is quite straightforward, the distribu-
tion scheme for the $1,575,000 is somewhat complex. The money
for the designation program is appropriated to the Department of
Local Affairs for distribution on an equal basis to all counties
participating in the identification and designation program;
nothing is appropriated directly to municipalities, although indi-
rect substantial assistance may be available. To be eligible to
-a couny .. L....uur u.. i require-
ments:9
(1) Section 106-3-9 requires that the county be com-
mitted to a designation program which will be part of a
long range comprehensive master plan.'0
(2) To assure "scope, detail and accuracy" of the des-
ignations and that "all information is comparable be-
tween counties," section 106-3-9 also requires that the
county designation program meet standards set by the
Department of Local Affairs in cooperation with applic-
able state agencies.
(3) Section 106-7-403(2)(b)(I) requires the Depart-
ment of Local Affairs to make a determination that
By amendment of COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-4-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1971). [Colo.
[Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 30-28-106(3) (1973)].
' See Op. Colo. Att'y Gen. (May 31, 1974). As of Oct. 1, 1974, at the encouragement
of the Department of Local Affairs, all 63 counties had requested and received $25,000 and
are in the process of developing "work plans."
Such plans are authorized by COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-2-5(3) (Supp. 1967)
[Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-23-101 to -112, §§ 31-23-201 to -210 (1973)].
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there are "development pressures" within the county.
The term "development pressures" has an extremely
broad meaning and it is believed that all counties can
make the necessary showing.
(4) Section 106-7-403(2)(b)(II) makes participation in
the $1,575,000 dependent upon the existence of a county
work program "describing the proposed use of technical
assistance and expenditure of financial assistance." It
is through this provision that the administration is en-
couraging good comprehensive planning on a statewide
coordinated basis.
H.B. 1041 means money, encouragement and direction for
counties and municipalities to deal with "matters of state inter-
est" and H.B. 1041 means a "state presence" hovering in the
background to assist and cajole local governments in their efforts
to deal with these matters. These are the very strong "plus" fea-
tures of the bill.
On the "minus side" of H.B. 1041, defects do exist and must
be reckoned with:
(1) There is an exemption clause (section 106-7-107).
The clause is so broad that one county commissioner
has recommended that a special session of the legisla-
ture be called for its repeal.
(2) The "designation" and "permit" procedures (sec-
tions 106-7-402 to -502) may prove unduly cumbersome.
(3) Although the definitions of the "matters of state
interest" and the criteria for their administration (sec-
tions 106-7-201 to -204) give clear direction for planning
and regulation by local government, from a legal point
of view, they are limited and very wobbly bases for the
adoption of regulations with bite that will hold up in
court.
Before discussing each of these problems in detail, it is necessary
to review another important bill, H.B. 1034.
B. H.B. 1034 as a Means of Curing the Defects of H.B. 1041
It is appropriate at this point to refer briefly to the piece of
land use legislation that has been termed the real "sleeper" of the
1974 session, H.B. 1034." Roughly speaking, it was the intent of
The most important section of Colo. H.B. 1034 (1974), section 106-8-104, states:
Powers of local governments. (1) Without limiting or superseding any power
of authority presently granted, each local government within its respective
jurisdiction has the authority to plan for and regulate the use of land by:
1974
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
this bill to tell local governments: "If there has been any doubt
in the past that the Legislature has given you adequate authority
to deal with modern day land use problems, we are now telling
you loud and clear that you do have ample authority." H.B. 1034,
entitled "The Local Government Land Use Control Enabling Act
of 1974," is worded very broadly-perhaps too broadly-but the
language is now law.
Local governments are authorized to adopt regulations to
protect wildlife habitats, historic and archaeological locations,
and to limit development of areas that would be hazardous for
man. Local governments which wish to develop systems to deal
with population changes are free to innovate, whether using those
techniques approved for use in the town of Ramapo 2 or those
designed to avoid the pitfalls encountered by the city of Petal-
uma.'3 Perhaps most importantly, H.B. 1034 authorizes local gov-
(a) Regulating development and activities in hazardous areas
(b) Protecting lands from activities which would cause immediate
or foreseeable material danger to significant wildlife habitat and
where an activity would endanger a wildlife specie;
(c) Preserving areas of historical and archaeological importance;
(d) Regulating, with respect to the establishment of, roads on pub-
lic lands administered by the federal government; this authority
includes authority to prohibit, set conditions, or require a permit
for the establishment of any road authorized under the general
right-of-way granted to the public by 43 U.S.C. 932 (R.S 94771 h,.t
iut inciude authority to prohibit, set conditions, or require a
permit for the establishment of any road authorized for mining
claim purposes by 30 U.S.C. 21 et seq., or under any specific per-
mit or lease granted by the federal government;
(e) Regulating the location of activities and developments which
may result in significant changes in population density;
(f) Providing for phased development of services and facilities;
(g) Regulating the use of land on the basis of the impact thereof
on the community or surrounding areas; and
(h) Otherwise planning for and regulating the use of land so as to
provide planned and orderly use of land and protection of the
environment in a manner consistent with constitutional rights.
In addition, section 106-8-105 of H.B. 1034 encourages intergovernmental cooperation
and section 106-2-20 authorizes counties to adopt temporary regulations without hearings
to deal with residential construction.
The complete text of Colo. H.B. 1034 (1974) is presented as Appendix B to this article.
2 Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
In this case, the Town of Ramapo had undertaken comprehensive planning for the location
and sequence of additional capital improvements over an 18-year period, and based on
that criteria, had adopted amendments to its zoning ordinance which conditioned subdivi-
sion during that 18-year period on the availability of specified municipal services to the
proposed subdivision plat. The court of appeals held that such phased growth was well
within the ambit of statutory authorization, and being only a temporary restriction on
development, was not an unconstitutional confiscation.
11 Construction Indus. Ass'n. v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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ernments to regulate the use of land on the basis of the impact
on the county or surrounding areas. Furthermore, there is an
"elastic clause" which invites local governments to experiment.'4
It would appear that this clause gives counties the option to ex-
tend the provisions of the 1972 subdivision act'5 to the subdivision
of large tracts into "ranchettes" or other parcels that are in excess
of 35 acres. This clause may even authorize local governments to
adopt development right transfer systems.
Much research and aggressive experimentation is needed
before the full import of this bill will be known. The new powers
in H.B. 1034, together with existing zoning powers,'" become par-
ticularly important when searching for ways to overcome the
three defects in H.B. 1041 that have been noted. Subject always
to constitutional limitations of due process, H.B. 1034 and the
zoning statutes provide a means to overcome the defects in H.B.
1041 because:
(1) H.B. 1034 and the zoning statutes have no exemp-
tions-they apply to all lands at all stages of develop-
ment.
(2) H.B. 1034 and the zoning statutes leave to local
governments the authority to devise simplified proce-
dures.
(3) H.B. 1034 and the zoning statutes provide much
more latitude to aggressive local governments than is
given in H.B. 1041 to deal effectively with "matters of
state interest."
C. The Exemptions in H.B. 1041
Section 106-7-107 contains several broad exemptions;" it
The Petaluma plan involved a limitation of housing units to a fraction of the demographic
demand, creation of an "urban extension line" to confine the growth within certain bound-
aries, use of density limitation to set a maximum population, and limitation of its water
contract to conform only to the growth which had been deemed desirable. The court did
not sustain this plan because it infringed a constitutionally protected right to travel and
there was no state interest sufficiently compelling to justify the infringement.
" Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-8-104(h) (1974).
Ch. 81, §§ 1 to 10, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 498, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 106-2-9(3), (4), 106-2-33 (3), (6) to (11) (1963), §§ 106-2-34(1), (3) to (5) (Supp. 1971)
and creating new sections intended to be designated under the 1963 statutory compilation
scheme as COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-2-4(9), (10), 106-2-9(3)(a), (4), 106-2-33(6) to
(11), 106-2-34(1), (3) to (8), 106-2-37, -38, 139-59-25 [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-28-
101(1), (2), (5), (6), (8), (10), (11), 30-28-105(9), (10), 30-28-110(3), (4), 30-28-133(1), (3)
to (5), 30-28-136, -137, 31-23-125 (1973)].
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-2-1 to -34 (1963), as amended (county planning and
zoning) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-28-101 to -136 (1973)]; id. §§ 139-59-1 to -12 (1963)
as amended and §§ 139-60-1 to -10 (1963), as amended (municipal planning and zoning)
[Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-23-,10l to -112, §§ 31-23-201 to -210 (1973)].
' Section 106-7-107 of Colo. H.B. 1041 (1974) states:
1974
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excludes from the coverage of H.B. 1041 developments in areas
of state interest and activities of state interest which meet certain
conditions. There is no objection to the exemptions for develop-
ments or activities that on the effective date of the act were
covered by current building permits or that had received approval
of the voters in the area of the proposed development.'" Nor can
there be any significant objection to the exemption of develop-
ments and activities which had received conditional or final ap-
proval from the appropriate local government on the effective
date of the act." But the exemption of every development or
activity in land "which has been zoned . . .for the use contem-
plated by such development or activity"20 creates a very severe
limitations on the use of H.B. 1041 as a land use control measure.
In all areas of the state that were zoned on May 17, 1974, the
effective date of the act, H.B. 1041 appears completely inopera-
tive as to activities and developments permitted by the zoning.
The bill can be operative in those areas only when rezoning oc-
curs.
For example, consider an area that has been zoned for resi-
dences but which lies in a flood plain or slide area. Many such
areas exist in Colorado, in both urban and mountain settings. For
Effect of article - developments in areas of state interest and activities of
state interest meeting certain conditions.
(1) This article shall not apply to any development in an area of state interest
or any activity of state interest w,,hich. moptR n,,, ff t_,,.C
tions as of the effective date of this article:
(a) The development or activity is covered by a current building
permit issued by the appropriate local government; or
(b) The development or activity has been approved by the electo-
rate; or
(c) The development or activity is to be on and: (I) Which has been
conditionally or finally approved by the appropriate local govern-
ment for planned unit development or for a use substantially the
same as planned unit development; or (I) Which has been zoned
by the appropriate local government for the use contemplated by
such development or activity; or (III) With respect to which a
development plan has been conditionally or finally approved by
the appropriate governmental authority.
Query: Is section 106-7-107(1)(b) a blanket exemption for any and all develop-
ments covered by voter approved bond issues of the Denver Water Board and the Regional
Transportation District?
11 Query: In relation to the 1972 subdivision act (ch.81 § 5, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws
498, 500, intended to be designated under the 1963 statutory compilation scheme as COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 106-2-33(7), (8) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 30-28-101 (6), (8) (1973)])
does "conditionally approved" in section 106-7-105(1)(c)(I) of H.B. 1041 (1974) refer to
approved "sketch plans" or approved "preliminary plans" under the earlier legislation?
"' Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-107(1)(c)(II) (1974).
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a city or county to designate any such area as a natural hazard
area and to adopt the protective type of regulation contemplated
by section 106-7-202(2) for such hazard areas, would be a total
waste of time. Section 106-7-107 makes residential construction
permitted by the zoning totally exempt from the protective regu-
lations developed under H.B. 1041.
However, even though regulatory powers under the bill are
inoperative in this type of situation, it is certainly proper and
desirable for a local government to use its H.B. 1041 funds to hold
hearings, identify the hazard areas, and formulate appropriate
protective regulations. The regulations may then be held in abey-
ance pending rezoning or, better yet, may be adopted under H.B.
1034. In this fashion, local governments may develop and adopt
protective requirements appropriate for hazard areas which have
already been zoned, despite the exemption clause.
There is an alternative and much narrower interpretation of
section 106-7-107(1)(c)(II) that deserves consideration. The ex-
emption may have been intended to apply only to uses which
were specifically contemplated and presented to the zoning au-
thorities at the time the zoning was obtained. This interpretation
would be consistent with other parts of the exemption section. If
it prevails, the worries over the scope of the exemption will have
been needlessly exaggerated.
D. H.B. 1041 Procedural Requirements
County commissioners and city councilmen, already bur-
dened with many responsibilities, will necessarily pause before
committing themselves to a new set of time-consuming hearings
with mountains of attendant paperwork. Nevertheless, full im-
plementation of H.B. 1041 may require just that.2' For example,
21 Sections 106-7-401 through -404 specify the procedure to be followed in making
designations. Briefly, the local government must go through the following steps in each
designation:
1. The boundaries of the area must be specified.
2. The reasons for the state interest, the dangers from uncontrolled growth
and the advantages of coordination must be specified.
3. Guidelines for administration must be developed that are consistent with
the appropriate criteria set forth in 106-7-202 and 204.
4. Newspaper notices of a hearing on a proposed designation must be pub-
lished, including publication of the proposed guidelines
5. Notice must be sent to the Land Use Commission and to others
who have requested and paid a fee to receive the notice.
6. A public hearing must be held to consider the proposed designation.
7. After the hearing, the guidelines and regulations must be adopted (a
difference between guidelines and regulations is never made clear in the bill).
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assume that a county designates a flood plain. Thereafter, a per-
mit will be required under H.B. 1041 for each development within
the flood plain. Development is defined in section 106-7-102(1) as
''any construction or activity which changes the basic character
or the use of the land on which the construction or activity oc-
curs." The fact that a permit is required for each development in
each separate part of the flood plain appears to be quite proper,
since this assures that the development will proceed in compli-
ance with the applicable regulations. What appears unnecessary,
however, is the requirement of H.B. 1041 that each application
for a permit be accompanied by newspaper publication, notice to
the Land Use Commission in Denver, and a public hearing on the
record. Local governments have no options about these proce-
dures under H.B. 1041.
However, H.B. 1034 and the ordinary zoning statutes provide
a means for local governments to adopt the appropriate protec-
tive regulation while avoiding the excessive procedural require-
ments of H.B. 1041.
E. Definitions and Criteria for Matters of State Interest
H.B. 1041 delegates to local governments the authority to
deal with each of the listed matters of state concern in accordance
8. All relevant materials pertaining to the designation must be sent to the
Land Use Commission for review.
9. The local government must then receive any proposals for modifications
in the guidelines and regulations from the Land Use Commission.
10. The local government must then either modify the proposed guidelines
and regulations consistent with the Land Use Commission recommendations
and resubmit these to the Land Use Commission or else must notify the Land
Use Commission that its recommendations have been rejected.
Once the designation has occurred the following procedures must be followed for every
development in the designated area and for every instance of a designated activity:
1. An application for a permit must be filed with the local government.
2. The local government must determine a reasonable fee sufficient to cover
the cost of processing the application.
3. The local government must publish notices of a hearing on the application.
4. The local government must send a copy of the notice to the Land Use
Commission.
5. The local government must hold a hearing on the application and either
grant or deny the permit.
6. A record of the hearing must be made and preserved.
7. The local government must state in writing the reasons for its decision and
its findings and conclusions.
8. If the permit is denied, the applying party may appeal the decision.
Under section 106-7-501(2)(b) the hearings for both designation and




with the statutory criteria. Before reviewing the separate defini-
tions and criteria, however, it is appropriate to caution that there
are instances in which some of the criteria appear inadequate to
permit local governments to deal comprehensively with the mat-
ter to which the criteria are related. Such deficiencies will have
to be cured by use of other statutory authority, such as H.B. 1034.
It has been suggested that cures are also to be found in section
106-7-402(3) of H.B. 1041 which states:
No provision in this article shall be construed as prohibiting a
local government from adopting guidelines or regulations containing
requirements which are more stringent than the requirements of the
criteria listed in sections 106-7-202 and 106-7-204.
As long as the local government's guidelines and regulations bear
some logical connection with the criteria in the bill, they may be
as stringent as the local government wishes, consistent with the
limitations of due process.2 2 However, it is difficult to see how this
language can be interpreted to authorize local governments to
adopt guidelines and regulations containing requirements that
are not based in some way on the criteria listed in sections 106-
7-202 and 106-7-204. It is not enough for a control regulation to
be relevant-it must be tied to the statutory criteria.
1. Nuclear Detonation
As a practical matter, no municipalities and only one or two
counties are likely to use their new authority under section 106-
7-203(1)(i) to regulate nuclear detonations. Nuclear shots have
required careful analysis and state permits from the Water Qual-
ity Control Commission since 1970.23 Now, after adoption of H.B.
1041, counties in which detonations are planned may either rely
on the state analysis and permit system or they may adopt regu-
latory schemes and conduct their own independent review in ac-
cordance with section 106-7-204(9):
Nuclear detonations shall be conducted so as to present no ma-
terial danger to public health and safety. Any danger to property
shall not be disproportionate to the benefits to be derived from a
detonation.
This language does not appear to give local governments any
arbitrary authority to veto proposed shots; local control must be
justified on the basis of the statutory criteria.
2 See Kelly v. City of Fort Collins, 163 Colo. 520, 431 P.2d 785 (1967).
Ch. 210 § 1 [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 709, 725, repealing and reenacting CoLO. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 66-28-9 (Supp. 1971), intended to be designated under the 1963 statutory
compilation scheme as CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-28-505 [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-
8-505 (1973)].
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2. Efficient Utilization of Municipal and Industrial Water
Projects
It is difficult to determine what is meant by "[e]fficient
utilization of municipal and industrial water projects."24 The con-
cept is not defined in the bill. The accompanying criteria for
administration consist of two sentences:
Municipal and industrial water projects shall emphasize the
most efficient use of water, including, to the extent permissible
under existing law, the recycling and reuse of water. Urban develop-
ment, population densities, and site layout and design of storm
water and sanitation systems shall be accomplished in a manner
that will prevent the pollution of aquifer recharge areas. "1
The legislator at whose instance this activity was included as a
matter of state concern was particularly concerned about the effi-
cient use of return flows of irrigation water. As H.B. 1041 prog-
ressed through the legislative processes, he unsuccessfully recom-
mended deletion of this particular activity, and he does not now
expect this portion of H.B. 1041 to be used. A legislative commit-
tee is now reviewing agricultural water management practices
and laws .
2
It is hard to believe that counties will tell municipalities how
they must develop their water supplies or that any local govern-
ment will inject itself into the operation of water and sanitation
districts that have already been approved. Proposed new districts
may readily be controlled under the Special District Contrn|
Act. "7 Whether local governments may constitutionally regulate
private water projects raises severe constitutional questions. Also,
Denver Water Board projects authorized in the 1973 bond elec-
tion may be exempt under section 106-7-107(1)(b). 8
3. Site Selection and Development of New Communities
"New communities" is a term defined by section 106-7-104
(13) to mean "the major revitalization of existing municipalities
or the establishment of urbanized growth centers in unincorpor-
ated areas." Site selection and development of new communites
are made activities of state interest by section 106-7-203(1)(g). No
2 Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-203(1)(h) (1974).
" Id. § 106-7-204(8).
Assigned to the Committee on Water, chaired by Senator Fred Anderson, the
committee's study is scheduled to be completed before the 1975 session of the legislature.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 89-18-1 to -10 (Supp.1965) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
32-1-201 to -209 (1973)].
1 See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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criteria are included with respect to "site selection," but "devel-
opment" is governed by the following:
When applicable, or as may otherwise be provided by law, a
new community design shall, at a minimum, provide for transporta-
tion, waste disposal, schools, and other governmental services in a
manner that will not overload facilities of existing communities of
the region. Priority shall be given to the development of total com-
munities which provide for commercial and industrial activity, as
well as residences, and for internal transportation and circulation
patterns.2
Since the establishment of new communities is probably the
most pressing growth problem in Colorado, both in the mountain
areas and in the sprawl of the Front Range, the usefulness of this
portion of H.B. 1041 deserves far more analysis than can be given
in this one article. The questions are many:
(1) May a county adopt guidelines and regulations for
new community sites which in effect "downzone" an
area or prevent new communities?
(2) At what point does a rural subdivision constitute
an urban growth center? If new community require-
ments are not imposed on a subdivision before it be-
comes a new community, how can such requirements be
imposed afterwards?
(3) If two or three new subdivisions are proposed that
will abut one another, will each separately be subject to
the statutory "new community" requirements or will
the combination be the "new community"? If the latter,
how are the separate subdividers to be brought into
agreement upon the total community requirement?
(4) With no criteria included in the bill with respect
to "site selection," how should a county decide where
new communities are or are not to be located and how
many new communities should be authorized-or
should a county even attempt to make such decisions?
These are extremely difficult questions and H.B. 1041 should
not be belittled for its failure to include the answers. The general
assembly recognized the shortcomings in this area and directed
its interim committee on local government to study the problems
of new communities. 0 Furthermore, the failure of H.B. 1041 to
answer these questions does not mean that local governments
Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-204(7) (1974).
Colo. H.J. Res. 1041 (1974).
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must neglect the problems of new communities. Quite the con-
trary-the bill clearly recognizes the importance of siting and
development of new communities as problems of state import-
ance. Local governments which have the confidence and inclina-
tion to control new communities are certainly free to receive
money under H.B. 1041, to develop their comprehensive plans,
and to formulate appropriate regulations. They may then adopt
those regulations under either H.B. 1034 or the zoning statutes.
Municipal incorporation, a device sometimes used by developers
to avoid regulation, is now subject to county control by virtue of
another recent legislative enactment."1
4. Site Selection and Construction of Major Facilities of a
Public Utility
Major facilities of a public utility are defined by section 106-
7-104(8) to include central office buildings of telephone utilities;
transmission lines, power plants and substations of electrical util-
ities; and pipelines and storage areas of utilities providing natural
gas or other petroleum derivatives. Section 106-7-203(1)(f) lists
"site selection and construction of major facilities of a public
utility" as an activity of state concern but no criteria are included
in the bill with respect to "construction." The criteria for site
selection are:
Where feasible, major facilities of public utilities shall be lo-
cated so as to avoid direct conflict with adopted local government.
.:,lai, nid sidae master pians.4'
Our statutes do not provide for any state master plan. Re-
gional planning commissions exist, but only one of Colorado's 13
planning regions has adopted a regional master plan. A few coun-
ties have adopted master plans but most have not. It would ap-
pear, therefore, that this particular feature of H.B. 1041 will re-
ceive very little use. Some attorneys, in fact, believe that the
exemption for public utilities contained in section 106-7-105 is so
broad as to completely remove public utilities from any effective
coverage by the act.
5. Site Selection of Arterial Highways and Interchanges
and Collector Highways
Arterial and collector highways are defined in sections 106-
7-104(3) and (4). The definitions include the interstate system,
3' Colo. H.B. 1179 (1974).
Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-204(6) (1974) (emphasis added).
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and highways and thoroughfares constructed under the supervi-
sion of the State Department of Highways. Selection of sites and
interchanges for these highways are made activities of state inter-
est under section 106-7-203(1)(e). Section 106-7-204(5) requires
these highways and interchanges to be located so that:
Community traffic needs are met; .. .[diesirable community pat-
terns are not disrupted; and . . . [d]irect conflicts with adopted
local government, regional, and state master plans are avoided.
Hopefully, a new spirit of cooperation concerning transporta-
tion planning is evolving between local governments and the state
and federal governments. The "Action Plan ' 33 developed by the
highway department and approved earlier this year by both
Governor Vanderhoof and the federal government requires re-
gional transportation planning that blends with land use plan-
ning, and public hearings are now routine matters in the planning
of highways and interchanges. It remains to be seen whether the
new spirit of openness in highway planning will prove effective.
If not, H.B. 1041 gives local governments a means to put a road-
block in front of the bulldozers.
6. Site Selection of Rapid or Mass Transit Terminals, Sta-
tions, and Fixed Guideways
While rapid transit and mass transit systems are separately
defined in sections 106-7-104(9) and (14), both are treated identi-
cally in H.B. 1041. The only system contemplated in Colorado
that fits either definition is the Personal Rapid Transit proposal
of the Regional Transportation District in the Denver metropoli-
tan area. Section 106-7-203(1)(d) makes the selection of sites for
"rapid or mass transit terminals, stations, and fixed guideways"
activities of state interest. The criteria for selection of these sites
appear in section 106-7-204(4). Since the federal involvement in
the RTD requires the holding of extensive public hearings for
selection of sites for corridors and facilities related to the PRT,
local governments may choose not to avail themselves of the au-
thority given them under this portion of the new law. Also, this
particular transit system may be exempt from coverage under
H.B. 1041 because of interaction between section 106-7-107(1)(b)
and the RTD bond issue approved by voters in 1973. 31
" Prepared by the Colorado Division of Highways pursuant to Federal Highway Act
of 1970, 23 U.S.C. §§ 109(h), 136(b) (1970) and FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, Process
Guidelines in ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY AND PROCEDURE MEMORANDUM 90-4 (1974).
1 See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
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7. Site Selection of Airports
"Airport" is defined in section 106-7-104(1) to mean "any
municipal or county airport or airport under the jurisdiction of an
airport authority." Airport site selection is an activity of state
interest under section 106-7-203(1) and the applicable criteria
are:
Airports shall be located or expanded in a manner which will
minimize disruption to the environment of existing communities,
will minimize the impact on existing community services, and will
complement the economic and transportation needs of the state and
the area.
35
Obviously, much sophisticated planning must go into the loca-
tion and expansion of airports and it is quite appropriate for the
legislature to draw attention to the fact that airport locations and
expansions are matters of great importance. Whether a local gov-
ernment will want to take the final step of designation is another
matter, however. What county will want to require a permit of
itself before it extends its own county airport runway? On the
other hand, does H.B. 1041 give Adams County any control over
expansion of Denver's airport?
8. Site Selection and Development of Solid Waste Disposal
Sites
"Site selection and development of solid waste disposalsites" are mnrlp. e.iitia nf ta, +-, . L... --__M_.......... by seoi, IOG-7-
203(1)(b). The criteria are:
Major solid waste disposal sites shall be developed in accord-
ance with sound conservation practices and shall emphasize, where
feasible, the recycling of waste materials. Consideration shall be
given to longevity and subsequent use of waste disposal sites, soil
and wind conditions, the potential problems of pollution inherent in
the proposed site, and the impact on adjacent property owners,
compared with alternate locations.3'
Since the current solid waste disposal act37 goes into consid-
erably greater detail on the siting, development, and operation of
disposal sites than is required by the H.B. 1041 criteria, only time
will tell whether this section of the law will receive much use.
9. Water and Sewage Treatment Systems
Listed among the activities of state interest is "[s]ite selec-
Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-204(3) (1974).
Id. § 106-7-204(2).
3 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-23-1 to -17 (Supp. 1967), as amended [Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 30-20-101 to -115 (1973)].
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tion and construction of major new domestic water and sewage
treatment systems and major extension of existing domestic
water and sewage treatment systems. '3 "Domestic water and
sewage treatment systems" are defined in section 106-7-104(5) by
a cross reference to definitions contained in 1973 legislation which
provides for the certification of water and wastewater treatment
plant operators.39 The net effect of combining the definition in
H.B. 1041 with the definition in the 1973 certification law results
in the following:
[Domestic water system] means the system of pipes, struc-
tures, and facilities through which a water supply is obtained,
treated, and sold or distributed for human consumption or house-
hold use . .. [and also] . . . the facility or facilities within the
water supply system which can alter the physical, chemical, or bac-
teriological quality of the water" [and]
[Domestic sewage treatment system] means the facility or
group of units used for the treatment of wastewater from sewer
systems and for the reduction and handling of solids and gasses
removed from such wastes"' [and] any system of pipes, structures,
and facilities through which wastewater is collected for treatment.
4 2
It should be noted that the criteria for site selection and construc-
tion of water and sewage treatment systems are considerably
more specific than any of the criteria that have previously been
reviewed, particularly regarding the financial and environmental
capacity of an area to sustain growth:
Major extensions of domestic water and sewage treatment systems
shall be permitted in those areas in which the anticipated growth
and development that may occur as a result of such extension can
be accommodated within the financial and environmental capacity
of the area to sustain such growth and development.a
Because water and sewage systems are so essential in every
growth situation, this portion of H.B. 1041 may prove as impor-
tant as any. Local governments are given authority to control
extensions into a new area on the basis of the financial and envi-
ronmental capacity of the area to sustain growth. The limited
Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-203(1)(a) (1974).
3 Ch. 214, § 1, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 747, creating new sections intended to be
designated under the 1963 statutory compilation scheme as COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-
38-1 to -10 [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-9-101 to -110 (1973)].
0 Id. at 748, designated under the 1963 statutory compilation scheme as CoLO. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 66-38-2(7), (8) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-9-102(6), (7) (1973)].
'1 Id., designated under the 1963 statutory compilation as CoLo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. §
66-38-2-(6) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-9-102(5) (1973).].
42 Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-104(5) (1974).
-3 Id. § 106-7-204(1)(b).
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ability of air and water to absorb wastes may thus limit the
growth of popular Colorado mountain resort areas.
Since 1965 the Special District Control Law has given local
governments authority to control new water and sanitation dis-
tricts on the basis of certain statutory criteria which do not in-
clude environmental considerations.44 H.B. 1041 supplies an addi-
tional factor which may be considered in deciding whether or not
a new or expanded district should be permitted. However, much
of the area in which growth is likely to occur is already included
in water and sanitation districts. Legal questions will certainly
arise if governmental agencies now attempt to block these dis-
tricts from extending services within district boundaries already
approved, particularly if bonded indebtedness is involved.
In 1973, the Water Quality Control Commission was charged
with supervision of site location, construction, and expansion of
sewage treatment systems." What is new in 1974 is the possibility
that this commission will exercise that authority in conformity
with the criteria of H.B. 1041 and consequently that much greater
attention will be given to limiting factors of the environment than
in the past.
10. Areas Around Key Facilities
While the term "key facilities" has little meaning to the
ordinary reader, its use in H.B. 1041 was prompted by legislation
nndina in ...f nn... 4 .....-. r. i5 -diu I i i section i06-7-1U4(7)
to mean four types of facilities: airports, major facilities of a
public utility, interchanges involving arterial highways, and
rapid or mass transit terminals, stations, and fixed guideways. 4
The "area around a key facility" is defined in section 106-7-104(2)
to mean "an area immediately and directly affected by a key
facility." Section 106-7-202(4) contains criteria applicable to key
facility areas of all types. Briefly, these criteria state that such
areas shall be administered in a manner which will minimize
danger from the facility and discourage traffic congestion, incom-
patible uses, and unreasonable expansion of the demand for gov-
41 [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 89-18-7 (Supp. 1965) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32-1-205
(1973)].
0 Ch. 210, § 1, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 709, repealing COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-
28-1 to -27 (Supp. 1965) as amended and amending and reenacting it with the intended
designation under the 1963 statutory compilation scheme as COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-
28-101 to -704 [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 25-8-101 to -704 (1973)].
0 S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
," See definitions of these terms in Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-104(1), (3), (8) (1974).
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ernment services. Section 106-7-202(5) lists additional criteria
designed for each different type of facility.
It will suffice to say about these additional criteria for each
distinct type of key facility that they focus on the routine features
of good planning, considerations of safety, minimization of
congestion, and preservation of desirable existing community
patterns. It does not appear that H.B. 1041 confers any authority
to deal with the problems of these areas which does not already
exist in Colorado's planning and zoning statutes. What is new,
however, is the expression of state concern. Hopefully, this will
prompt local governments to pay closer attention to the problems
of these areas.
11. Areas Containing, or Having Significant Impact Upon,
Historical, Natural, or Archaeological Resources of Statewide
Importance
Among the areas that may be designated as areas of state
interest are "[aireas containing, or having significant impact
upon, historical, natural, or archaeological resources of statewide
importance. 48 The language "having significant impact upon" is
important, since it means that these resources may be protected
by appropriately outlining and regulating buffer zones. The out-
lines of these buffer areas are to be determined by the "state
historical society, the department of natural resources, and the
appropriate local government."4 The act is silent on resolution of
disagreements that may occur between the state agencies and
local governments over the proper outlines of these areas.
"Natural resources of statewide importance" is a term lim-
ited by definition to
shorelands of major publicly-owned reservoirs and significant wild-
life habitats in which the wildlife species, as identified by the divi-
sion of wildlife of the department of natural resources, in a proposed
area could be endangered."
Historical and archaeological resources are those which have been
"included in the national register of historic places, designated by
statute, or included in an established list of places compiled by
the state historical society."'" The criteria for these resource areas
require that they be administered
Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-201(1)(c) (1974).
" Id. § 106-7-202(3).
- Id. § 106-7-104(12).
" Id. § 106-7-104(6).
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in a manner that will allow man to function in harmony with, rather
than be destructive to, these resources. Consideration is to be given
to the protection of those areas essential for wildlife habitat. Devel-
opments in areas containing historical, archaeological, or natural
resources shall be conducted in a manner which will minimize dam-
age to those resources for future use.2
By far the most important element in this portion of H.B.
1041 is the authority to deal with areas having significant impact
upon wildlife. The big game herds currently under the greatest
adverse pressure from man's activities are located in La Plata,
Eagle and Routt counties, and, conceivably, protection of their
habitats will close large portions of those counties to rampant
mountain development. In this connection, it should be noted
that H.B. 1034 also authorizes local governments to protect lands
"from activities which would cause immediate or foreseeable
material danger to significant wildlife habitat and where an ac-
tivity would endanger a wildlife specie.
'53
Historical and archaeological sites already receive substan-
tial protection under state and federal statutes. 4 While many of
these have already been located, significant further work is
needed, particularly in the archaeological area.
12. Natural Hazard Areas
One of the strongest motivating forces behind the enactment
of H.B. 1041 was the need to identify and regulate geologic haz-
ards, such as unstable slopes and avalanches, and areas suscepti-
ble to floods and wildfires. It is not surprising, then, that the bill
takes on an entirely new complexion in the portions that deal
with these natural hazards. Technical terms and concepts are
elaborately defined in section 106-7-103, and the criteria for
administration are spelled out in great detail in section 106-7-
202(2). Furthermore, the Colorado Water Conservation Board,
the Colorado State Forest Service, and the Colorado Geological
Survey are directed to promulgate model control regulations for
these types of hazard areas no later than September 30, 1974.
These same agencies, with assistance from the Colorado Soil Con-
servation Board, will also be engaged in the massive chore of
locating these hazard areas.
52 Id. § 106-7-202(3).
5 Colo. H.B. 1034, § 106-8-104(1)(b) (1974).
'4 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 131-12-1 to -6 (Supp. 1967) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§
24-80-401 to -406 (1973)1; 42 U.S.C.A. § 470a (West Supp. 1974).
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Since the natural hazard definitions and criteria are so well
developed, these portions of the bill will probably not be a source
of legal problems. Nevertheless, the use of these portions of H.B.
1041 will command the attention of lawyers on many occasions:
(1) A new federal law providing for a national program
of flood insurance5 puts local governments under pres-
sure to identify floodplains and adopt protective codes
and regulations before the end of 1974. If appropriate
building restrictions are not adopted, then federal flood
insurance is not available. As a consequence, many Col-
orado communities are identifying floodplains and
adopting protective regulations without reference to
H.B. 1041. Having once done so, what is to be gained
by repeating the process? Will any of the procedures
used in connection with the federal law satisfy the re-
quirements of H.B. 1041?
(2) Permits are a desirable regulatory device for haz-
ard areas, but the H.B. 1041 procedures involved during
and after the designation of a hazard area may appear
overly complex. Can a local government require a per-
mit but avoid the separate newspaper publication, pub-
lic hearing with record, and notice to the Land Use
Commission that is required in connection with every
permit issued under H.B. 1041 procedures? If a local
government does not resort to H.B. 1034, as suggested
earlier, 5 the local government may wish to formulate
hazard area regulations which divide construction ac-
tivities into three classes: first, "development" for
which a permit is required under H.B. 1041, which in-
cludes a public hearing for which notice must be given
to the Land Use Commission and published in a news-
paper, and also means that a record of the hearing must
be preserved;5 7 second, construction for which a permit
is required from the local government but which is not
a "development" within the meaning of H.B. 1041;11
and third, minor construction for which no permit is
required.
(3) The best solution to development problems in a
42 U.S.C.A. § 4001 to 4128 (West Supp. 1974).
"' See Part B supra.
Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-501 (1974).
As defined by Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-102(1) (1974).
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hazard area is often found through the flexibility of a
"planned unit development." (PUD). But Colorado's
statute which authorizes PUD's flatly prohibits local
governments from limiting developments to this de-
vice. 9 Under the broad authority of H.B. 1041, however,
it may be that hazard area regulations can be drawn
that will require the developers to incorporate in their
projects the desired features of a PUD.
13. Mineral Resource Areas
Next to natural hazard areas, mineral resource areas received
the greatest attention in the drafting process. "Mineral" and
"mineral resource area" are defined in sections 106-7-104(10) and
(11) and criteria for administration are set forth in section 106-7-
202(1). The definitions' effect is to make vast portions of Colo-
rado subject to being "designated," not only in the mountain
areas but in certain front range counties as well. The criteria for
administration clearly encourage development. Section 106-7-
202(1)(a) provides, in pertinent part:
Mineral resource areas designated as areas of state interest shall
be protected and administered in such a manner as to permit the
extraction and exploration of minerals therefrom, unless extraction
and exploration would cause significant danger to public health and
safety.
At the same time, the need for environmental control is recog-
nized:
The extraction and exploration of minerals from any area shall
be accomplished in a manner which causes the least practicable
environmental disturbance, and surface areas disturbed thereby
shall be reclaimed ....
H.B. 1041 does not appear to contain any authority for the adop-
tion of regulations on the basis of aesthetics which would block
mining operations entirely.
Many options are open to local governments which wish to
control mining activities, ranging from zoning, which may prove
clumsy and ineffective," to the adoption of a master plan for
extraction, as authorized in 1973.12 In addition, state regulations
31 Ch. 82, § 1 [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 508, 513, in a new section intended to be
designated under the 1963 statutory compilation scheme as COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 106-
6-7(5) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-67-107(5) (1973)].
10 Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-202(1)(c) (1974).
" See Sherwood, Zoning Against Mining, 2 COLO. LAW. 27 (July 1973).
.2 Ch. 298, § 1, [19731 Colo. Sess. Laws 1049, creating new sections intended to be
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may be applicable under the Colorado Open Mining Land Recla-
mation Act of 1973,63 which was also adopted as part of the same
bill." How or whether a local government will choose to use H.B.
1041 will vary according to the nature of the mineral, the degree
of development that is imminent or that already has occurred, the
existence of regulations authorized under other statutes, and the
type of control desired. An in-depth analysis of the options now
available in Colorado for control of mining operations would be
extremely helpful to local governments.
F. Use of H.B. 1041 by Local Governments and the Land Use
Commission
Nothing in H.B. 1041 directly requires local governments to
identify or designate anything, and when the practical problems
of participating in the program are examined, many may balk.
This would be unfortunate, both for themselves and for the peo-
ple of Colorado. As was noted by the Executive Director of the
Department of Local Affairs:
Certain counties will want to proceed as rapidly as possible to
complete the designation of the most critical matters of state inter-
est. Many other counties, however, will want to place their initial
emphasis on comprehensive planning, identification and formula-
tion of guidelines. The act contemplates completion of the program
by June 30, 1976. The work plan for the current year need not in-
clude a commitment to complete the designations during the first
year."
In short, local governments can accomplish much with H.B. 1041
by requesting state funds and putting them to work in a thought-
ful, orderly fashion: first, identifying the most critical matters;
next, planning for each of them as part of their comprehensive
plans; and finally, formulating the appropriate regulations.
Whether regulations are finally adopted under the designation
procedure of H.B. 1041 or, for convenience, under H.B. 1034 or
other authority may be of importance to lawyers, but it is of no
consequence to the public. What the people of Colorado have
asked for, through the votes of their elected representatives, is
that local governments proceed rapidly with land use planning
designated under the 1963 statutory compilation scheme as CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92-
36-1 to -5 [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-1-301 to -305 (1973)].
Ch. 298, §§ 2 to 15, [1973] Colo. Sess. Laws 1049, amending COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 92-13-1 to -18 (Supp. 1969) [Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 34-32-101 to -118 (1973)].
, Colo. H.B. 1529 (1973).
Letter from J.D. Archart to Colorado County Commissioners, June 19, 1974.
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and adopt effective controls for the matters of state interest desig-
nated by H.B. 1041.
Knowing that certain matters of state interest deserve imme-
diate attention and fearing that some local governments would
fail to use their H.B. 1041 powers appropriately, the legislature
gave the Colorado Land Use Commission authority to force local
governments to make designations.6 Many persons wonder how
this power will be used and with what effectiveness. The answer
is a political one, not a legal one.
By far the most important aspect of both the commission's
power to initiate the designation process, and its emergency
power under the Land Use Act,"1 is the psychological consequence
of the State government's becoming involved in a handful of local
problems. The experiences of the Land Use Commission since its
creation in 1970 indicate that local governments will welcome this
"state presence" as often as they resent it. In either event, the
"state presence" carries with it a glare of publicity that generally
assures effective protection of the public interest-usually on a
voluntary, practical basis. Therefore, the effectiveness of the
Land Use Commission will not be limited by technical problems
that might arise in carrying H.B. 1041 to its statutory conclusion
of designation and adoption of permit procedures.
CONCLUSION
H.B. 1041 moves Colorado into an arena of land use control
legislation that has been entered by only two or three other
states-the giving to a state agency statewide power to influence
land use decisions of local governments. It is hardly surprising
that this bitterly-fought bill contains many technical problems
from a lawyer's point of view; these, however, can be corrected.
The importance of the bill lies in its moving Colorado forward in
land use controls on three fronts: significant encouragement and
direct financial assistance to local governments to deal with mat-
ters of state interest; substantially increased authority for the
Land Use Commission to make its presence and state attitudes a
factor in the handling of land use problems by local governments;
and the mustering of state agencies to make their technical infor-
mation and expertise readily available to local governments.
These are three very sound, very worthwhile, and very forward
moving steps.
" Colo. H.B. 1041, § 106-7-407 (1974).





House BiLL No. 1041
SECTION 1. Chapter 106, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, as amended, is
amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW ARTICLE to read:
ARTICLE 7
Areas and Activities of State Interest
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
106-7-101. Legislative declaration. (1) In addition to the legislative declaration con-
tained in section 106-4-1 (1), the general assembly further finds and declares that:
(a) The protection of the utility, value, and future of all lands within the state,
including the public domain as well as privately owned land, is a matter of the public
interest;
(b) Adequate information on land use and systematic methods of definition, classifi-
cation, and utilization thereof are either lacking or not readily available to land use
decision makers;
(c) It is the intent of the general assembly that land use, land use planning, and
quality of development are matters in which the state has responsibility for the health,
welfare, and safety of the people of the state and for the protection of the environment of
the state.
(2) It is the purpose of this article that:
(a) The general assembly shall describe areas which may be of state interest and
activities which may be of state interest and establish criteria for the administration of
such areas and activities;
(b) Local governments shall be encouraged to designate areas and activities of state
interest and, after such designation, shall administer such areas and activities of state
interest and promulgate guidelines for the administration thereof; and
(c) Appropriate state agencies shall assist local governments to identify, designate,
and adopt guidelines for administration of matters of state interest.
106-7-102. General definitions. As used in this article, unless the context otherwise
requires:
(1) "Development" means any construction or activity which changes the basic
character or the use of the land on which the construction or activity occurs.
(2) "Local government" means a municipality or county.
(3) "Local permit authority" means the governing body of the local government
with which an application for development in an area of state interest or for conduct of
an activity of state interest must be filed or the designee thereof.
(4) "Matter of state interest" means an area of state interest or an activity of state
interest or both.
(5) "Municipality" means a home rule or statutory city, town, or city and county
or a territorial charter city.
(6) "Person" means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, company,
or other public or corporate body, including the federal government, and includes any
political subdivision, agency, instrumentality, or corporation of the state.
106-7-103. Definitions pertaining to natural hazards. As used in this article, unless
the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Aspect" means the cardinal direction the land surface faces, characterized by
north-facing slopes generally having heavier vegetation cover.
(2) "Avalanche" means a mass of snow or ice and other material which may become
incorporated therein as such mass moves rapidly down a mountain slope.
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(3) "Corrosive soil" means soil which contains soluble salts which may produce
serious detrimental effects in concrete, metal, or other substances that are in contact with
such soil.
(4) "Debris-fan floodplain" means a floodplain which is located at the mouth of a
mountain valley tributary stream as such stream enters the valley floor.
(5) "Dry wash channel and dry wash floodplain" means a small watershed with a
very high percentage of runoff after torrential rainfall.
(6) "Expansive soil and rock" means soil and rock which contains clay and which
expands to a significant degree upon wetting and shrinks upon drying.
(7) "Floodplain" means an area adjacent to a stream, which area is subject to
flooding as the result of the occurrence of an intermediate regional flood and which area
thus is so adverse to past, current, or foreseeable construction or land use as to constitute
a significant hazard to public health and safety or to property. The term includes but is
not limited to:
(a) Mainstream floodplains;
(b) Debris-fan floodplains; and
(c) Dry wash channels and dry wash floodplains.
(8) "Geologic hazard" means a geologic phenomenon which is so adverse to past,
current, or foreseeable construction or land use as to constitute a significant hazard to
public health and safety or to property. The term includes but is not limited to:





(9) "Geologic hazard area" means an area which contains or is directly affected by
a geologic hazard.
(10) "Ground subsidence" means a process characterized by the downward dis-
placement of surface material caused by natural phenomena such as removal of under-
ground fluids, natural consolidation, or dissolution of underground minerals or by man-
made phenomena such as underground mining.
(11) "Mainstream floodplain" means an area adjacent to a perennial stream that
is subject to periodic flooding.
(12) "Mudflow" means the downward movement of mud in a mountain watershed
because of peculiar characteristics of extremely high sediment yield and occasional high
runoff.
(13) "Natural hazard" means a geologic hazard, a wildfire hazard, or a flood.
(14) "Natural hazard area" means an area containing or directly affected by a
natural hazard.
(15) "Radioactivity" means a condition related to various types of radiation emitted
by natural radioactive minerals that occur in natural deposits of rock, soil, and water.
(16) "Seismic effects" means direct and indirect effects caused by an earthquake
or an underground nuclear detonation.
(17) "Siltation" means a process which results in an excessive rate of removal of soil
and rock materials from one location and rapid deposit thereof in adjacent areas.
(18) "Slope" means the gradient of the ground surface which is definable by degree
or percent.
(19) "Unstable or potentially unstable slope" means an area susceptible to a land-
slide, a mudflow, a rock fall, or accelerated creep of slope-forming materials.
(20) "Wildfire behavior" means the predictable action of a wildfire under given
conditions of slope, aspect, and weather.
(21) "Wildfire hazard" means a wildfire phenomenon which is so adverse to past,
current, or foreseeable construction or land use as to constitute a significant hazard to
public health and safety or to property. The term includes but is not limited to:
(a) Slope and aspect;
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(b) Wildfire behavior characteristics; and
(c) Existing vegetation types.
(22) "Wildfire hazard area" means an area containing or directly affected by a
wildfire hazard.
106-7-104. Definitions pertaining to other areas and activities of state interest. As
used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Airport" means any municipal or county airport or airport under the jurisdic-
tion of an airport authority.
(2) "Area around a key facility" means an area immediately and directly affected
by a key facility.
(3) "Arterial highway" means any limited-access highway which is part of the
federal-aid interstate system or any limited-access highway constructed under the super-
vision of the state department of highways.
(4) "Collector highway" means a major thoroughfare serving as a corridor or link
between municipalities, unincorporated population centers or recreation areas, or in-
dustrial centers and constructed under guidelines and standards established by, or under
the supervision of, the state department of highways. Collector highway does not include
a city street or local service road or a county road designed for local service and con-
structed under the supervision or local government.
(5) "Domestic water and sewage treatment system" means a wastewater treatment
plant, water treatment plant, or water supply system, as defined in section 66-38-2 (6),
(7), and (8), C.R.S. 1963, and any system of pipes, structures, and facilities through which
wastewater is collected for treatment.
(6) "Historical or archaeological resources of statewide importance" means re-
sources which have been officially included in the national register of historic places,
designated by statute, or included in an established list of places compiled by the state
historical society.
(7) "Key facilities" means:
(a) Airports;
(b) Major facilities of a public utility;
(c) Interchanges involving arterial highways;
(d) Rapid or mass transit terminals, stations, and fixed guideways.
(8) "Major facilities of a public utility" means:
(a) Central office buildings of telephone utilities;
(b) Transmission lines, power plants, and substations of electrical utilities; and
(c) Pipelines and storage areas of utilities providing natural gas or other petroleum
derivatives.
(9) "Mass transit" means a coordinated system of transit modes providing transpor-
tation for use by the general public.
(10) "Mineral" means an inanimate constituent of the earth, in either solid, liquid,
or gaseous state which, when extracted from the earth, is usable in its natural form or is
capable of conversion into usable form as a metal, a metallic compound, a chemical, an
energy source, a raw material for manufacturing, or construction material. This definition
does not include surface or ground water subject to appropriation for domestic, agricul-
tural, or industrial purposes, nor does it include goethermal resources.
(11) "Mineral resource area" means an area in which minerals are located in suffi-
cient concentration in veins, deposits, bodies, beds, seams, fields, pools, or otherwise, as
to be capable of economic recovery. The term includes but is not limited to any area in
which there has been significant mining activity in the past, there is significant mining
activity in the present, mining development is planned or in progress, or mineral rights
are held by mineral patent or valid mining claims with the intention of mining.
(12) "Natural resources of statewide importance" is limited to shorelands of major
publicly-owned reservoirs and significant wildlife habitats in which the wildlife species,
as identified by the division of wildlife of the department of natural resources, in a
proposed area could be endangered.
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(13) "New communities" means the major revitalization of existing municipalities
or the establishment of urbanized growth centers in unincorporated areas.
(14) "Rapid transit" means the element of a mass transit system involving a me-
chanical conveyance on an exclusive lane or guideway constructed solely for that purpose.
106-7-105. Effect of article - public utilities. (1) With regard to public utilities, noth-
ing in this article shall be construed as enhancing or diminishing the power and authority
of municipalities, counties, or the public utilities commission. Any order, rule, or directive
issued by any governmental agency pursuant to this article shall not be inconsistent with
or in contravention of any decision, order, or finding of the public utilities commission
with respect to public convenience and necessity. The public utilities commission and
public utilities shall take into consideration and, when feasible, foster compliance with
adopted land use master plans of local governments, regions, and the state.
(2) Nothing in this article shall be construed as enhancing or diminishing the rights
and procedures with respect to the power of a public utility to acquire property and rights-
of-way by eminent domain to serve public need in the most economical and expedient
manner.
106-7-106. Effect of article - rights of property owners - water rights. (1) Nothing in
this article shall be construed as:
(a) Enhancing or diminishing the rights of owners of property as provided by the
state constitution or the constitution of the United States;
(b) Modifying or amending existing laws or court decrees with respect to the deter-
mination and administration of water rights.
106-7-107. Effect of article - developments in areas of state interest and activities of
state interest meeting certain conditions. (1) This article shall not apply to any develop-
ment in an area of state interest or any activity of state interest which meets any one of
the following conditions as of the effective date of this article:
(a) The development or activity is covered by a current building permit issued by
the appropriate local government; or
(b) The development or activity has been approved by the electorate; or
(c) The development or activity is to be on land:
(I) Which has been conditionally or finally approved by the appropriate local gov-
ernment for planned unit development or for a use substantially the same as planned unit
development; or
(II) Which has been zoned by the appropriate local government for the use contem-
plated by such development or activity; or
(III) With respect to which a development plan has been conditionally or finally
approved by the appropriate governmental authority.
106-7-108. Effect of article - state agency or commission responses. (1) Whenever any
person desiring to carry out development as defined in section 106-7-102 (1) is required to
obtain a permit, to be issued by any state agency or commission for the purpose of
authorizing or allowing such development, pursuant to this or any other statute or regula-
tion promulgated thereunder, such agency shall establish a reasonable time period, which
shall not exceed sixty days following receipt of such permit application, within which such
agency must respond in writing to the applicant, granting or denying said permit or
specifying all reasonable additional information necessary for the agency or commission
to respond. If additional information is required, said agency or commission shall set a
reasonable time period for response following the receipt of such information.
(2) Whenever a state agency or commission denies a permit, the denial must specify:
(a) The regulations, guidelines, and criteria or standards used in evaluating the
application;
(b) The reasons for denial and the regulations, guidelines, and criteria or standards
the application fails to satisfy; and
(c) The action that the applicant would have to take to satisfy the state agency's or
commission's permit requirements.
(3) Whenever an application for a permit as provided under this section contains a
statement describing the proposed nature, uses, and activities in conceptual terms for the
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development intended to be accomplished and is not accompanied with all additional
information, including, without limitation, engineering studies, detailed plans and specifi-
cations, zoning approval, or where a hearing is required by the statutes, regulations, rules,
ordinances, or resolutions thereof prior to the issuance of the requested permit, the agency
or commission shall, within the time provided in this section for response, indicate its
acceptance or denial of the permit on the basis of the concept expressed in the statement
of the proposed uses and activities contained in the application. Such conceptual approval
shall be made subject to the applicant filing and completing all prerequisite detailed
additional information in accordance with the usual filing requirements of the agency or
commission within a reasonable period of time.
(4) All agencies or commissions authorized or required to issue permits for develop-
ment shall adopt rules and regulations, or amend existing rules and regulations, so as to
require that such agency or commission respond in the time and manner required in this
section.
(5) Nothing in this section shall shorten the time allowed for responses provided by
federal statute dealing with, or having a bearing on, the subject of any such application
for permit.
(6) The provisions of this section shall not apply to applications approved, denied,
or processed by a unit of local government.
PART 2
AREAS AND ACTIVITIES DESCRIBED -
CRITERIA FOR ADMINISTRATION
106-7-201. Areas of state interest - as determined by local governments. (1) Subject
to the procedures set forth in part 4 of this article, a local government may designate
certain areas of state interest from among the following:
(a) Mineral resource areas;
(b) Natural hazard areas;
(c) Areas containing, or having a significant impact upon, historical, natural, or
archaeological resources of statewide importance; and
(d) Areas around key facilities in which development may have a material effect
upon the facility or the surrounding community.
106-7-202. Criteria for administration of areas of state interest. (1) (a) Mineral re-
source area designated as areas of state interest shall be protected and administered in
such a manner as to permit the extraction ard exploration of minerals therefrom, unless
extraction and exploration would cause significant danger to public health and safety. If
the local government having jurisdiction, after weighing sufficient technical or other evi-
dence, finds that the economic value of the minerals present therein is less than the value
of another existing or requested use, such other use should be given preference, however,
other uses which would not interfere with the extraction and exploration of minerals may
be permitted in such areas of state interest.
(b) Areas containing only sand, gravel, quarry aggregate, or limestone used for
construction purposes shall be administered as provided by article 36 of chapter 92, C.R.S.
1963.
(c) The extraction and exploration of minerals from any area shall be accomplished
in a manner which causes the least practicable environmental disturbance, and surface
areas disturbed thereby shall be reclaimed in accordance with the provisions of article 13
or article 32 of chapter 92, C.R.S. 1963, whichever is applicable.
(d) Unless an activity of state interest has been designated or identified or unless it
includes part or all of another area of state interest, an area of oil and gas or geothermal
resource development shall not be designated as an area of state interest unless the state
oil and gas conservation commission identifies such area for designation.
(2) (a) Natural hazard areas shall be administered as follows:
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(I) Floodplains shall be administered so as to minimize significant hazards to public
health and safety or to property. The Colorado water conservation board shall promulgate
a model floodplain regulation no later than September 30, 1974. Open space activities such
as agriculture, recreation, and mineral extraction shall be encouraged in the floodplains.
Any combination of these activities shall be conducted in a mutually compatible manner.
Building of structures in the floodplain shall be designed in terms of the availability of
flood protection devices, proposed intensity of use, effects on the acceleration of floodwa-
ters, potential significant hazards to public health and safety or to property, and other
impact of such development on downstream communities such as the creation of obstruc-
tions during floods. Activities shall be discouraged which, in time of flooding, would create
significant hazards to public health and safety or to property. Shallow wells, solid waste
disposal sites, and septic tanks and sewage disposal systems shall be protected from
inundation by floodwaters. Unless an activity of state interest is to be conducted therein,
an area of corrosive soil, expansive soil and rock, or siltation shall not be designated as
an area of state interest unless the Colorado soil conservation board, through the local soil
conservation district, identifies such area for designation.
(II) Wildfire hazard areas in which residential activity is to take place shall be
administered so as to minimize significant hazards to public health and safety or to
property. The Colorado state forest service shall promulgate a model wildfire hazard area
control regulation no later than September 30, 1974. If development is to take place, roads
shall be adequate for service by fire trucks and other safety equipment. Firebreaks and
other means of reducing conditions conducive to fire shall be required for wildfire hazard
areas in which development is authorized.
(II) In geologic hazard areas all developments shall be engineered and administered
in a manner that will minimize significant hazards to public health and safety or to
property due to a geologic hazard. The Colorado geological survey shall promulgate a
model geologic hazard area control regulation no later than September 30, 1974.
(b) After promulgation of guidelines for land use in natural hazard areas by the
Colorado water conservation board, the Colorado soil conservation board through the soil
conservation districts, the Colorado state forest service, and the Colorado geological sur-
vey, natural hazard areas shall be administered by local government in a manner which
is consistent with the guidelines for land use in each of the natural hazard areas.
(3) Areas containing, or having a significant impact upon, historical, natural, or
archaeological resources of statewide importance, as determined by the state historical
society, the department of natural resources, and the appropriate local government, shall
be administered by the appropriate state agency in conjunction with the appropriate local
government in a manner that will allow man to function in harmony with, rather than be
destructive to, these resources. Consideration is to be given to the protection of those areas
essential for wildlife habitat. Development in areas containing historical, archaeological,
or natural resources shall be conducted in a manner which will minimize damage to those
resources for future use.
(4) The following criteria shall be applicable to areas around key facilities:
(a) If the operation of a key facility may cause a danger to public health and safety
or to property, as determined by local government, the area around the key facility shall
be designated and administered so as to minimize such danger; and
(b) Areas around key facilities shall be developed in a manner that will discourage
traffic congestion, incompatible uses, and expansion of the demand for government serv-
ices beyond the reasonable capacity of the community or region to provide such services
as determined by local government. Compatibility with nonmotorized traffic shall be
encouraged. A development that imposes burdens or deprivation on the communities of a
region cannot be justified on the basis of local benefit alone.
(5) In addition to the criteria described in subsection (4) of this section, the follow-
ing criteria shall be applicable to areas around particular key facilities:
(a) Areas around airports shall be administered so as to:
(I) Encourage land use patterns for housing and other local government needs that
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will separate uncontrollable noise sources from residential and other noise-sensitive areas;
and
(II) Avoid danger to public safety and health or to property due to aircraft crashes.
(b) Areas around major facilities of a public utility shall be administered so as to:
(I) Minimize disruption of the service provided by the public utility; and
(II) Preserve desirable existing community patterns.
(c) Areas around interchanges involving arterial highways shall be administered so
as to:
(I) Encourage the smooth flow of motorized and nonmotorized traffic;
(II) Foster the development of such areas in a manner calculated to preserve the
smooth flow of such traffic; and
(III) Preserve desirable existing community patterns.
(d) Areas around rapid or mass transit terminals, stations, or guideways shall be
developed in conformance with the applicable municipal master plan adopted pursuant
to section 139-59-6, C.R.S. 1963, or any applicable master plan adopted pursuant to
section 106-2-7. If no such master plan has been adopted, such areas shall be developed
in a manner designed to minimize congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, flood
waters, and other dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to provide adequate
light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of popula-
tion; to facilitate the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools,
parks, and other public requirements. Such development in such areas shall be made with
reasonable consideration, among other things, as to the character of the area and its
peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings
and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the jurisdiction of the
applicable local government.
106-7-203. Activities of state interest as determined by local governments. (1) Subject
to the procedures set forth in part 4 of this article, a local government may designate
certain activities of state interest from among the following:
(a) Site selection and construction of major new domestic water and sewage treat-
ment systems and major extension of existing domestic water and sewage treatment
systems;
(b) Site selection and development of solid waste disposal sites;
(c) Site selection of airports;
(d) Site selection of rapid or mass transit terminals, stations, and fixed guide-
ways;
(e) Site selection of arterial highways and interchanges and collector highways;
(f) Site selection and construction of major facilities of a public utility;
(g) Site selection and development of new communities;
(h) Efficient utilization of municipal and industrial water projects; and
(i) Conduct of nuclear detonations.
106-7-204. Criteria for administration of activities of state interest. (1) (a) New do-
mestic water and sewage treatment systems shall be constructed in areas which will result
in the proper utilization of existing treatment plants and the orderly development of
domestic water and sewage treatment systems of adjacent communities.
(b) Major extensions of domestic water and sewage treatment systems shall be
permitted in those areas in which the anticipated growth and development that may occur
as a result of such extension can be accommodated within the financial and environmental
capacity of the area to sustain such growth and development.
(2) Major solid waste disposal sites shall be developed in accordance with sound
conservation practices and shall emphasize, where feasible, the recycling of waste materi-
als. Consideration shall be given to longevity and subsequent use of waste disposal sites,
soil and wind conditions, the potential problems of pollution inherent in the proposed site,
and the impact on adjacent property owners, compared with alternate locations.
(3) Airports shall be located or expanded in a manner which will minimize disrup-
tion to the environment of existing communities, will minimize the impact on existing
community services, and will complement the economic and transportation needs of the
state and the area.
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(4) (a) Rapid or mass transit terminals, stations, or guideways shall be located in
conformance with the applicable municipal master plan adopted pursuant to section 139-
59-6, C.R.S. 1963, or any applicable master plan adopted pursuant to section 106-2-7. If
no such master plan has been adopted, such areas shall be developed in a manner designed
to minimize congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, flood waters, and other
dangers; to promote health and general welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to
prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate
the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public
requirements. Activities shall be conducted with reasonable consideration, among other
things, as to the character of the area and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and
with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate
use of land throughout the jurisdiction of the applicable local government.
(b) Proposed locations of rapid or mass transit terminals, stations, and fixed guide-
ways which will not require the demolition of residences or businesses shall be given
preferred consideration over competing alternatives.
(c) A proposed location of a rapid or mass transit terminal, station, or fixed guide-
way that imposes a burden or deprivation on a local government cannot be justified on
the basis of local benefit alone, nor shall a permit for such a location be denied solely
because the location places a burden or deprivation on one local government.
(5) Arterial highways and interchanges and collector highways shall be located so
that:
(a) Community traffic needs are met;
(b) Desirable community patterns are not disrupted; and
(c) Direct conflicts with adopted local government, regional, and state master plans
are avoided.
(6) Where feasible, major facilities of public utilities shall be located so as to avoid
direct conflict with adopted local government, regional, and state master plans.
(7) When applicable, or as may otherwise be provided by law, a new community
design shall, at a minimum, provide for transportation, waste disposal, schools, and other
governmental services in a manner that will not overload facilities of existing communities
of the region. Priority shall be given to the development of total communities which
provide for commercial and industrial activity, as well as residences, and for internal
transportation and circulation patterns.
(8) Municipal and industrial water projects shall emphasize the most efficient use
of water, including, to the extent permissible under existing law, the recycling and reuse
of water. Urban development, population densities, and site layout and design of storm
water and sanitation systems shall be accomplished in a manner that will prevent the
pollution of aquifer recharge areas.
(9) Nuclear detonations shall be conducted so as to present no material danger to
public health and safety. Any danger to property shall not be disproportionate to the
benefits to be derived from a detonation.
PART 3
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVED AND THEIR FUNCTIONS
106-7-301. Functions of local government. (1) Pursuant to this article, it is the func-
tion of local government to:
(a) Designate matters of state interest after public hearing, taking into considera-
tion:
(I) The intensity of current and foreseeable development pressures; and
(II) Applicable guidelines for designation issued by the applicable state agencies;
(b) Hold hearings on applications for permits for development in areas of state
interest and for activities of state interest;
(c) Grant or deny applications for permits for development in areas of state interest
and for activities of state interest:
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(d) Receive recommendations from state agencies and other local governments re-
lating to matters of state interest;
(e) Send recommendations to other local governments and the Colorado land use
commission relating to matters of state interest; and
(f) Act, upon request of the Colorado land use commission, with regard to specific
matters of state interest.
106-7-302. Functions of other state agencies. (1) Pursuant to this article, it is the
function of other state agencies to:
(a) Send recommendations to local governments and the Colorado land use commis-
sion relating to designation of matters of state interest on the basis of current and develop-
ing information; and
(b) Provide technical assistance to local governments concerning designation of and
guidelines for matters of state interest.
(2) Primary responsibility for the recommendation and provision of technical assis-
tance functions described in subsection (1) of this section is upon:
(a) The Colorado water conservation board, acting in cooperation with the Colorado
soil conservation board, with regard to floodplains;
(b) The Colorado state forest service, with regard to wildfire hazard areas;
(c) The Colorado geological survey, with regard to geologic hazard areas, geologic
reports, and the identification of mineral resource areas;
(d) The Colorado division of mines, with regard to mineral extraction and the recla-
mation of land disturbed thereby;
(e) The Colorado soil conservation board and soil conservation districts, with regard
to resource data inventories, soils, soil suitability, erosion and sedimentation, floodwater
problems and watershed protection; and
(f) The division of wildlife of the department of natural resources, with regard to
significant wildlife habitats.
(3) Pursuant to section 106-7-202 (1) (d), the oil and gas conservation commission
of the state of Colorado may identify an area of oil and gas development for designation
by local government as as area of state interest.
PART 4
DESIGNATION OF MATTERS
OF STATE INTEREST - GUIDELINES FOR ADMINISTRATION
106-7-401. Designation of matters of state interest. (1) After public hearing, a local
government may designate matters of state interest within its jurisdiction, taking into
consideration:
(a) The intensity of current and foreseeable development pressures; and
(b) Applicable guidelines for designation issued by the Colorado land use commis-
sion after recommendation from other state agencies, if appropriate. In adopting such
guidelines, the Colorado land use commission shall be guided by the standards set forth
in this article applicable to local governments.
(2) A designation shall:
(a) Specify the boundaries of the proposed area; and
(b) State reasons why the particular area or activity is of state interest, the dangers
that would result from uncontrolled development of any such area or uncontrolled conduct
of such activity, and the advantages of development of such area or conduct of such
activity in a coordinated manner.
106-7-402. Guidelines - regulations. (1) The local government shall develop guidelines
for administration of the designated matters of state interest. The content of such guide-
lines shall be such as to facilitate administration of matters of state interest consistent
with sections 106-7-202 and 106-7-204.
(2) A local government may adopt regulations interpreting and applying its adopted
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guidelines in relation to specific developments in areas of state interest and to specific
activities of state interest.
(3) No provision in this article shall be construed as prohibiting a local government
from adopting guidelines or regulations containing requirements which are more stringent
than the requirements of the criteria listed in sections 106-7-202 and 106-7-204.
106-7-403. Technical and financial assistance. (1) Appropriate state agencies shall
provide techanical assistance to local governments in order to assist local governments in
designating matters of state interest and adopting guidelines for the administration
thereof.
(2)(a) The department of local affairs shall oversee and coordinate the provision of
technical assistance and provide financial assistance as may be authorized by law.
(b) The department of local affairs shall determine whether technical or financial
assistance or both are to be given to a local government on the basis of the local govern-
ment's:
(I) Showing that current or reasonably foreseeable development pressures exist
within the local government's jurisdiction; and
(U1) Plan describing the proposed use of technical assistance and expenditure of
financial assistance.
106-7-404. Public hearing - designation of an area or activity of state interest and
adoption of guidelines by order of local government. (1) The local government shall hold
a public hearing before designating an area or activity of state interest and adopting
guidelines for administration thereof.
(2) (a) Notice, stating the time and place of the hearing and the place at which
materials relating to the matter to be designated and guidelines may be examined, shall
be published once at least thirty and not more than sixty days before the public hearing
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county. The local government shall send
written notice to the Colorado land use commission of a public hearing to be held for the
purpose of designation and adoption of guidelines at least thirty days and not more than
sixty days before such hearing.
(b) Any person may request, in writing, that his name and address be placed on a
mailing list to receive notice of all hearings held pursuant to this section. If the local
government decides to maintain such a mailing list, it shall mail notices to each person
paying an annual fee reasonably related to the cost of production, handling, and mailing
such notice. In order to have his name and address retained on said mailing list, the person
shall resubmit his name and address and pay such fee before January 31 of each year.
(3) Within thirty days after completion of the public hearing, the local government,
by order, may adopt, adopt with modification, or reject the particular designation and
guidelines; but the local government, in any case, shall have the duty to designate any
matter which has been finally determined to be a matter of state interest and adopt
guidelines for the administration thereof.
(4) After a matter of state interest is designated pursuant to this section, no person
shall engage in development in such area and no such activity shall be conducted until
the designation and guidelines for such area or activity are finally determined pursuant
to this article.
(5) Upon adoption by order, all relevant materials relating to the designation and
guidelines shall be forwarded to the Colorado land use commission for review.
106-7-405. Report of local government's progress. (1) Not later than one hundred
eighty days after the effective date of this article, each local government shall report to
the Colorado land use commission, on a form to be furnished by the Colorado land use
commission, the progress made toward designation and adoption of guidelines for admin-
istration of matters of state interest.
(2) Upon the basis of the information contained in such reports and any information
received pursuant to any other relevant provision of this article, the Colorado land use
commission may take appropriate action pursuant to section 106-4-3(2) (a).
106-7-406. Colorado land use commission review of local government order containing
[VOL. 51
LAND USE
designation and guidelines. (1) Not later than thirty days after receipt of a local govern-
ment order designating a matter of state interest and adopting guidelines for the adminis-
tration thereof, the Colorado land use commission shall review the contents of such order
on the basis of the relevant provisions of part 2 of this article and shall accept the
designation and guidelines or recommend modification thereof.
(2) If the Colorado land-use commission decides that modification of the designation
or guidelines is required, the Colorado land use commission shall, within said thirty-day
period, submit to the local government written notification of its recommendations and
shall specify in writing the modifications which the Colorado land use commission deems
necessary for compliance with the relevant provisions of part 2 of this article.
(3) Not later than thirty days after receipt of the modifications recommended by
the Colorado land use commission, a local government shall:
(a) Modify the original order in a manner consistent with the recommendations of
the Colorado land use commission and resubmit the order to the Colorado land use
commission; or
(b) Notify the Colorado land use commission that the Colorado land use commis-
sion's recommendations are rejected.
106-7-407. Colorado land use commission may initiate identification, designation, and
promulgation of guidelines for matters of state interest. (1) (a) The Colorado land use
commission may submit a formal request to a local government to take action with regard
to a specific matter which said commission considers to be of state interest within the local
government's jurisdiction. Such request shall identify the specific matter and shall set
forth the information required in section 106-7-401 (2) (a) and (2) (b). Not later than thirty
days after receipt of such request, the local government shall publish notice and hold a
hearing within sixty days pursuant to the provisions of section 106-7-404, and issue its
order thereunder.
(b) After receipt by a local government of a request from the Colorado land use
commission pursuant to paragraph (a) of this subsection (1), no person shall engage in
development in the area or conduct the activity specifically described in said request until
the local government has held its hearing and issued its order relating thereto.
(c) If the local government's order fails to designate such matter and adopt guide-
lines therefor, or, after designation, fails to adopt guidelines therefor pursuant to stan-
dards set forth in this article applicable to local governments, the Colorado land use
commission may seek judicial review of such order or guidelines by a trial de novo in the
district court for the judicial district in which the local government is located. During the
pendency of such court proceedings, no person shall engage in development in the area or
conduct the activity specifically described in said request except on such terms and
conditions as authorized by the court.
PART 5
PERMITS FOR DEVELOPMENT IN AREAS OF STATE
INTEREST AND FOR
CONDUCT OF ACTIVITIES OF STATE INTEREST
106-7-501. Permit for development in area of state interest or for conduct of an activ-
ity of state interest required. (1) (a) Any person desiring to engage in development in an
area of state interest or to conduct an activity of state interest shall file an application
for a permit with the local government in which such development or activity is to take
place. The application shall be filed on a form prescribed by the Colorado land use
commission. A reasonable fee determined by the local government sufficient to cover the
cost of processing the application, including the cost of holding the necessary hearings,
shall be paid at the time of filing such application.
(b) The requirement of paragraph (a) of this subsection (1) that a public utility
obtain a permit shall not be deemed to waive the requirements of article 5 of chapter 115,
C.R.S. 1963, that a public utility obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity.
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(2) (a) Not later than thirty days after receipt of an application for a permit, the
local government shall publish notice of a hearing on said application. Such notice shall
be published once in a newspaper of general circulation in the county, not less than thirty
nor more than sixty days before the date set for hearing, and shall be given to the Colorado
land use commission. The Colorado land use commission may give notice to such other
persons as it determines not later than fourteen days before such hearing.
(b) If a person proposes to engage in development in an area of state interest or for
conduct of an activity of state interest not previously designated and for which guidelines
have not been adopted, the local government may hold one hearing for determination of
designation and guidelines and granting or denying the permit.
(c) The local government may maintain a mailing list and send notice of hearings
relating to permits in a manner similar to that described in section 106-7-404 (2) (b).
(3) The local government may approve an application for a permit to engage in
development in an area of state interest if the proposed development complies with the
local government's guidelines and regulations governing such area. If the proposed devel-
opment does not comply with the guidelines and regulations, the permit shall be denied.
(4) The local government may approve an application for a permit for conduct of
an activity of state interest if the proposed activity complies with the local government's
regulations and guidelines for conduct of such activity. If the proposed activity does not
comply with the guidelines and regulations, the permit shall be denied.
(5) The local government conducting a hearing pursuant to this section shall:
(a) State, in writing, reasons for its decision, and its findings and conclusions; and
(b) Preserve a record of such proceedings.
(6) After the effective date of this article, any person desiring to engage in a develop-
ment in a designated area of state interest or to conduct a designated activity of state
interest who does not obtain a permit pursuant to this section may be enjoined by the
Colorado land use commission or the appropriate local government from engaging in such
development or conducting such activity.
106-7-502. Judicial review. The denial of a permit by a local government agency shall
be subject to judicial review in the district court for the judicial district in which the major
development or activity is to occur.
SECTION 2. Article 3 of chapter 106, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, as amended,
is amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION to read:
106-3-9. Statewide program for identification of matters of state interest as part of
local land use planning. (1) The department of local affairs shall conduct a statewide
program encouraging counties and municipalities to prepare, as a part of the comprehen-
sive plan provided for in section 106-2-5 and article 59 of chapter 139, C.R.S. 1963, a
complete and detailed identification and designation of all matters of state interest within
each county by June 30, 1976. The general assembly shall appropriate funds for this
purpose to the department of local affairs for distribution to participating counties. Each
county desiring to participate in the identification and designation of matters of state
interest program established by this section shall be allocated an equal amount by the
department of local affairs from the funds so appropriated, to be expended by each county
separately or through an organized group of counties or counties and municipalities. The
department of local affairs, in cooperation with applicable state agencies, shall establish
reasonable standards relative to the scope, detail, and accuracy of the program and shall
insure that all information is comparable for each county. Each county shall, after con-
sultation with the municipality, prepare such identification and designation for territory
located within these municipalities which request such preparation and in any municipal-
ity which fails to undertake an identification and designation program. Each county shall,
upon request of the municipality, assist the municipality in its identification and designa-
tion program.
(2) The general assembly shall appropriate to the department of local affairs funds
to assist counties and municipalities participating in the identification and designation
of matters of state interest program, where additional assistance is deemed by the depart-
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ment of local affairs to be necessary. The department of local affairs shall also allocate
such funds upon request of any county participating in the identification and designation
of matters of state interest program under subsection (1) of this section for implementa-
tion of supplemental planning in that county, or to any municipality, based upon priori-
ties established by the department of local affairs and on the need and capabilities of each
county and municipality.
SECTION 3. 106-4-3 (2) (a), Colorado Revised Statutes 1963 (1971 Supp.), is
amended to read:
106-4-3. Duties of the commission - temporary emergency power. (2) (a) Whenever
in the normal course of its duties as set forth in this article the commission determines
that there is in progress or proposed a land development activity which constitutes a
danger of ineparble injury, loss, or damage of serious and major proportions to the public
health, welfare, or safety, the commission shall immediately give written notice to the
board of county commissioners of each county involved of the pertinent facts and dangers
with respect to such activity. If the said board of county commissioners does not remedy
the situation within a reasonable time, the commission may request the governor to review
such facts and dangers with respect to such activity. If the governor grants such request,
such review shall be conducted by the governor at a meeting with the commission and
the boards of county commissioners of the counties involved. If, after such review, the
governor shall determine that such activity does constitute such a danger, the governor
may direct the commission to issue its written cease and desist order to the person in
control of such activity. Such order shall require that such person immediately discon-
tinue such activity. If such activity, notwithstanding such order, is continued, the com-
mission may apply to any district court of this state in which such activity is located for
a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction, as pro-
vided for in the Colorado rules of civil procedure. Any such action shall be given preced-
ence over all other matters pending in such district court. The institution of such action
shall confer upon said district court exclusive jurisdiction to determine finally the subject
matter thereof.
SECTION 4. Article 4 of chapter 106, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, as amended,
is amended BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION to read:
106-4-5. Commission staff to assist counties and municipalities. The commission,
within available appropriations, shall assign full-time professional staff members to assist
counties and municipalities in the program established under article 7 of this chapter and
to monitor progress in the same. No later than February 1, 1975, the commission shall issue
its report to the general assembly as to progress being made in such program and shall
include in its report those items required by section 106-4-4 (4) (b) and (4) (c).
SECTION 5. Appropriation. (1) There is hereby appropriated to the department of
local affairs, out of any moneys in the state treasury not otherwise appropriated, the sum
of two million seventy-five thousand dollars ($2,075,000), or so much thereof as may be
necessary, to implement the provisions of section 106-3-9, C.R.S. 1963, which moneys shall
become available upon passage of this act and remain available until June 30, 1975, to
be allocated as follows: Identification and designation of matters of state interest program
- one million five hundred seventy-five thousand dollars ($1,575,000); supplemental plan-
ning - five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000).
(2) There is hereby appropriated out of any moneys in the state treasury not other-
wise appropriated, to the Colorado land use commission, for the fiscal year beginning July
1, 1974, the sum of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000), or so much thereof as may
be necessary, to provide assistance to counties and municipalities pursuant to section 106-
4-5, C.R.S. 1963 (10.0 FTE, five of which shall be full-time professional staff pursuant to
said section 106-4-5).
SECTION 6. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and




HousE BILL No. 1034
SECTION 1. Chapter 106, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, as amended, is amended
BY THE ADDITION OF A NEW ARTICLE to read:
ARTICLE 8
Local Government Land Use Control
Enabling Act
106-8-101. Short title. This article shall be known and may be cited as the "Local
Government Land Use Control Enabling Act of 1974".
106-8-102. Legislative declaration. The general assembly hereby finds and declares
that in order to provide for planned and orderly development within Colorado and a
balancing of basic human needs of a changing population with legitimate environmental
concerns, the policy of this state is to clarify and provide broad authority to local govern-
ments to plan for and regulate the use of land within their respective jurisdictions. Noth-
ing in this article shall serve to diminish the planning functions of the state or the duties
of the division of planning.
106-8-103. Definitions. As used in this article, unless the context otherwise requires:
(1) "Local government" means a county, home rule or statutory city, town, terri-
torial charter city, or city and county.
106-8-104. Powers of local governments. (1) Without limiting or superseding any
power or authority presently exercised or previously granted, each local government within
its respective jurisdiction has the authority to plan for and regulate the use of land by:
(a) Regulating development and activities in hazardous areas;
(b) Protecting lands from activities which would cause immediate or foreseeable
material danger to significant wildlife habitat and where an activity would endanger a
wildlife specie;
(c) Preserving areas of historical and archaeological importance;
(d) Regulating, with respect to the establishment of, roads on public lands adminis-
tered by the federal government; this authority includes authority to prohibit, set condi-
tions, or require a permit for the establishment of any road authorized under the general
right-of-way granted to the public by 43 U.S.C. 932 (R.S. 2477) but does not include
authority to prohibit, set conditions, or require a permit for the establishment of any road
authorized for mining claim purposes by 30 U.S.C. 21 et seq., or under any specific permit
or lease granted by the federal government;
(e) Regulating the location of activities and developments which may result in
significant changes in population density;
(f) Providing for phased development of services and facilities;
(g) Regulating the use of land on the basis of the impact thereof on the community
or surrounding areas; and
(h) Otherwise planning for and regulating the use of land so as to provide planned
and orderly use of land and protection of the environment in a manner consistent with
constitutional rights.
106-8-105. Intergovernmental cooperation. Without limiting or superseding any power
or authority presently exercised or previously granted, local governments are authorized
and encouraged to cooperate or contract with other units of government pursuant to article
2 of chapter 88, C.R.S. 1963, for the purposes of planning or regulating the development
of land, including but not limited to the joint exercise of planning, zoning, subdivision,
building, and related regulations.
106-8-106. Receipt of funds. Without limiting or superseding any authority presently
exercised or previously granted, local governments are hereby authorized to receive and
expend funds from other governmental and private sources for the purpose of planning
for or regulating the use of land within their respective jurisdictions.
106-8-107. Compliance with other requirements. Where other procedural or substan-
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tive requirements for the planning for or regulation of the use of land are provided by law,
such requirements shall control.
SECTION 2. 106-2-20, Colorado Revised Statutes 1963, is amended to read:
106-2-20. Temporary regulations. The board of county commissioners of any county,
after appointment of a county or district planning commission and pending the ADOP-
TION by such commission of a zoning plan, where in the opinion of the board conditions
require such action, may promulgate, by resolution without a public hearing, regulations
of a temporary nature, to be effective for a limited period only and in any event not to
exceed six months, prohibiting or regulating in any part or all of the unincorporated
territory of the county or district the erection, construction, reconstruction, or alteration
of any building or structure used or to be used for any business, RESIDENTIAL, in-
dustrial, or commercial purpose.
SECTION 3. Safety clause. The general assembly hereby finds, determines, and
declares that this act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace,
health, and safety.

TOWARDS A MORE PRACTICAL CENTRAL REGISTRY
By BRIAN G. FRASER*
INTRODUCTION
Approximately 300 cases of child abuse' per million popula-
tion are reported in the United States each year.' It has been
estimated, moreover, that two children die each day as a result
of serious abuse.3 Often the abused child is battered not once but
a number of times.4 The majority of serious physical injuries are
inflicted on children 3 years of age or younger,5 resulting in a
substantial number of victims who, because of their age and their
legal incapacities, lack the ability to cry out for help.
All 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the
Virgin Islands require by law that certain persons report incidents
* Staff Attorney, The National Center for the Prevention and Treatment of Child
Abuse and Neglect, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1968, University of Buffalo; J.D., 1972, Uni-
versity of Colorado School of Law.
Child abuse as is commonly used in this context refers to a traditional definition of
a physical, nonaccidental injury. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-801, 802 (Supp. 1973).
It does not refer to sexual abuse which, it has been suggested, is just as prevalent as
physical abuse. See V. DEFRANciS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF SEX CRIMES COMMIT-
TED BY ADULTS vii (1969). Nor does child abuse refer to emotional abuse which is beginning
to be recognized as a serious medical problem. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-716, 722
(1973).
2 C. KEMPE, H. SILVER & D. O'BRIEN, CURRENT PEDIATRIC DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT
781 (3d ed. 1974). Reported cases are those cases which have been reported to some state
governmental agency. This is in no way intended to reflect the true incidence of child
abuse. The real figure can only be estimated.
U. FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD Is CRYING 39 (1973).
Fontana, Donovan & Wong, The "Maltreatment Syndrome" in Children, 269
N.E.J. MED. 1389, 1392 (1963); Grumet, The Plaintive Plaintiffs: Victims of the Battered
Child Syndrome, 4 FAM. L.Q. 296, 303-04 (1970); Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droege-
mueller & Silver, The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17, 18 (1962); McCoid, The
Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon the Family, 50 MINN. L. REv. 1, 49 (1965).
1 "Estimates of the usual age for child abuse are that one-third occur under 1 year of
age, one-third from ages 1-3, and one-third over the age of 3." C. KEMPE, H. SILVER & D.
O'BRIEN, supra note 2, at 781. However, while it is true that the majority of child abuse
is inflicted on the young child, certain types of abuse, e.g., sexual abuse, are more closely
correlated with an older age group. Id.
' The minor cannot initiate legal proceedings on his own behalf in a court of law.
Thus, he must bring suit through his parents (obviously, unfeasible in these types of cases)
or through a court appointed guardian ad litem or next friend. At the present time, four
states mandate by law that a guardian ad litem be appointed to represent the child's
interests in all cases of child abuse. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-821 (1973); N.Y. FAMILY CT.
ACT §1043(a) (McKinney Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-248 (Supp. 1973); ch. 36,
§ 2, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 154; Id. § 3 at 155. See also Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 4(b)(2)(G) (1974), which requires that a guardian
ad litem be appointed to represent the interests of an abused child in every case which
results in a judicial proceeding.
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of suspected child abuse, but only 33 states presently make provi-
sion in their reporting statutes7 for a central registry8 to record
these reports. What is needed is some effective legislation in the
remaining 17 states to force professionals' within the community
to report suspected child abuse. In addition, a physical facility in
which to record these reports, i.e., a central registry is also
needed. A physical plant in which reports of child abuse are re-
corded and appropriately cross indexed can serve three functions:
(1) to supply research data' ° needed for identifying and categoriz-
ing" the abusers and the abused, and for predicting the eventual
fate of the abused children; 2 (2) to aid the individual physician
7 For the status of each State's mandatory reporting statute and reporting statutes
in general, see V. DEFRANCIS & C. LucHT, CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's (rev. ed.
1974); Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to Child Abuse,
12 AM. CaIM. L. REV. 103 (1974).
1 ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.040 (1971); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-546.03 (1974); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 42-803 (Supp. 1973); CAL. PENAL CODE § 11161.5(a) (West Supp. 1974);
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-6 (Supp. 1969); Pub. Act No. 73-205(g) 3 CONN. LEG. SERV.
(1973), formerly CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a (1958); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 1004(b) (Supp. 1972); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(7) (Supp. 1974); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 350-2 (1968); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2047 (Smith-Hurd 1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
721 (1973); LA. REv. STAT. § 14:403(B) (Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A(i)
(Supp. 1973); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51F (Supp. 1974); MIcH. STAT. ANN.
§ 14.564(2) (1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.107(3) (Vernon Supp. 1974); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 10-903 (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1504(3) (Supp. 1973); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 571:25(a)-30 (Supp. 1971); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8:11 (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Soc.
SEarv. § 422 (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-122 (Supp. 1973); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2151.42.1 (Page Supp. 1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1973);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 418.765 (1973); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2106 (Supp. 1974); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. § 40-11-4 (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-12.2 (Supp. 1973);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1207 (Supp. 1973); TEX. FAM. CODE § 34.06 (1973); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 16.1-217.1 (Supp. 1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.070 (Supp. 1973); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 14-28.13 (Supp. 1973).
State mandatory reporting statutes require certain professionals (and sometimes
other specified persons) to report suspected cases of child abuse. See Fraser, supra note
7, at 108 n.19, 109 nn.22-26.
1o The Department of Human Resources shall maintain a central regis-
try of abuse and neglect cases . . . in order to compile data for appropriate
study of the extent of abuse and neglect with the State.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 110-122 (Supp. 1973).
1 Abusive parents/caretakers come from all walks of life, and it is virtually impossible
to group them categorically into one socio-economic, religious, or ethnic background. See
C. KEMPE, H. SILVER & D. O'BRIEN, supra note 2.
12 Study has shown that child abuse results from parental character disorders devel-
oped in the parent's own childhood and passed on from generation to generation causing
the abused child of today to become the abusing parent of tomorrow. Steele & Pollock, A
Therapeutic Approach to the Parents, in HELPING THE BATTERED CHILD AND HIS FAMILY 3,
4 (1972). There are also indications that the seriously abused and neglected child today
will become a juvenile delinquent in 10 years and a convicted felon in 20 years. Duncan,




and the courts in determing whether the child has been abused; 13
and (3) to aid departments of social services and courts (which
also have the duty of protecting the child in peril) in following
abusing parents and caretakers who "hospital shop" and "doctor
shop."' 4 This article examines the concept of, the need for, and
the problems concerned with a central registry.
I. THE CONCEPT OF THE CENTRAL REGISTRY
Although central registries have not been universally ac-
cepted, in the last few years there has been a large increase in
their number.'" There are three basic forms of statewide central
registries. The first is a warehouse for statistical data to be used
for research purposes. The second is a registry used to track abus-
ing parents and their abused children" and to help physicians
make a diagnosis of child abuse. 7 The third form combines the
elements necessary for research and for tracking. 8
In those states which have adopted a central registry system,
certain persons in each state are mandated by law to report to the
police department, to the department of social services, or to the
district court with juvenile jurisdiction (depending upon the sta-
tutory provisions of each state) 9 suspected cases of child abuse
. . . that all persons so authorized by this title may use [the central
registry] for determing the existence of prior reports in order to evaluate the
condition or circumstances of the child before them.
N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 422(2) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
" To aid in detecting patents/caretakers who have their battered children treated by
a different doctor or at a different hospital each time the child is injured, the North
Carolina statute, for example, provides:
The [state department] shall maintain a central registry of abuse and neg-
lect cases . . . to identify repeated abuses of the same child or of other
children within the same family.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-122 (Supp. 1973).
11 For example, in late 1971, there were only 19 states with legislatively mandated
central registries. Hearings on the Rights of Children Before the Subcomm. on Children
and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2,
at 250 (1972). Today, there are 33 states with such legislatively mandated central regis-
tries, an increase of over 80 percent in 2 years. See FRASER, THE LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO
CHILD ABUSE: A CURRENT COMPILATION OF OUR STATES' STATUTES (1973).
11 The following states provide for use of the central registry for tracking purposes:
Conn., Del., Fla., Hawaii, Ill., Kan., La., Md., Mich., Mo., N.H., N.Y., N.C., Ohio, Okla.,
Ore., R.I., Tenn., Tex., Va., Wash., and Wyo. See Appendix for appropriate statutes.
" The following states provide access to physicians: Ark., Colo., Conn., Fla., Md.,
N.H., N.Y., Ore., R.I., Tenn., Tex., and Wash. See Appendix for appropriate statutes.
11 The following states provide for both research and tracking purposes: Alas., Ariz.,
Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., Del., Fla., Hawaii, Ill., Kan., La., Md., Mich., Mo., N.H., N.Y.,
N.C., Ohio, Okla., Ore., R.I., Tenn., Tex., Va., Wash., and Wyo. See Appendix for
appropriate statutes.
11 At the present time, 20 states require that initial reports be sent to some social
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when they have reasonable cause to believe that the child has
been abused. 0 The recipient of the report then investigates the
suspected abuse and transmits a report to the state central regis-
try where it is appropriately filed and cross indexed. When a
report has previously been filed concerning the same child or the
same parents, notification of the previous injury is released to
those persons and/or agencies specified by law.2"
Since every state does require that a report be made of the
cases of suspected abuse, it would seem to be a relatively easy
task to establish a central registry in those states which, at this
time, make no provision for one.2 The relevant material is avail-
able; what is required is a facility in which to store this informa-
tion.2
3
II. THE NEED FOR A CENTRAL REGISTRY
Because an abused child is usually battered a number of
times, the physical damage done to a child is directly correlated
with the duration of the abuse. In many cases, the only way to
detect the "battered child syndrome"" is to collect and analyze
all previous reports of suspicious injuries and all relevant medical
data. For example, when a physician who is unaware of any prior
abuse examines a child with numerous bruises on his leg and
buttocks, he is more apt to accept the parents' explanation of the
agency, (department of social services, welfare department, or department of youth and
child services). Another 19 states require that a copy of the initial report be sent to both
the welfare department and the police department or, in the alternative, a report be sent
to either a social agency or a police department. The remaining states require that the
initial report be sent directly to the police department and/or the district attorney and/or
the district court with juvenile jurisdiction.
" Some states require that not only suspected incidents of child abuse be recorded,
but events or circumstances which would reasonably result in abuse also be recorded when
a person "observes the child being subjected to conditions or circumstances which reason-
ably would normally result in abuse .... " COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-2 (Supp.
1969). See also IDAHO CODE § 16-1641 (Supp. 1973); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(2)
(Supp. 1972); LA. REv. STAT. § 14:403(C)(1) (Supp. 1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-6-
I(C)(1) (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-118(a) (1973).
" Not all states make provision for a report to be made back to the receiving agency.
See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-803 (Supp. 1973).
2 However, it should be noted that a number of states have created a central registry
by administrative fiat and not through statutory provision. For those states which have
created a central registry through legislation, see Appendix.
21 A word of caution is, perhaps, in order. The mere fact that a central registry is
mandated by law is no guarantee that it will function properly and serve the purposes for
which it was created. See 1973 N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY REP. OF THE SELEcr COMM. ON CHILD
ABUSE at 42.
24 See C. KEMPE, H. SILvER & D. O'BRIEN, supra note 2; Kempe, Silverman, Steele,
Droegemueller & Silver, supra note 4.
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injury as accidental in nature than if he had knowledge of pre-
vious reports of suspicious and unexplained injuries to the same
child. The critical need is to identify the abused child at the
earliest possible time and to place him within the protective serv-
ices of the state to prevent the abused case from becoming the
terminal case."
It is not at all unusual for the abusing parent to "doctor
shop" or "hospital shop",26 never giving the attending physician
a clear picture of just how extensive the collective trauma ac-
tually is. Without the ability to identify the abuse or its extent,
the departments of social services and the courts have little hope
of protecting those persons who cannot protect themselves. A
central registry is needed, therefore, to gather information of past
abuse to the same child.?
III. THE OPERATION OF THE CENTRAL REGISTRY
Every state28 minimally requires in the initial report of child
abuse the name and the address of the child suspected of being
abused; the names and addresses of the parents or others who are
legally responsible for the child; the child's age; the nature and
extent of the injuries; and any other information the reporter
believes might be helpful in establishing the cause of the injuries
and the identity of the abuser.8
Recognizing the paucity of information contained in so lim-
ited a report, a few states require the following additional infor-
mation: "any evidence of previous injury or maltreatment to the
child or his siblings";" "family composition . . .the actions
taken by the reporting source, including the taking of photo-
graphs and x-rays,3 removal or keeping of the child or notifying
The early identification of a child already the victim of abuse is ob-
viously not optimal prevention. Yet it would appear from our investigations
that the severe permanent damage associated with "the battered child syn-
drome" usually does not occur with the initial incident. Identification of
abuse at this time thus offers an opportunity for intervention with the goal
of preventing subsequent trauma and irreversible injury to the child.
Friedman, The Need for Intensive Follow-up of Abused Children, in HELPING THE BAT-
TERED CHILD AND His FAmILY 79 (1972).
* See note 14 supra.
* For example, within the bounds of Denver, Colorado, there are 28 hospitals and
over 3,080 practicing physicians, as well as mental health centers, free clinics, outpatient
clinics, social workers, and nurses, all of whom would, without a central registry, remain
ignorant of past abuse.
n See Appendix for appropriate statutes.
" See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-717 (1973).
" CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-38a(c) (Supp. 1974).
" N.Y. Soc. SEarv. § 415 (McKinney Supp. 1973). In this respect, New York is rather
1974
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the medical examiner";32 "if known, the name of the person or
persons delivering or accompanying the child for treatment.
3
The type of central registry employed in a given state is
significant to the nature of this process. If it is to function solely
as a storehouse for statistical material, the information requested
by the central registry will be somewhat limited, and there will
be no feedback to the reporting agencies concerning any previous
injury to the same child. If the central registry is to be used as a
tool for evaluation and for tracking, the material initially re-
quested by the registry will be much broader in scope and copies
of reports of previous abuse should be available immediately to
authorized persons.
Ideally, a physician who is examining a child in his office and
suspects child abuse would be able to call the central registry,
and after giving the central registry the names and addresses of
the child and parents, should expect within minutes an answer,
retrieved from storage by the computer, regarding previous in-
stances of suspected child abuse. After verifying that the request
is a proper one and validating the identity of the person request-
ing the information,34 the registrar would return the call and pro-
vide the physician with any previous reports of suspected abuse.
If abuse is diagnosed, the physician would make the mandatory
report and take any precautionary steps available under state
law.3 The report would then be forwarded to the receiving agency
which would forward a copy of a "suspected abuse" report to the
central registry. The receiving agency would be mandated to
unique. It is the only state which mandates that photographs and x-rays be taken in
certain circumstances and provide immunity for such action. Id. § 416. See also WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.050 (Supp. 1973), which authorizes an investigating agency to take
photographs.
3 N.Y. Soc. SERv. § 415 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
W.VA. CODE ANN. § 49-6A-2 (Supp. 1974).
Probably the most efficient method would be to take the name, address, and
occupation of the person making the request and to return the call when the relevant
information is obtained. An operator can cross-reference the name and address of the
caller with the appropriate telephone directory. If the name can be verified and the person
has an occupation or position authorized by law to receive the information, the operator
simply places a return call to that person to provide the requested data.
' A number of states have provided that if a physician has before him a child whom
he believes has been abused, that physician may take temporary custody of that child
without the parents' consent, even though no further medical treatment is indicated. See,
e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (f-1) (Supp.
1973); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(1), (2) (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.16 (Supp.
1974); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 1024 (McKinney Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-
118(d) (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1204 (Supp. 1973); Pub. L. No. 73-205(d), 3
CONN. LEG. SERV. (1973).
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make a complete investigation, and a follow up report would be
required to be made to the central registry. The central registry,
using the initial report and the follow up report, would separate
the founded from the unfounded reports, and the unfounded re-
ports would be immediately expunged." The recorded informa-
tion in the central registry would be available to the department
in any future investigation, to physicians, and to the court to
enable it to make a factual, well-informed disposition in neglect
proceedings ."7
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CENTRAL REGISTRY
Central registry opponents have raised a number of valid
objections as to the lack of sufficient procedural safeguards in
present legislative provisions. For example, in most states, a cen-
tral registry contains reports of both adjudicated and suspected
abuse.38 In practical terms, this means that certain individuals
are listed in the registry as suspect parties .3 This listing occurs
without opportunity for representation by counsel and without
the right of appeal. Additionally, the listing of a name in a central
registry carries with it a stigma of wrong doing and guilt which is
potentially damaging if the information should be made public
or be made available for use by the FBI, state police agencies,
credit agencies, insurance companies, or potential employers., A
number of states have provided by statute that there shall be a
central registry, but have failed to enumerate who shall have
access to the records and have failed to grant to any state agency
3, See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 422(5) (McKinney Supp. 1973), which provides that
reports of abuse which are not supported by some credible evidence are immediately
expunged.
37 The majority of states provide for two separate hearings in neglect (child abuse)
proceedings. Initially, there is an adjudicational hearing to determine the status of the
subject child, i.e., is this child an abused (and consequently, a neglected and dependent)
child? See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3(20), 3-6 (Supp. 1969). If the child is
found to be an abused child a dispositional hearing is ordered to determine who should
be awarded custody. Alternatives include: termination of parental rights, temporary cus-
tody with some state agency and a rehearing within some defined time period, or return
of the child to his parents but under court supervision and a rehearing within some defined
time period. See, e.g., CoLo. Rsv. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-13 (Supp. 1967).
Washington is the sole state which limits records in the central registry to adjudi-
cated reports.
Every law enforcement agency shall forward copies of all reports received to
the state registry after investigation has shown that the child's injuries were
the result of abuse or if the cause remains unknown.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 418.765 (1973).
,' The abuse of recorded and computerized information is increasingly recognized as
a serious invasion of privacy. See S.2810, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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the right to establish relevant rules and regulations concerning
access." To protect all people who have been reported, this infor-
mation should be available only to those persons with a bona fide
legal interest, and with proper safeguards.42
The children whom the central registry is designed to protect
become emancipated at the age of 18, move out of their homes
and, in effect, move out of danger. Accordingly, opponents argue,
the recorded information is no longer necessary for the protection
of a particular child, and such information should be expunged
automatically after a statutory time period. Only four states pres-
ently make provisions for the automatic expungement of recorded
material. 3 The majority of states either make no statutory provi-
sion for expungement or have granted the right to provide guide-
lines for expungement to a state agency, and the state agency has
failed to promulgate the needed rules.
On the other hand, it is arguable that legislation could be
narrowly drawn to protect against unfounded and unnecessary
recording and the arbitrary release of information.
V. SOLUTIONS
Only in severe cases is child abuse in its early stages easily
identifiable." Because the initial diagnosis must require knowl-
edge of the present suspicious injury and of any history of unex-
plained or inadequately explained injuries, 5 if the central registry
is to serve a utilitarian purpose, records cannot be limited just to
adjudicated cases of abuse. At the same time, a standard must
be developed which will exclude reports made without some cred-
" States which have created a central registry but have failed to specify who shall
have access and which have failed to grant to some state agency the right to create rules
and regulations which would give certain persons access include: Ark., Ill., Kan., N.J.,
Ohio, Ore., Pa., and R.I. See Appendix for appropriate statutes.
" States which have legislatively specified who shall have access include: Alas., Cal.,
La., Md., Mich., Mo., N.Y., Okla., S.D., Tenn., Tex., and Va. See Appendix for appro-
priate statutes. Other states have statutorily delegated the power to create rules and
regulations which would grant to certain persons access to records contained in the central
registry. Those states include: Colo., Conn., Del., Hawaii, Mass., N.H., N.C., and Wyo.
See Appendix for appropriate statutes.
'1 Ariz., N.Y., Tenn., and Va. are the four states providing for automatic expunge-
ment. See Appendix for appropriate statutes.
" This is particularly true in those states which have defined child abuse to include
"emotional abuse." See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1002 (Supp. 1972); KAN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 38-721, -722 (1973); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (Supp. 1974); S.D.
COMPILED LAws ANN. § 26-10-12.2 (Supp. 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1203 (Supp. 1973);
Thx. FAM. CODE § 34.01 (1973). See also Fraser, supra note 7, at 107 n.12 for a definition
and explanation of emotional abuse.
1 C. KEMPE, H. SILvER & D. O'BRIEN, supra note 2.
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ible evidence of child abuse," and procedures must be developed
for the immediate removal of reports which, after further investi-
gation, prove to be false.
To serve the purposes of the central registry, physicians
should have direct access to information contained within it, and
reports of suspected abuse should be filed with reports of adjudi-
cated abuse. Information must be appropriately cross referenced
and indexed, probably in a computerized system, to make it
available in a matter of minutes. The use of a central registry
with appropriate safeguards should produce an increase in the
number of reports of child abuse. With a greater number of child
abuse cases reported, clearer definition should emerge of who the
abusers are, who is likely to be abused, and where abuse is likely
to take place. With an early identification of child abuse and with
adequate therapeutic programs available to abused children and
their abusing parents, the incidence of serious abuse should dec-
line, and the possibility of future abuse should lessen. 7
Legislation for an effective central registry48 must provide for
reports of both suspected and adjudicated cases of child abuse.
At a minimum, each report should include the name, age, and
present address of the abused child; the names (maiden name, all
married names, and aliases, appropriately cross referenced), and
address or addresses of the parents/caretakers; the nature of the
injury and all previous unexplained injuries; the name, address,
and occupation of the reporter; any services which have been
offered to the parties (those which have been accepted and those
which have been refused); the name, address, and occupation of
any person requesting information from the central registry;" the
names and ages of any siblings; and the final disposition of the
case.
The reports should be released only to those persons specified
by law, including: (a) a physician who is examining a child he
" See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SEav. § 422(5) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
41 If one accepts the premise that child abuse is learned behavior and is passed down
from generation to generation, it follows that if the cycle of present abuse is severed, future
incidents of child abuse are prevented. See D. GIL, VIOLENcE AGAINST CMLDREN 48 (1970).
11 Probably the best statutory provision for a central registry is found in New York's
new child abuse act. See N.Y. Soc. Szav. § 422 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
,1 The assumption underlying this provision is that a person who requests information
from the central registry must have some appropriate reason for doing so, e.g., a physician
who has before him a child whom he believes may have been abused. By listing the name,
the occupation, and the address of the person requesting information, another resource
for information becomes available to other physicians.
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reasonably suspects may have been abused; (b) a person author-
ized to place a child in protective custody when that person has
before him a child whom he reasonably believes may have been
abused; (c) an agency having the responsibility for the care or
supervision of a subject of a report;50 (d) any person who is a
subject of a report;5 (e) a court or a grand jury upon a finding
that the information is necessary to resolve an issue before it; (f)
a person who is engaged in bona fide research provided that no
identifying information is made available to the researcher unless
it is absolutely essential for research purposes and the state board
of social welfare gives its prior approval. 2 In no event should
reports be made available for employment or credit purposes, or
to any law enforcement agency.53 Any person who willfully per-
mits or who encourages the release of data contained in the regis-
try to persons not legally entitled to such information, should be
held criminally liable.
4
Any person who is the subject of a report should be permitted
to request in writing that the report be amended, sealed, or ex-
punged if he believes the report is unfounded. If the request is
denied, the person making that request should be so notified in
writing55 and be entitled to a hearing to determine whether the
denial was justified. In such a hearing, the local child protection
agency and the central registry should have the burden of proof,
but any previous judicial determination of child abuse, sexual
abuse, or neglect must be presumptive evidence that such a re-
port is true. 51 When a child who is the subject of a report reaches
18 years of age, the record should be sealed but not destroyed.57
w Subject of a report is any child reported to the central registry as abused and the
parents or other persons legally responsible for the child who are also named in the report.
11 Any person named in the report as a suspected child abuser should have access to
the information contained in the registry, excluding the name, address, and occupation
of the reporter. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 422(4) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
52 These provisions giving access to certain enumerated persons follow the provisions
of the new New York child abuse act very closely. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 422(4) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1973). See also ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-546.03(C) (1974); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11161.5(a) (West Supp. 1974); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 35A(i) (Supp. 1973); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-1207 (Supp. 1973).
0 Records of convictions for child abuse appear with records of criminal convictions.
There is no reason why the central registry should also disclose this information.
11 See MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 51F (Supp. 1974); N.Y. Soc. SERv. § 422(10)
(McKinney Supp. 1973).
" See N.Y. Soc. SERV. §§ 422(8), (9) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
9 See id. § 422(8).




When it is reasonably believed that a younger sibling or the off-
spring of the original abused child is then being abused, access
to that sealed report should be made available through petition
to the agency and the central registry.58
If legislation is drafted as outlined here, the abused child, as
well as all others involved, will be protected against improper use
of the records. The answer to any further argument is that the
danger to our children that we know exists and the utilitarian
value that an adequate central registry will provide outweigh the
possibility of abuse and personal indiscretion, which can be mini-
mized by establishing narrow procedural guidelines.
CONCLUSION
The concept of a central registry for recording instances of
child abuse is here to stay. For maximum effectiveness, it is
hoped that the eventual form will be somewhat akin to what has
been described above.
A more far-reaching problem in state central registry systems
arises from the transience between states so prevalent today.
That there have been a number of reports made and recorded in
the central registry in California, for example, is of little value to
a physician and protective service agency in New York, if the
suspect party is now living there. State reports could be coordi-
nated in one of two ways. A federal central registry, which would
house all reports of suspected abuse in the country, might be
created. Immediate problems arise with this concept, however,
because there is no one standardized definition of abuse,59 some
states do not have a centralized collection point for reports, and
the Federal Government has no power to require that reports
from individual states be sent to a federal central registry. Yet,
standardizing the definition of abuse and accomplishing the for-
warding of reports to a federal central registry could be achieved
by making such steps conditions precedent to a state receipt of
federal funds allocated to fight child abuse." The second alterna-
tive is the establishment of a central registry in each state which
See N.Y. Soc. SERV. § 422(4) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
" See Hearings on H.R. 6379, H.R. 10552, and H.R. 10968 Before the Select Sub-
comm. on Education of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
18 (1974).
" As a condition precedent to receiving federal funds under Pub. L. No. 93-247, each
state will be required to broaden its definition of abuse to include neglect and to provide
for reporting both known and suspected cases of abuse. Pub. L. No. 93-247 § 4(b)(2)(B)
(Jan. 31, 1974). To qualify for federal aid, 48 states will be required to amend their
reporting statutes.
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would voluntarily exchange child abuse reports with other
states." This approach would presumably be more acceptable to
the various states, and is much more likely to become a reality
than any form of a single, central federal registry.
The department may adopt such rules and regulations as may be
necessary in carrying out the provisions of this section, specifically . . . in
cooperation with other states in exchanging reports to effectuate a national
registry system.
TEX. FAM. CODE § 34.06 (1973). See also ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.040(b) (1971); LA. REV.
STAT. 46:52(14) (Supp. 1974); ORE. REV. STAT. § 418.770 (1973).
CENTRAL REGISTRY
APPENDIX
STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS F-OR CENTRAL REGISTRIES
Statute: The statute in which provision for the creation of a central registry is man-
dated.
Address: The physical location of the central registry within the state.
Access: Those who have been specified by law to have access to the material con-
tained within the central registry.
Safety
factors: The statutory provisions to protect the confidentiality of material within the
central registry and to provide due process to those persons who are the
subject of a report, i.e., expungement, amendment, seal, appeal, penalty for
disclosures.
*Indicates those states which have not replied to two separate written inquir-
ies concerning the functioning of the central registry.
ALABAMA
Statute: No statutorily created central registry. However, there is a "central file" for
reporting previous abuse to a child.
Address: State Department of Pensions and Security, Administrative Building, 64
North Union Street, Montgomery, Alabama 36184.
Access: Social agencies to help in providing and planning protective services; courts




Statute: ALASKA STAT. § 47.17.040 (1971).
Address: Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family and Chil-
dren's Services, Juneau, Alaska 99801.
Access: Appropriate government agencies with child protection functions, (inside
and outside Alaska) in connection with investigations or judicial proceedings
involving child abuse, neglect, or custody.
Safety
factors: Automatic expungement when subject child reaches 18 years of age. Registry
includes investigation reports based on reports of harm, but not the reports
of harm themselves.
ARIZONA
Statute: Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-546.03 1974).
Address: Department of Economic Security, 1717 West Jefferson, P.O. Box 6123,
Phoenix, Arizona 85005.
Access: Social agencies (juvenile court, physicians, and health and education agen-
cies and institutions) with approval of Director of Economic Security.
Safety
factors: Automatic expungement when subject child reaches 18 years of age.
ARKANSAS
Statute: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 42-803 (Supp. 1973).
Address: Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services, P.O. Box 1437, Little
Rock, Arkansas 72203.
Access: No written guidelines as to who shall have access; information given to extra
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CALIFORNIA
Statute: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1161.5(a) (West Supp. 1974).
Address: Special Services, Bureau of Identification, Department of Justice, 3301 C
Street, P.O. Box B417, Sacramento, California 95813.




Statute: COLO. aEv. STAT. ANN. § 22-10-6 (Supp. 1969).
Address: Department of Social Services, 1575 Sherman Street, Denver, Colorado
80203.
Access: Protective service agencies; may be given to others if disclosure is consistent




Statute: Pub. L. No. 73-205(g), 3 CONN. LEG. SEiv. (1973).
Address: Welfare Department, State of Connecticut, 100 Asylum Avenue, Hartford,
Connecticut 06115.
Access: Physician, surgeon, resident, intern, registered nurse, licensed practical
nurse, medical examiner, dentist, psychologist, teacher, school principal,
school guidance counselor, social worker, police officer, clergyman.
Safety
factors: Automatic expungement when subject child reaches 18 years of age.
DELAWARE
Statute: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 1004(b) (Supp. 1972).
Address: Division of Social Services, P.O. Box 309, Wilmington, Delaware 19899.
Access: Operating procedures for the central registry never formulated; however, it
is implied that legitimate professionals would have access.
Safety
factors: Statutory provisions require files to be confidential, subject to rules and
regulations as adopted by the Division of Social Services.
DisTRcr OF COLUMBIA
Statute: No statutorily created central registry. However, the Youth Division of the
Metropolitan Police Department does maintain a registry.
Address: Youth Division, Metropolitan Police Department, 25 K Street N.E., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20002.




Statute: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 828.041(7) (Supp. 1974).
Address: Department of Family Services, P.O. Box 2050, Jacksonville, Florida 32203.
Access: Given when appropriate, e.g., in connection with treatment for an abused




Statute: No statutorily created central registry, but one has been created by adminis-
trative order.
Address: Georgia Department of Human Resources, 47 Trinity Avenue, Atlanta, Geor-
gia 30334.
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Statute: HAWAII REV. STAT. § 350-2 (1968).
Address: Department of Social Services and Housing, State of Hawaii, P.O. Box 339,
Honolulu, Hawaii 96809.
Access: Staff of the Department of Social Services and Housing and social agencies
(not defined) working with the child or family who has been registered.
Safety
factors: Departmental policy of confidentiality.
IDAHO
Statute: No statutorily created central registry. However, a central registry was cre-
ated by and is maintained at the Department of Environmental and Com-
munity Services.
Address: Department of Environmental and Community Services, Statehouse, Boise,
Idaho 83720.




Statute: ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2047 (Smith-Hurd 1974).
Address: Department of Children and Family Services, State Administration Offices,
524 South 2d Avenue, Springfield, Illinois 62706.




Statute: No statutorily created central registry. However, a central registry is main-
tained by the Department of Public Welfare.
Address: Department of Public Welfare, 100 North Senate Avenue, Room 701, Indian-
apolis, Indiana 46204.




Statute: No statutory provision for a central registry.
KANSAS
Statute: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-721 (1973).
Address: State Department of Social Welfare, State Office Building, Topeka, Kansas
66612.




Statute: No statutory provision for the creation of a central registry. However, a
central registry is maintained in the Department for Human Resources.
Address: Department for Human Resources for Social Services, 403 Wapping Street,
Bush Building, Frankfort, Kentucky 40601.
Access: Staff of Department of Human Resources; staff of Metropolitan Social Ser-
vices Department in Louisville.
Safety
factors: None. However, if suspected child abuse is not confirmed (undefined), there
is an "attempt" to remove the information.
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LOUISIANA
Statute: LA. REV. STAT. § 14:403(B) (Supp. 1974).
Address: Health and Social Rehabilitation Services Administration, P.O. Box 44065,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804.
Access: Local child service agencies, hospitals, clinics, schools. Statute provides for




Statute: MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27, § 35A (Supp. 1973).
Address: Department of Employment and Social Services, Social Services Adminis-
tration, 1305 St. Paul Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21202.
Access: Local departments of social services, social agencies, law enforcement agen-
cies, physicians, health and educational facilities.
Safety
factors: Limited form of appeal to Social Services Administration.
MASSACHUSETTS
Statute: MASS. GEN. LAWS Am. ch. 119, § 51F (Supp. 1974).
Address: Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Public Welfare, Central
Office, 21 Jones Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02118.
Access: Not enumerated.
Safety
factors: Fine for release of unauthorized information.
MICHIGAN
Statute: MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.564(2) (1969).
Address: Department of Social Services, 300 South Capitol Avenue, Lansing, Michi-
gan 48926.




Statute: No statutory requirement for a central registry. However, a central registry
is maintained by the State Department of Public Welfare.





Statute: No statutory requirement for a central registry. One has been created by
administrative order.
Address: State Department of Public Welfare, P.O. Box 4321, Fondren Station, 600
Woolfolk Building, Jackson, Mississippi 39216.
Access: Department of Public Welfare, state agencies, courts.
Safety
factors: Automatic expungement when subject child reaches 21 years of age.
MISSOURI
Statute: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 210.107(3) (Supp. 1974).
Address: State Department of Public Health and Welfare, Division of Welfare, Broad-
way State Office Building, Jefferson City, Missouri 65101.
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MONTANA
Statute: MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 10-903 (Supp. 1973).





Statute: NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1504(3) (Supp. 1973).
Address: Department of Public Welfare, 1526 K Street, 4th Floor, Lincoln, Nebraska
68508.
Access: County attorney, juvenile courts, county and state welfare department direc-
tors in Nebraska and other states. Information available only for purposes
directly connected with protection of a child or incompetent or disabled





Statute: No statutorily created central registry. However, the welfare department has
created its own central registry.
Address: Department of Health, Welfare and Rehabilitation, Welfare Division, 201
South Fall Street, Carson City, Nevada 89701.




Statute: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 571:25(a)-30 (Supp. 1971).
Address: Department of Health and Welfare, Division of Welfare, 8 Loudon Road,
Concord, New Hampshire 03301.




Statute: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.11 (Supp. 1974).
Address: Department of Institutions and Agencies, Division of Youth and Family
Services, 1 South Montgomery Road, Trenton, New Jersey 08625.




Statute: No statutory nor administrative provision for the creation of a central regis-
try.
NEW YORK
Statute: N.Y. Soc. SERv. § 422 (McKinney Supp. 1973).
Address: Office of Social Services Information, New York State Department of Social
Services, 1450 Western Avenue, Albany, New York 12203.
Access: Physician, person authorized to place child in temporary custody, agency
having responsibility for the care of a child, subject of the report, court and
grand jury when necessary, any legislative committee for bona fide research.
Safety
factors: Only indicated reports are kept. Automatic expungement, sealing of records,
right to amend, right to appeal, penalty for illegal release of data.
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NORTH CAROLINA
Statute: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 110-22 (Supp. 1973).
Address: Department of Human Resources, Department of Social Services, 325 North
Salisbury Street, Raleigh, North Carolina 27611.
Access: Anyone, for bona fide research purposes. (Hypothetically, anyone has access
to information contained in the central registry if he writes to the Commis-
sioner of Social Services giving assurance of confidentiality and explanation




Statute: No statutorily nor administratively created central registry.
OHIO
Statute: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.421 (Page Supp. 1973).
Address: Ohio Department of Public Welfare, 408 East Town Street, Columbus, Ohio
43215.




Statute: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1973).
Address: Oklahoma Public Welfare Commission, Department of Institutions, Social
and Rehabilitative Services, Sequoyah Memorial Office Building, Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma 73125.
Access: Any county office of the Department of Institutions, Social and Rehabilita-
tive Services; any district attorney's office; any public law enforcement




Statute: ORE. REV. STAT. § 418.765 (1973).
Address: Department of Human Resources, Public Service Building, Salem, Oregon
90310.
Access: Physician, law enforcement agencies inside and outside Oregon.
Safety
factors: Expungement when subject child reaches 15 years of age.
PENNSYLVANIA
Statute: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 2106 (Supp. 1974).






Statute: R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 40-11-4 (Supp. 1973).
Address: Department of Social and Rehabilitative Services, Division of Community
Services, 600 New London Avenue, Cranston, Rhode Island 02920.




Statute: No statutorily created central registry. However, a central registry has been
created by administrative rule.
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Statute: S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 26-10-12.2 (Supp. 1973).
Address: Division of Social Welfare, Pierre, South Dakota 57501.
Access: Attorney general, state's attorneys, judges of the court, any other person by





Statute: TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1207 (Supp. 1973).
Address: Department of Public Welfare, State Office Building, Nashville, Tennessee
37219.
Access: Statute delegates adoption of rules for disclosure for purposes of research and
cooperation with local child service agencies including, but not limited to,
hospitals, clinics, schools, and physicians in identifying cases of harm.
Safety
factors: Expungement when subject child reaches 18 years of age.
TEXAS
Statute: TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 34.06 (1973).
Address: State Department of Public Welfare, John H. Reagan Building, Austin,
Texas 78701.
Access: Welfare department to develop rules and regulations for cooperation with
local child service agencies, hospitals, clinics, physicians, and schools, and




Statute: No statutory provision for creation of a central registry, nor administratively
created central registry.
VERMONT
Statute: No statutory provision for a central registry; however, the Department of
Rehabilitation has created a central registry.






Statute: VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-217.1 (Supp. 1973).
Address: Department of Welfare and Institutions, Welfare and Institutions Building,
429 South Belvidere Street, Richmond, Virginia 23220.
Access: Any state or local government agency.
Safety
factors: Expungement when subject child reaches 18 years of age.
WASHINGTON
Statute: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.070 (Supp. 1973).




Access: Law enforcement agencies (defined by administrative ruling to include coro-
ners, hospitals, physicians, and other state agencies), professionals (defined
by rules and regulations as those who might be treating the child or family).
Safety
factors: None. (However, an opinion of the state attorney general's office limits re-
ports to substantiated reports.)
WEST VIRGINIA
Statute: No statutory provision for a central registry; however, one is maintained in
the attorney general's office.
Address: Department of Welfare, Charleston, West Virginia 25305.




Statute: No statutory provision for a central registry; however, one is maintained in
the Department of Health and Social Services.
Address: Department of Health and Social Services, 1 West Wilson Street, Madison,
Wisconsin 53702.
Access: County welfare agency, licensed voluntary agency, public agencies in other
states.
Safety
factors: Expungement within 10 years.
WYOMING
Statute: WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-28.13 (Supp. 1973).
Address: Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Public Assistance and
Social Services, State Office Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002.
Access: Not enumerated.
Safety
factors: Central Registry records subject to rules concerning preservation, use, and
production of records of Department of Health and Social Services for judi-
cial proceedings. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 42-19 (Supp. 1973).
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INVERSE CONDEMNATION-A VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
By HAROLD A. FEDER,* CHRISTI WIELAND**
INTRODUCTION
Citizens are experiencing a steady increase in governmental
activities which often encroach on various individual property
rights. The areas range from highway and airport projects to so-
cial and environmental problems. Some programs which benefit
the general public often impose an undue burden on a single
person or entity. The law of eminent domain was fashioned out
of this conflict between the interest of the public vis-a-vis the
principle of indemnity for the resultant damage. Over the years
Colorado has developed a sound legal basis in eminent domain
through statutes and case law.'
But situations have arisen in which private property or con-
commitants of its ownership were taken or damaged for public
use without formal condemnation proceedings and without com-
pensation. A remedy was needed to alleviate these situations
whereby a landowner could institute an action to recover for loss
when the entity possessing condemnation power failed to insti-
tute condemnation proceedings for compensation. The remedy
which emerged was inverse condemnation. The cause of action is
"inverse" because traditional constitutional eminent domain
guarantees are invoked by the owner rather than a public agency.
Because of the proliferation of government projects, the prac-
titioner should be aware of possible damages which a client may
suffer through various activities. There should be an awareness
that inverse condemnation is an available remedy; elements of
the action must be known; and the procedures to follow in pursu-
ing this remedy should be understood. This article will establish
the groundwork for an inverse condemnation case in Colorado
and suggest possible new areas for future use.
Rights of citizens in matters relating to eminent domain are
based upon constitutional guarantees, statutory interpretations,
and common law developments. The United States Constitution
provides:
No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property
*Partner, Feder & Morris, P.C., Denver, Colorado; LL.B., University of Colorado,
1959; J.D., University of Colorado, 1968.
**Attorney at law, Texaco, Inc.; J.D., University of Nebraska, 1973.
Board of Cornm'rs v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 P. 621 (1920); Denver Circle R.R. v.
Nestor, 10 Colo. 403, 15 P. 714 (1887).
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without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation.
2
In keeping with basic standards of the Federal Constitution, the
Colorado founding document provides likewise, but enlarges the
coverage:
Private property shall not be taken or damaged, for public or
private use, without just compensation ....
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.
3
The emphasized portions of the Colorado constitution provide
substantial bases for many inverse condemnation cases. Often
the cases involve damaging rather than taking; consequently, the
added language in the Colorado constitution provides distinct
theoretical and philosophical advantages to the practitioner.
I. ELEMENTS OF THE ACTION
A system of fundamental principles applicable to inverse
condemnation proceedings can be derived from constitutional,
statutory, and common law decisions. Inverse condemnation is a
very limited action, and caution should be exercised in ascertain-
ing that all elements are present. Inverse condemnation is taking
(or damaging under the Colorado constitution)4 private property
without formal proceedings for public (or private) use and with-
out just compensation being paid by a government agency or
private entity with the right of condemnation.
Taking: Foremost among the elements is that there must be
a taking or, as in Colorado and some other jurisdictions, a damag-
ing of private property for public purposes.5 In Colorado, constitu-
tional guarantees also apply to taking of private property for pri-
vate purposes, e.g., where land has been condemned to afford
access to landlocked real property.' This threshold element is
often the most difficult to pinpoint. The legislature has left to the
judiciary determinations of when governmental action becomes
so restrictive as to constitute a taking. Court decisions are some-
times vague, conflicting, and without pattern.'
' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 15 (emphasis added).
Id.
Approximately one-half of the states require just compensation for "damaging" as
well as "taking." 2A P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN, § 6.44 (rev. 3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter
cited as NICHOLS].
COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 15.
See Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search For Inverse
Condemnation Criteria, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1970).
[VOL. 51
INVERSE CONDEMNATION
Federal limitations on "taking" actions are considerably
more restrictive than Colorado's and require rather severe inter-
ference with property before compensation will be allowed.' A
good example of the narrow federal limits are the overflight cases
which use the pro forma rule that the offending plane must fly
directly overhead.' An adjacent homeowner who is afflicted with
smoke or noise, but does not suffer penetration of usable airspace
above the real property is denied compensation because there is
no taking found. Federal courts have long distinguished between
taking and consequential damages, the latter not being recovera-
ble.10
In other areas, the physical invasion test has not been as
important. The classic example of rejection of this rigid standard
was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon." Speaking for the Court,
Justice Holmes reasoned: "[W]hile property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized
as a taking."'" Every temporary trespass or damaging is not ipso
facto a constitutional taking. Recently there has been a growing
recognition at the federal level of the need to expand the scope
of compensation to those affected by government activity. This
attitude is evidenced by enactments such as the Highway Reloca-
tion Assistance Act' 3 and the Uniform Relocation Assistance and
Real Property Acquisitions Policies Act of 1970.'"
While mere damage will probably not support a federal re-
covery, it will base state action in Colorado.' 5 Colorado's constitu-
tion provides protection for property interests which substantially
exceed that available under the fifth amendment. It not only
recognizes an invasion which may be so severe as to amount to a
taking, but also damages alone may be compensable. Recovery
for damage, however, is not unrestricted; it must be different in
both kind and degree from that suffered by the general public.'6
Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
2 Id.; United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
o Nunnaly v. United States, 239 F. 2d 521 (4th Cir. 1956). Some states have relaxed
this standard in state cases to allow recovery. See also Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233
Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962) wherein the standard applied was whether the interference
is sufficiently disturbing to the use and enjoyment as to constitute a taking.
260 U.S. 393 (1922).
I d. at 415.
,3 23 U.S.C. §§ 501-12 (1970), repealed Act of Jan. 2, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-646,
§ 220(a), 84 Stat. 1903.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 (1970).
* CoLo. CONST. art. 2, § 15.
* Radinsky v. City & County of Denver, 159 Colo. 134, 410 P.2d 644 (1966); Gayton
v. Department of Highways, 149 Colo. 72, 367 P.2d 899 (1962); City of Colorado Springs
1974
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Private Property: The common law theory of land owner-
ship-cajus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum (implied rights to
the heavens above)-no longer exists. While air travel has limited
ownership rights in some ways, 7 there has also been a corollary
expansion in the definition of ownership in other ways. If property
for fifth amendment purposes means only possessory interest in
real property, the concept of inverse condemnation would present
little difficulty. This highly restrictive construction of property,
however, was rejected by the Supreme Court in United States v.
Welch.' The Court reasoned that an easement, like the right of
possession, was just one element in the entire bundle of property
rights held by the farmer in his land. Property interference may
include not only property itself, but the right to acquire, use, and
dispose of it.'" Included are such things as water rights 0 and
easements." This expanded constitutional concept of property to
include intangible rights makes it more difficult to determine
whether or not the government has "taken" anything. As prop-
erty rights evolve to include all those things incidental to owner-
ship, anything which damages one of these rights to that extent
destroys or diminishes the value of the property itself. It is axio-
matic that all references to "property" include both real and
personal property interests.
Without Formal Proceedings or Just Compensation: Two ele-
ments of inverse condemnation which differ from regular con-
demnation are: (a) the property was taken without formal pro-
ceedings, and (b) the property was taken without just compensa-
tion being paid. These elements turn the tables and cause the
property owner to become the plaintiff. There are no significant
definitional problems attached to the other elements of inverse
condemnation; all that is required is absence of a proceeding and
lack of compensation.
Public Use: The taking must be for a "public use" which is
a very broad and flexible term. Colorado courts have held that
property is taken for public use when it is taken to subserve a
v. Weiher, 110 Colo. 55, 129 P.2d 988 (1942); Gilbert v. Greeley, S.L. & P. Ry., 13 Colo.
501, 22 P. 814 (1889).
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
" 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
City of Englewood v. Apostolic Christian Church, 146 Colo. 374, 362 P.2d 172
(1961).
1 Farmers Irr. Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962);
United States v. Martin, 267 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1959).
11 City & County of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 P. 6 (1883).
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public purpose.22 Other cases hold that it must serve a public
benefit or be of a public nature or advantage.23 None of these
definitions establish a clear standard. The "use by public" test
in Colorado is not an infallible definition because the takings for
various private enterprises such as for restaurants and hotels
would presumptively be covered. Mere numbers of people who
use the property taken is not determinative of whether it consti-
tutes a public use.24 A few examples of what Colorado courts have
found to be public use are highways, 25 irrigation districts and
canals, 6 urban renewal,"7 schools,28 and parks. 9 Accrual of broad
public benefits seems to be the common thread.
Primarily, the right to declare what shall be deemed a public
use is vested in the legislature. The presumption is that a use is
public if the legislature has declared it to be such. 0 Courts do not
inquire into the necessity of the taking or whether it is a "public
use" unless "bad faith" by the condemning body is found,3' or
unless the action was fraudulent or unreasonable. 2
Authority to Condemn: There can be no inverse condemna-
tion in a situation where no right existed in a governmental
agency to proceed under eminent domain.3 Because condemna-
tion is in derogation of common law, statutes relating to it must
be strictly construed,34 and the grant of authority must be clearly
expressed. 5 In the absence of these elements, another theory of
recovery must be pursued.
II. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
The general procedure to be followed before undertaking an
21 McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281, 244 P. 1017 (1926).
" Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922);
Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 P. 464 (1906).
2 Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 P. 464 (1906).
Town of Greenwood Village v. District Court, 138 Colo. 283, 332 P.2d 210 (1958).
Dillinger v. North Sterling Irr. Dist., 135 Colo. 95, 308 P.2d 606 (1957); Farmers
Indep. Ditch Co. v. Agricultural Ditch Co., 22 Colo. 513, 45 P. 444 (1896).
'7 Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Authority, 509 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1973).
Schaefer v. School Dist., 111 Colo. 340, 141 P.2d 903 (1943).
Londoner v. City & County of Denver, 52 Colo. 15, 119 P. 156 (1911).
0 Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 83 P. 464 (1906).
11 Colorado State Bd. of Land Comm'rs v. District Court, 163 Colo. 338, 430 P.2d 617
(1967); Mack v. Board of County Comm'rs, 152 Colo. 300, 381 P.2d 987 (1963); Welch v.
City & County of Denver, 141 Colo. 587, 349 P.2d 352 (1960).
32 City & County of Denver v. Board of Comm'rs, 113 Colo. 150, 156 P.2d 101 (1945).
Game & Fish Comm'n v. Farmers Irr. Co., 162 Colo. 301, 426 P.2d 562 (1967).
Healy v. City of Delta, 59 Colo. 124, 147 P. 662 (1915); Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v.
Four Mile Ry., 29 Colo. 90, 66 P. 902 (1901).
- Potashnik v. Public Serv. Co., 126 Colo. 98, 247 P.2d 137 (1952).
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inverse condemnation case includes carefully examining the
premises in question. There should be a visual observation as well
as a title search; all available information must be gathered. It
would behoove counsel to become familiar with the surrounding
area and to note the character of the property and neighborhood
to determine whether the injury is peculiar to the client and to
assess a damage framework. To reiterate, the injury is not com-
pensable if it is suffered by the general public. When examining
the property, first ascertain if any physical invasion fulfills the
"taking or damaged" test. There are many intrusions which up-
hold the "taking or damaged" requirement, but none as persu-
asive or convincing to a jury as those which are visible. Considera-
tion must also be given to whether the invasion is an aggravation
of a preexisting condition or the creation of a new one. Old prob-
lems may not be actionable because of laches, release, or statutes
of limitation.
It is important to consider three causes of action available in
inverse condemnation cases. First, claims for damage resulting
from diminution in market value of claimant's property as a re-
sult of the public project might be considered "pure" inverse
condemnation. If the federal government or a federal agency is
the defendant, the Tucker Act36 is applicable under which claims
must be based upon the Constitution, an act of Congress, a regu-
lation of an executive department, any express or implied con-
tract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated
damages in cases not sounding in tort. If the claim arises due to
nonfederal invasion, the pure common law action is most fre-
quently used. Unfortunately, monetary remuneration is the only
feasible remedy.
Second, because of growing dissatisfaction with the rigid
"direct and peculiar and substantial a burden" test37 which is
required in inverse condemnation cases, nuisance is sometimes
seen as an alternative remedy.38 The essence of private nuisance
is an interference with use and enjoyment of land.39 Interference
must be substantial and unreasonable. Many areas and situa-
tions can be covered by nuisance because the breadth of defini-
tion of interference can include an infinite variety of invasions.
3, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
17 Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 557 (1914).
31 Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 920, 496 P.2d 480, 101 Cal. Rptr. 568
(1972).
' W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 89 (4th ed. 1971).
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Third, trespass is another alternative. The relationship be-
tween trespass and inverse condemnation was recently delineated
by the Colorado Supreme Court in Ossman v. Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph Co.40 That case held "that a landowner
has a right to sue in trespass even though the trespasser may have
the statutory power of eminent domain with respect to the land
on which the trespass occurs."' The landowner has the right to
elect to sue in trespass where the trespasser refuses to promptly
initiate eminent domain proceedings. Trespass offers an advan-
tage over inverse condemnation because exemplary damages as
well as special damages may be awarded in a proper case.
Three areas of equitable relief are also available. First, in-
junction is sometimes sought to prevent the project from being
constructed or the operation from continuing. As with the other
types of equitable relief, courts are hesitant to entertain this rem-
edy unless there is an absolute absence of legal remedies.42 This
inquiry is the proper method to question unlawful or improper
exercise of eminent domain power, but the court still does not
have power to inquire into the necessity of exercising the power.
4 3
Second, mandamus action inquires into the governmental
authority to undertake a project. It must clearly appear that the
landowner is legally entitled to the relief, benefit or protection
sought to be enforced, and that the agency is under a legal duty
to perform or abstain from the acts in question.
Third, prohibition lies in these settings to prevent a court
from exceeding its jurisdiction. It is frequently used in conjunc-
tion with mandamus or injunction.44
Some cases may warrant combining several mentioned reme-
dies. Courts often use and blend nuisance and trespass terminol-
ogy in deciding inverse condemnation cases. The resulting amal-
gamation tends to obscure the decisional basis. A recent nuance
in the field of inverse condemnation has presented itself under the
expanding view in federal courts of the Civil Rights Act.45 Cast
in this setting, numerous fact situations are suggestive of conduct
under color of state law of such a nature as to be either a threat-
ened deprivation of constitutionally guaranteed rights or a flat
abusive or coercive exercise of the power of eminent domain.
520 P.2d 738 (Colo. 1974).
" Id. at 740.
4" Colorado Cent. Power Co. v. City of Englewood, 89 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1937).
'3 Dunham v. City of Golden, 31 Colo. App. 433, 504 P.2d 360 (1972).
" Colorado ex rel. Watrous v. District Court of United States, 207 F.2d 50 (10th Cir.
1953).
,3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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Except for pleadings of the property owner, usual and cus-
tomary procedures of direct condemnation actions are followed in
inverse matters." Two eminent domain concepts in direct con-
demnation are highly analogous to the legal procedures to be
followed in an inverse condemnation case. They are: (a) a partial
taking with residual damage, 7 and (b) the taking or destruction
of access without a physical intrusion." Methods of putting on
evidence and submission of issues in trial in an inverse case are,
for all intents and purposes, very similar to direct condemnation.
Since 1951, federal procedure in condemnation cases has been
governed by Rule 71(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; state
procedure is governed by Chapter 50 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes.
In Colorado, inverse condemnation proceedings are tried as
if they were eminent domain proceedings.49 Consequently, inverse
condemnation proceedings are statutory in nature and must be
conducted strictly according to procedures set out in the eminent
domain statute.5 The district courts have jurisdiction over any
case concerning property situated within their boundaries." Rule
98 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure places venue in the
county in which the subject of the action, or a substantial part
of it, is located. There are several advantages in bringing the
action in state courts. Colorado generally recognizes a condem-
nee's right to recover reasonable expert witness fees. 2 Attorneys'
fees had not previously been included as compensable expenses,
but statutory enactment now makes it possible for a property
owner to recover these fees if successful in the proceeding. 5 There
" Union Exploration Co. v. Moffatt Tunnel Improvement Dist., 104 Colo. 109, 89
P.2d 257 (1939); San Luis Valley Irr. Dist. v. Noffsinger, 85 Colo. 202, 274 P. 827 (1929).
,7 United States v. Grizzard, 219 U.S. 180 (1911).
City of Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888).
,Ossman v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 520 P.2d 738, 742 (Colo. 1974).
5, Id. The Colorado eminent domain statute is contained in COLO. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§§ 50-1-1 to -6-22 (1963).
5' Id. § 50-6-2 (1963); id. § 50-1-2 (Supp. 1965).
52 Leadville Water Co. v. Parkville Water Dist., 164 Colo. 362, 436 P.2d 659 (1967);
Denver Joint Stock Land Bank v. Board of County Comm'rs, 105 Colo. 366, 98 P.2d 283
(1940); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 56-6-2(4) (Supp. 1971).
'. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-10-16 (Supp. 1971).
Inverse condemnation proceedings. Where an inverse condemnation pro-
ceeding is instituted by the owner of any right, title, or interest in real
property because of the alleged taking of his property for any program or
project for which federal financial assistance will be available to pay all or
any part of the cost of the program or project, the court, rendering a judg-
ment for the plaintiff in such proceeding and awarding compensation for the
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has been neither statutory nor common law right in federal courts
for the allowance of expert fees in any type of case, including
condemnation;54 however, a recent trend in federal legislation and
court decisions in this area is toward recognizing the right to
recover expert witness fees and in some cases attorneys' fees.5
Actions may be removed from state to federal courts if the
district court would have had original jurisdiction or if there is a
federal question." It must be noted, however, that the state and
state agencies are not "citizens." Consequently, where condem-
nation is by the state or one of its agencies, removal is improper.57
The Tucker Act 8 is Congress' only grant of jurisdiction over
claims against the United States for a violation of the fifth
amendment's prohibition against governmental taking of private
property without just compensation. 9 The Tucker Act grants
plenary jurisdiction to the Court of Claims, 0 while district court
jurisdiction is limited to claims not exceeding $10,000.1 The
taking of property, or attorney for the acquiring agency effecting a settlement
of any such proceeding, shall determine and award or allow to such plaintiff,
as a part of such judgment or settlement, such sum as will, in the opinion of
the court or such attorney, reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs,
disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and
engineering fees, actually incurred because of such proceeding.
Id.
Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 58 F.2d 159 (8th Cir. 1932); Taylor v.
Washington Terminal Co., 308 F. Supp. 1152 (D.D.C. 1970); Morgan v. Knight, 294 F.
Supp. 40 (E.D.N.C. 1968).
" United States v. 12.85 Acres of Land, 321 F. Supp. 651 (S.D. Tenn. 1971). This case
held that 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970) which provides certain costs "may be awarded to the
prevailing party in any civil action brought by or against the United States" applies to
condemnation. 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (1970) now provides for payment of attorneys' fees as well
as appraisers' fees if the United States abandons a condemnation action or if the court
declares no federal right to take the property.
" 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970).
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil
action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the
defendants, to the district court of the United States . ...
(b) [Federal question cases may be removed without regard to citizenship
but] any other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in
interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in
which such action is brought.
" State Highway Comm'n v. Utah Constr. Co., 278 U.S. 194 (1929); Colorado ex rel.
Land Acquisition Comm'n v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 143 F. Supp. 703 (D. Colo.
1956).
Federal Tort Claims Act 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970).
Vigil v. United States, 293 F. Supp. 1176 (D. Colo. 1970).
28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970).
Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963).
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United States or one of its agencies is defendant in these actions."2
The claim must be based upon the Constitution, an act of Con-
gress, a regulation of an executive department, any express or
implied contract with the United States,"3 or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.64 The district
court may, at its discretion, transfer a case to the Court of Claims
under the Tucker Act when the claim turns out to be more than
$10,000 and "if it be in the interest of justice."" Venue in federal
cases is in the district court of the district where the land is
located or, if located in different districts within the same state,
in any of such districts.
At an early stage in the proceedings, it may be well to test
the efficacy of the complaint by an in limine motion to determine
whether damages claimed are compensable as a matter of law."
In Colorado the court is not authorized to determine questions as
to the necessity of the exercise of power of eminent domain.68 It
may, however, inquire into whether: (1) the governmental body
is entitled to condemn; (2) the property sought to be taken be-
longs to a class of property subject to condemnation; (3) the pur-
pose for which property is sought to be taken is one for which
condemnation is permitted, i.e., a public use; (4) the condemning
body and owner have been able to come to an agreement concern-
ing the purchase of the land-that is, if there were proper negotia-
tions; or (5) the act authorizing the proceeding is constitutional.
Parties: Parties in an inverse condemnation action stand in
opposite relationship to those in direct proceedings. Plaintiffs in
inverse cases are usually owners, occupiers, or possessors of prop-
erty taken or damaged. Other parties in interest who may present
themselves in varying fact situations include tenants for years,"
life tenants, remaindermen or reversioners, 0 mortgagees, per-
", See United States v. Wald, 330 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1964). When the United States
takes property for public use and without compensation, owner may sue under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346 (1970).
11 This theory of implied contract is used often in inverse condemnation cases in that
the government, by appropriating the property right, implies that it will pay for it.
a, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (1970).
28 U.S.C. § 1406(c) (1970). See United States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist., 449 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1971).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1403 (1970).
,7 Troiano v. Colorado Dep't of Highways, 170 Colo. 484, 463 P.2d 448 (1970); Radin-
sky v. City & County of Denver, 159 Colo. 134, 410 P.2d 644 (1966); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-1-1 (1963); Davis, Motions in Limine, 15 CLsv.- MAR. L. REv. 255 (1966).
68 Pine Martin Mining Co. v. Empire Zinc Co., 90 Colo. 529, 11 P.2d 221 (1932).
, A.W. Duckett & Co., v. United States, 266 U.S. 149 (1924).
70 27 AM. JUR. 2d Eminent Domain § 251 (1966).
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sonal representatives, heirs, or owners of mineral and water
rights."
Enlarging the scope of condemnation powers has caused an
increase in the number of entities authorized to condemn. Like-
wise, there has been an expansive growth in the power of con-
demning authorities. Defendants on the federal level customarily
are governmental agencies conducting the project which possess
condemnation powers by virtue of statutory authority founding
the service or agency. Agencies such as the Forest Service, Corps
of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Department of Defense, or
the Department of Interior are included.
On the state level, the state itself is a prime condemner with
its various departments such as the Highway Department and the
Department of Fish and Game. Counties, cities, towns, and
school districts are granted the power of condemnation through
state legislation. Determination as to whether the political subdi-
vision being sued does in fact have the power of condemnation
and whether it is acting within the scope of the grant should be
made. Expansion of condemnation powers and the need for more
public facilities have made the quasi-municipal corporation a
usual defendant in the inverse condemnation setting. Railroad
companies, utility companies, water and sanitation districts, and
urban renewal authorities are included. As with the political sub-
divisions, these quasi-municipal corporations' grant of power and
their scope of power must be carefully scrutinized.
Pleadings: Once the fact situation is enunciated and parties
identified, actual pleading should include certain basics conclud-
ing with a prayer for damages which are required under the Con-
stitution to compensate for property taken." The following items
must be alleged as essential elements precedent to recovery:" (1)
identity and capacity of parties defendant spelled out in detail,
particularly as they relate to the exercise of governmental powers
by defendant; (2) ownership of the fee or a lesser interest in the
land taken; 5 (3) conduct constituting a basis for the cause stated
"1 Twin Lakes Hydraulic Gold Mining Syndicate (Ltd.) v. Colorado M. Ry., 16 Colo.
1, 27 P. 258 (1890).
" U.S. CONST. amend. V.
" See 8 AM. JUR. TRIALs Pleading § 31 (1965).
1, See Wilfong v. United States, 480 F.2d 1326 (Ct. Cl. 1973),wherein the court held
that to support a fifth amendment taking via inverse condemnation, there must not only
be shown federal activity or project, but it must be permanent in nature. Game & Fish
Comm'n v. Farmers Irr. Co., 162 Colo. 306, 426 P.2d 562 (1967).
" Monen v. State Dep't of Highways, 515 P.2d 1246 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973). The right
to damages accrues to the owner of the land at the time of the taking and is personal to
him unless specifically assigned to subsequent grantees.
1974
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with specificity and the exact nature of interference with private
property by condemning authority;" (4) the legal duty of defen-
dant to pay just compensation for land or interest taken or dam-
aged; (5) the neglect or refusal of defendant to pay for land taken
or the damage created; (6) existence of damages to claimant dif-
ferent in both kind and degree from that suffered by the general
public;77 (7) an extensive, step-by-step spelling out of such facts
and circumstances as might entitle claimant to relief; (8) itemiza-
tion of any conduct of the governmental body which might show
bad faith, fraud, or malicious motive;78 (9) specific physical dam-
age, injury, or impairment of appurtenances; (10) value of the
land taken or damaged measured by the dollar amount of dam-
ages constituting diminution in market value (or the value before
as compared with the value after the project) of the claimant's
property; and (11) finally, if the taking involves only a part of the
claimant's land, severance damages, i.e., reduction in value of
claimant's remaining land as a result of the taking.
IlI. DEFENSES
Usual and customary defenses are available to the govern-
mental authority in inverse eminent domain proceedings and
should be examined by plaintiff very carefully. Before commenc-
ing an action, all possible stumbling blocks should be examined.
Despite the broad language of the Colorado statutes, the courts
have upheld various exceptions to the rule of just compensation.
Because defendant did not compensate plaintiff in the first place,
all possible defenses will be called into play. Those defenses in-
clude:
(1) The project constitutes a valid exercise of police power.79
The line between police power and eminent domain is often indis-
cernible and might turn on policy. To be within the police power,
the act must be done on behalf of public health, morals, or safety.
The action must be reasonable and adapted to the scope of the
problem with power usually limited to regulation, impairment,
or destruction. This defense has definite limitations, but it is
usually most successful when used in connection with emergency
situations.
7" Farmers Irr. Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962).
Radinsky v. City & County of Denver, 159 Colo. 134, 410 P.2d 644 (1966); Gayton
v. Department of Highways, 149 Colo. 72, 367 P.2d 899 (1962).
11 Arizona-Colorado Land & Cattle Co. v. District Court, 511 P.2d 23 (Colo. 1973);
Union Pac. R.R. v. Colorado Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 30 Colo. 133, 69 P. 564 (1902).
", State v. Lavasek, 73 N.M. 33, 385 P.2d 361 (1963); Morlane Co. v. Highway Dep't,
384 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1964); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 73 (1950); 26 AM. JuR. 2d Eminent
Domain § 41 at 693 (1966); 16 AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 301 (1964).
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(2) Temporary takings are not actionable.80 This defense is
closely related to the police power, and its justification is often
couched in police power terminology. In the federal area, to sup-
port a fifth amendment taking via inverse condemnation there
must be a project which is permanent in nature.8'
(3) The 6-year statute of limitations82 or its equitable coun-
terpart, laches, is available.83 This defense can be particularly
important in Colorado if the action is based on damage without
taking. The limitation might apply and bar suit for damages
incurred prior to the time limitation of the statute." If the taking
was a gradual encroachment, the time of the actual taking be-
comes difficult to determine and is crucial.
(4) Incidental losses, de minimus damages,85 and damages to
business 8  are similar defenses. Proof of these defenses is often
nebulous. Recovery is sometimes denied because of judicial fear
that allowing payment would make condemnation too expensive,
retard social progress, and open the courts to a multitude of cases.
Loss-of-business damages are traditionally considered highly
speculative.
(5) The defenses of mere inconvenience87 and circuity of
route have a similar basis. The loss to the property owner must
be different in kind and degree. The hardship felt in cases such
as blocking a street entrance is really a public burden and not
different in kind to the plaintiff; he might suffer more only in
degree.
(6) Statutory prohibitions may bar the action. An example
is the Colorado statute dealing with limited access highways. 8 It
would probably bar the assertion of an inverse condemnation
" State Highway v. Peters, 416 P.2d 390 (Wyo. 1968); Commonwealth v. Sherrod, 367
S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963); Lybargar v. State Dep't of Roads, 128 N.W.2d 132 (Neb. 1964).
" Wilfong v. United States, 480 F.2d 1326 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
a COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 87-1-11 (1963).
Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 69 Colo. 590, 196 P. 334 (1921).
Zimmerman v. Hinderlider, 85 Colo. 176, 97 P.2d 443 (1939); Fort v. Bietsch, 105
Colo. 340, 274 P. 812 (1929); Seven Lakes Reservoir Co. v. Majors, 69 Colo. 590, 196 P.334
(1921). See also, Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d 416, 348 P.2d 673 (1960).
" Gayton v. Department of Highways 149 Colo. 72, 377 P.2d 899 (1962).
" City & County of Denver v. Tondall, 86 Colo. 372, 282 P. 191 (1929).
Radinsky v. City & County of Denver, 159 Colo. 134, 410 P.2d 644 (1966).
Id.; Gayton v. Department of Highways, 149 Colo. 72, 367 P.2d 899 (1962); State
v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 384 P.2d 241 (1963); Northern Light Shopping Center v. State,
15 N.Y.2d 688, 204 N.E.2d 333, 247 N.Y.S.2d 333 (1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826 (1965);
County Comm'rs v. Slaughter, 49 N.M. 141, 158 P.2d 859 (1945). But see State v. Terry,
194 So. 2d 144 (La. 1966).
" COLO. RIv. STAT. ANN. § 120-6-2(2) (1963).
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action as to access taken if the claim was based on establishment
of a limited access highway across plaintiff's property and if it
came within the purview of statutory language.
(7) Damnum absque injuria is a vague concept which is
really a summation of all the above-listed defenses. 0 It is damage
without legal result, thus not compensable as a matter of law. An
example of this defense is sometimes found where a property
owner suffers damage and loss of property value because of con-
demnation proceedings which are legally abandoned."
Burden of Proof: The burden of proof lies generally with the
plaintiff-owner asserting damages to his property resulting from
governmental action." He must prove both the manner of damage
or taking and the extent.9 3 Proof by a preponderance of the evi-
dence" must be had as to reasonable market value of the property
taken and the damages, if any, to the residue. 5 Some courts have
required the landowner to show a definite diminution of market
value of his property if the action is inverse.9
As in direct eminent domain proceedings, the burden is on
the condemning authority to establish benefits, if any, from the
public project. Those benefits must be specific benefits to the
property taken or damaged rather than general benefits accruing
to the public at large.
Damages: Damages in inverse condemnation are the reduc-
tion in reasonable market value 7 of plaintiff's interest in the
See City & County of Denver v. Bayer, 7 Colo. 113, 2 P. 6 (1883); Kansas City v.
Berkshire Lumber Co., 393 S.W.2d 470 (Mo. 1965); Baldwin-Hall Co. v. State, 22 App.
Div. 2d 747, 253 N.Y.S.2d 651 (1964); Sheridan Drive-in Theater, Inc. v. State, 384 P. 2d
597 (Wyo. 1963); Happy, Damnum Absque Injuria: When Private Property May be Dam-
aged Without Compensation in Missouri, 36 Mo. L. REv. 453 (1971).
" Kean v. Union County Park Comm'n, 130 N.J. 591, 22 A.2d 256 (1941). But see
Piz v. Housing Authority, 132 Colo. 457, 289 P.2d 905 (1955), which permitted damages
awarded to a bakery owner for buying replacement property after the Denver Housing
Authority lost a condemnation case and thereafter decided to abandon the taking of the
property.
12 Board of County Comm'rs v. Noble, 117 Colo. 77, 184 P.2d 142 (1947).
" Id. Noble sets forth the rules regarding the weight of the burden of proof and the
allocation of the burden of proof between the parties on the various issues. Id. at 80-81,
184 P.2d at 143-44.
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 52-1-28 (Supp. 1971).
" Gayton v. Department of Highways, 149 Colo. 72, 367 P.2d 899 (1962).
Alevzios v. Metropolitan Air Comm'n, 216 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. 1974).
Although the statute refers to the "true and actual" value of the property, the
Colorado Supreme Court has construed this language to mean "reasonable market value."
See Vivian v. Board of Trustees, 152 Colo. 556, 383 P.2d 801 (1963); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 50-1-17 (1963). The federal courts consider that the property owner is entitled only to
just compensation. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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property at the date of taking. 8 Reasonable or fair market value
is the price for which the property could have been sold on the
open market for cash under usual and ordinary circumstances,
i.e., under those circumstances where the owner was willing to
sell and the purchaser was willing to buy, but neither was obli-
gated to do so." In determining damages, improvements on the
property at the time of the taking, the use, conditions and sur-
roundings of the property, 00 and sales of comparable property in
the vicinity must all be considered.'0 ' The most advantageous use
or uses to which the property might reasonably and lawfully be
put in the future by persons of ordinary prudence and judgment
shall be considered,'10 this element being referred to as highest
and best use.
In establishing damages, the owner's opinion as to fair mar-
ket value may be heard as well as appraisers and other claimed
experts.'0 Damages are determined by what the property owner
lost as a result of the taking and not what the government gained.
Neither the property value to the public nor the purpose to which
it will be applied may be considered. Nor may consideration be
given as to whether plaintiff-owner wanted to sell.' 4
As a general rule, the method for determining just compensa-
tion for the owner in a partial taking is to compare fair market
value of the property before and after taking.0 5 This determina-
tion is accomplished by subtracting fair market value of what
remains after the taking from fair market value of the whole
before taking. Not all factors which render the residue less valua-
ble are compensable. Such damages must flow from the severance
itself, or, if they flow from the proposed public use, they must be
unique and peculiar to the residue.' Evidence of comparable
sales after the date of valuation as well as prior sales may be
11 Under the statute, the valuation date is the date "the petitioner is authorized by
agreement, stipulation, or court order to take possession, or the date of trial or hearing to
assess compensation, whichever is earlier." CoLo. Rgv. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-17 (1963).
" Kistler v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 126 Colo. 11, 246 P.2d 616
(1952).
"® Wassenich v. City & County of Denver, 67 Colo. 456, 186 P. 533 (1919).
101 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 50-1-21 (1963).
I" Sill Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 411 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 840
(1965); Ruth v. Department of Highways, 145 Colo. 546, 359 P.2d 1033 (1961).
101 5 NIcHoLs § 18.114]; Union Trust Co. v. Woodrow Mfg. Co., 63 F.2d 602 (8th Cir.
1933).
' United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); 4 NicHoLs § 12.21.
"' United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
10, See generally Gayton v. Department of Highways, 149 Colo. 72, 367 P.2d 899
(1962); A. JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN 133-46 (1953).
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considered, 07 but such sales must not be excessively remote in
time.
IV. POSSIBLE FACT SITUATIONS
A wide latitude of situations exist where inverse condemna-
tion can be used. A number of new areas where it may become a
useful theory to consider will also be explored. The cases are
divided into four categories merely as an attempt to create some
order out of the plethora. These categories are purely arbitrary
and far from exclusive.
A. Physical Invasions
The inverse condemnation cases which are most often en-
countered are physical invasions of property, such as power line
overhang and the razing of buildings by government entities with-
out condemnation proceedings. A logical beginning in this area
is to consider the earth, or the loss of it. Cases based on loss of
lateral support include such instances as buildings settling and
cracking because the adjacent land has been withdrawn by exca-
vation. 0 1 In apposition is the problem created when earth is de-
posited on property. 09 This backfill not only damages land, but
it may amount to a taking if the owner is unable to make effective
use of that portion of the land. A public entity has been held
liable for the silting of a private lake from erosion of an unstabil-
ized highway embankment." 0
Water is often encountered in physical invasion cases. Where
there has been dam construction"' or a change in the water
course, 2 faulty storm sewers, or irrigation ditches which overflow
improperly, land which is thereby inundated is obviously dam-
aged or taken. A new development in water cases is evolving in
pollution problems. A city's action in polluting streams was found
to constitute a prima facie case of inverse condemnation,113 as was
pollution of a spring by seepage from a septic tank."'
Governmental agencies in carrying out their duties often fail
to provide for the interest of individuals tangentially affected.
"37 5 NICHOLS § 21.31 [2].
" Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345, 475 P.2d 441 (1970).
" Central Realty Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 169 Tenn. 525, 89 S.W.2d 346 (1936).
330 Commonwealth v. Cochrane, 397 S.E.2d 155 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
United States v. Northern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., 449 F.2d 1 (10th Cir.
1971).
132 Shaeffer v. State, 3 Cal. App. 3d 348, 83 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1970).
"3 City of Walla Walla v. Conkey, 6 Wash. App. 6, 492 P.2d 589 (1971).
"I Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955).
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Through street construction, bridge and viaduct construction,"'
changes in the grade of the street,"' denial of access,"' and ex-
traordinary or different use of existing way,"' highway and street
departments of the state and city are continually harming prop-
erty owners. The importance of access to roads cannot be overem-
phasized. A property's value, whether commercial or residential,
is often dependent on the type of access available. Changes in
traffic flow or use of the street can drastically affect land values.
In recent years when emphasis has been on construction of a
vast network of superhighways, many injuries to individuals'
properties were ignored. With the change in government priori-
ties, highways have become less important, and damaged indi-
viduals are being given more consideration. Inverse condemna-
tion may be evoked not only during construction, but negligent
design, maintenance, or repair of public improvements are now
recognized as actionable."' Thus, such operations as salting a
turnpike which damaged the abutting property have become ac-
tionable. 20
B. Nonphysical Encroachments
Physical encroachments on plaintiff's land are usually easier
to recognize than the following which, for want of a better term,
are called nonphysical. These burdens on land offend the physi-
cal senses of smell, sight, and hearing. Because aesthetic taste is
involved, these areas have caused great problems in the inverse
area. In many instances recovery has not been allowed unless
there has also been some property taken. Damages are based on
the harmful effect these nonphysical interferences have on value
of remaining property making recovery conditioned on a quantum
of physical taking or damaging.
"I City of Chicago v. Taylor, 125 U.S. 161 (1888); People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 532,
144 P.2d 799 (1943); Minnequa Lumber Co. v. City & County of Denver, 67 Colo. 472,
186 P. 539 (1919); Liddick v. City of Council Bluffs, 232 Iowa 197, 5 N.W.2d 361 (1942).
Contra, Troiano v. Department of Highways, 170 Colo. 484, 463 P.2d 448 (1969); Radinsky
v. City & County of Denver, 159 Colo. 134, 410 P.2d 644 (1966).
"I City & County of Denver v. Bonesteel, 30 Colo. 107, 69 P. 595 (1902); Atchison Ice
Co. v. City of Atchison, 172 Kan. 94, 238 P.2d 531 (1951); Hatch, Survey of Recent Case
Law re the Compensability of Access Impairment in Eminent Domain, A.B.A. COMM. ON
CONDEMNATION AND CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE, SEC. OF LOCAL AND Gov'T LAW 361 (1968).
" Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 115, 186 P. 904 (1919).
"' City of Pueblo v. Strait, 20 Colo. 13, 36 P. 789 (1894). See also Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d
860 (1973).
"' State v. Lovett, 254 Ind. 27, 257 N.E.2d 298 (1970).
'o Foss v. Maine Turnpike Authority, 309 A.2d 339 (Me. 1973).
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It has generally been held that noise or vibration cannot in
and of itself constitute a taking of property in the constitutional
sense.'12 1 The position has been taken that compensation may be
obtained for physical damage done by the noise and vibration
even absent an actual condemnation. '1 Loss of enjoyment or sim-
ple inconvenience suffered by a property owner as a result of noise
and vibration is not "damage" where conditions complained of
are common to other property owners in the neighborhood. 23 The
injury must be peculiar to the claimant.
The federal rule on aircraft noise is that the aircraft must
actually invade the super-adjacent airspace of a landowner before
there can be recovery.' 2 ' There must be a physical interference in
conjunction with the noise interference. Noise from an aircraft
laterally near but not over the owner's land is not compensable.121
The sonic boom case, Laird v. Nelms, 21 effectively foreclosed
strict liability recovery in tort for damages caused by the sound
because the problem was isolated and not permanent which did
not constitute wrongdoing by the government.'2
Like noise, vibration which is either bothersome or harmful
can come from many different sources. The obvious case is a
blasting operation or nearby pile driving which causes structural
damage to a building.'2 A highway which has developed a "wash-
board" surface may damage nearby structures. 2 ' Cases involving
vibration must, as a rule, show physical damage created by the
vibration. Mere human discomfort does not suffice. Courts in this
area continue to mirror society's attitudes that things are more
worth judicial protection than people, but hopefully that position
may be slowly eroding.
People can be very sensitive about odors wafting about their
property. Sewage plants, garbage incinerators, and city dumps
are common offenders.'3 There is no question that effluvia detri-
"I People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451, 9
Cal. Rptr. 363 (1960).
'n State v. Williams, 22 Utah 2d 331, 452 P.2d 881 (1969); City of Yakima v. Dahlin,
55 Wash. App. 129, 485 P.2d 628 (1971).
'2 Lombardy v. Peter Kiewit Sons' Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d 599, 72 Cal. Rptr. 240,
appeal dismissed, 394 U.S. 813 (1968).
" United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
' Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
121 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
"7 Kirk v. United States, 451 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1971).
12S Raymond v. Department of Highways, 255 La. 425, 231 So. 2d 375 (1970).
' City of Pueblo v. Mace, 132 Colo. 89, 285 P.2d 596 (1955).
'13 Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Fiscus, 128 Ark. 250, 193 S.W. 521 (1917);
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mentally affects the value of land as does extraordinary smoke
and soot.'
3'
The view from a piece of property also affects its value. Cases
have recognized diminution of value because of the proximity of
a public building,32 and deprivation of privacy. View and seclu-
sion are recoverable damage elements, 33 as are loss of light and
air. 134
C. Taking by Withholding of Governmental Service or Benefits
The case which opened this area was Bydlon v. United
States.' This inverse condemnation action was brought by own-
ers of resort property located in the roadless upper reaches of
Superior National Forest. The only feasible access to plaintiff's
resort was by aircraft, and a substantial vacation business had
developed based on this mode of access. In order to preserve
wilderness characteristics of the forest, the government banned
low flights and landings over the territory. This prevented plain-
tiff from bringing in guests or supplies. Judgment for plaintiff was
for a "taking of the plaintiff's means of access to their properties
by air.''
36
Colorado is in the midst of a struggle to save its environment
and to accomodate its continually growing population. One
method of control used by Florida has been land use regula-
tions.'1 These laws definitely restrict a property owner's freedom
to use and develop land by denying such things as land develop-
ment permits or sewer service. Colorado makes it a misdemeanor
to subdivide property into parcels of 35 acres or less without first
obtaining the county planning commission approval. 3 Subdivi-
sion approval is a very powerful political and tactical device. A
municipality's refusal to supply sewer service to a developer's
property may be the decisive factor in preventing the land from
Clinard v. Kernersville, 215 N.C. 245, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Ivester v. City of Winston-
Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d 88 (1939); Jacobs v. City of Seattle, 93 Wash. 171, 160 P. 299
(1917).
"I Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
2 Eachus v. Los Angeles Consol. Elec. Ry., 103 Cal. 614, 37 P. 750 (1894); Rigney v.
City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 (1882); City of McAlester v. King, 317 P.2d 265 (Okla. 1957).
" Dennison v. State, 22 N.Y.2d 409, 239 N.E.2d 708, 293 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1968).
Crawford v. City of Des Moines, 255 Iowa 861, 124 N.W.2d 868 (1963).
' 175 F. Supp. 891 (Ct. Cl. 1959).
Id. at 894.
'" See Harris, Environmental Regulations, Zoning, and Withheld Municipal Serv-
ices: Taking of Property by Multi-Government Action, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 635 (1973).
I- Ch. 81, §§ 3, 4, [1972] Colo. Sess. Laws 499, amending CoLo. Rav. STAT. ANN.
§§ 106-2-9(4)(a), 106-2-33(3)(b) (1963).
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having any reasonable value or use. Developers around Denver in
recent months have been refused water tap rights which figura-
tively speaking, has left their land high and dry. Developing land
is analogous in many ways to developing coal mines. In a case
concerning the regulation of coal mines, Justice Holmes speaking
for the court stated:
What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be
exercised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to
mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating it or destroying it.'13
While land use controls do serve a utilitarian purpose, they
also impose economic loss and in many cases this loss could be
serious enough to constitute a taking. Zoning until recently has
been handled as a purely constitutional issue. The well-recog-
nized principle of zoning law was that where zoning regulation
foreclosed any reasonable use of property, the ordinance was con-
fiscatory and unconstitutional as applied. In City of Cherry Hills
Village v. Trans-Robles Corp.,'4 0 sewer and water facilities,
streets, and utilities had been installed on the basis of county
zoning of 1/2-acre sites. The city then modified the zoning ordi-
nance to 21/2-acre sites which would preclude the use of the in-
stalled sewer and water facilities, streets, and other utilities. The
zoning ordinance was ruled unconstitutional as it applied to the
particular property in suit.
The act of zoning is a legislative proceeding and a valid exer-
cise of the police power when reasonably related to public health,
safety, morals, or general welfare. Unless the zoning fits into one
of these categories, it becomes a taking under the eminent do-
main provisions and as such is compensable.
It must be remembered that property is more than the mere
thing which a person owns. It is elemental that property also
includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of the thing
owned."' Any legislative action which takes away any of these
essential attributes of property or imposes unreasonable restric-
tions thereon violates the due process clause.
Other possible examples are denial or withdrawal of access
to public roads,4 2 withholding of urban renewal projects and pub-
lic services until land values have dropped in an area,4 3 refusal
,s' Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 at 415 (1922).
,,0 509 P.2d 797 (Colo. 1973).
"' Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
'2 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-6-10 (1963).
43 Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964).
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of governmental bodies to enforce statutes or regulate pollution
and crime which in turn causes neighboring property to diminish
in value, and zoning ordinances which require, among other
things, compulsory, involuntary offstreet parking maintained by




With the expanding interest in compensation, a broad range
of fact situations may develop in which inverse condemnation
might serve as a useful theory for recovery. The limits of its appli-
cation may be limited only by the lawyer's imagination.
While inverse condemnation is usually associated with real
property, an as yet undeveloped concept may also include using
it for personal property damage. Government takings may result
in confiscations of contraband without a warrant."4 Statutes
dealing with the destruction of materials which are health or
safety hazards rarely include methods of reimbursement for lost
property.
Zoning and land use planning also appear to be areas where
inverse condemnation could be especially useful in the future. It
may be used in such cases as where land is devalued because of
the threat of condemnation or where the government delays for a
long period of time before bringing any proceedings. 46 Such cases
may arise when the government starts condemnation proceed-
ings, the owner buys replacement property, and then the whole
condemnation is abandoned because of a change of the govern-
ment's plans. Many municipalities now require donations of
lands, schools, or roads by developers prior to plat acceptance,
zoning, or annexation. These requirements appear to constitute
a taking, and whether the city's plat approval is "just compensa-
tion" is questionable at best.
CONCLUSION
Between the enlargement of governmental activities which
City & County of Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 141 Colo. 121, 347 P.2d 919 (1959).
Note, Inverse Condemnation and Nuisance: Alternative Remedies for Airport
Noise Damage, 24 SmAcusE L. Ray. 793 (1973).
"I But see Sayer v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1974). In this case the
city of Cleveland denominated the broad boundaries of the general neighborhood renewal
plan and within these boundaries did not "take or condemn" all of the properties; a
property owner whose land was within the general neighborhood renewal plan did not have
this property "taken" because the values in the general neighborhood renewal plan area
disminished as a result of the designation.
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result in more taking or damaging and the trend in judicial deci-
sions which allow recovery in a wider latitude of cases, inverse
condemnation actions are becoming more numerous. The practi-
tioner, if presented with a possible case, should not hesitate to
traverse this legal hinterland. Courts have been involved for a
considerable period of time in developing a body of common law
in this area. This variety of case decisions which construe and
interpret constitutional guarantees and statutory amplifications,
makes inverse condemnation a viable tool in dealing with govern-
mental taking or damaging of private property. Increasing gov-
ernmental activities should make more manifest the opportuni-
ties for inverse condemnation.
Justice Pringle in his Troiano47 dissent succinctly stated the
policy underlying recovery in inverse condemnation and charted
a course for future decisions:
In this day, when the trend is to apply humane and enlightened
expression to the law so as to provide, for instance, that loss to an
individual without his fault by reason of the use of a product should
be spread among those who received the benefit of the product, I
would think it only proper to hold that the public as the recipient
of the benefits of the public involvement ought to bear the irretrieva-
ble loss suffered by the individual whose use of his property is not
noxious nor injurious to the public and whose only sin is that his
property is located adjacent to the improvement. "8
This view would seem to presage the future direction of in-
verse condemnation. On the federal level such legislation as the
Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions
Policies Act' has provided not only payment for the property
acquired, but has also granted moving expenses incident to the
condemnation. On the state level, Colorado now provides for at-
torneys' fees in successful cases. 50 The legislative and judicial
position is toward complete compensation for injured parties, and
Colorado is presently at this threshold.
... Troiano v. Department of Highways, 170 Colo. 484, 503, 463 P.2d 448, 457 (1970).
',' Id. at 503, 463 P.2d at 457.
", 84 Stat. 1894, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1415, 2473, 3307, 4601-02, 4621-38, 4651-55, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1606 (1971).
" See note 53 supra.
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WHAT CONSTITUTES "BENEFITS" FOR URBAN
DRAINAGE PROJECTS
By W. JOSEPH SHOEMAKER*
A tunnel which, though serving no useful purpose as an isolated
transportation unit, is intended to furnish an avenue or highway to
be leased to public transportation agencies, is a public improvement
for a public use, for which taxes may be imposed.'
INTRODUCTION
Colorado has a history of finding legal justification for public
improvements as the holding above witnesses. Milheim v. Moffat
Tunnel Improvement District, a famous Colorado case, involved
an even more famous engineering feat, that of boring a railroad
tunnel, with provisions for a 108-inch water pipe, through the
Rocky Mountains. That case has set a precedent upon which
proponents of urban drainage projects may also rely. In order to
use the Milheim precedent to advocate such a cause, however, it
is important to understand the distinction between assessing
property for general benefits which accrue to the community at
large as contrasted with assessing property for the special benefits
which must accrue directly and solely to the owner of the land in
question and not to others. Milheim approved of the former
method of assessing, although most of its language related to the
special benefits the property owners would receive.
Most public improvements, including urban drainage pro-
jects, are financed with revenues obtained from taxes paid by the
public.2 Drainage improvements in rural areas have long been
financed by establishing drainage districts3 which assess rural
lands for the cost of building and maintaining drainage facilities,
while urban areas have been given authority to use local improve-
ment and special improvement districts to build drainage works.4
* Partner, Shoemaker and Wham, Denver, Colorado; B.S., 1947, United States
Naval Academy; J.D., 1956, University of Iowa.
' See Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U.S. 710 (1923), aff'g 72
Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922).
1 Private funds sometimes are received. User fees are becoming more popular as a
means of financing public projects, e.g., airport facilities, sewage treatment works, turn-
pikes, water works, because such fees relate to services received as opposed to the value
of one's property.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-1 (1963).
Cow. REV. STAT. ANN. § 89-2-1 (1963): "It shall be lawful ... to construct any of
the local improvements mentioned in this article and to assess the cost thereof. . . upon
the property especially benefited by such improvements." Further, "Such improvements
may also consist of the construction of sewers .... " id. § 89-2-2(1)(a) (1963).
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In local improvement districts, the property owners vote on the
issue of whether their property should be taxed to pay for the
improvements. Whether their property will be generally benefited
to the extent of the additional taxes is the determinative issue.
In special improvement districts, the property owners are as-
sessed in relation to the special benefits bestowed upon their
property by the construction of the improvement. The assessing
government eventually has the burden of showing these benefits.
In the application of user fees toward the construction of
urban drainage projects, the users are entitled to question
whether the fee paid is commensurate with the cost of the facility
and the benefits received from the use of such facility. Any re-
sponsible governmental builder will clearly delineate the benefits
to be received by his constituents from proposed drainage projects
before adding to the taxation burden of those same constituents
the amount necessary to derive revenues to pay for the drainage
projects. Therefore, whether the urban drainage project is of
general benefit or special benefit, someone in government-
whether administrative, legislative, or both-has to know what
the judicial branch ultimately may hold to be a legal benefit for
which taxpayers may be taxed.5 One objective of this article is
to provide some background on what courts may decide on urban
drainage projects as to special versus general benefits.
Drainage projects have had minimal success in competition
with other public improvements (such as housing, transportation,
etc.) because the benefits of drainage projects have been narrowly
construed in those cases involving special improvement districts
as a taxing mechanism, in which special benefits have to be
proved. The main undertaking of this article is to demonstrate
that the narrow special benefit viewpoint is to be distinguished
from the general benefit definition so that public builders of
urban drainage projects may have the justification needed to
merit their use of taxpayers' dollars. Additionally, the legal
meaning of benefits as interpreted by the courts in different fac-
tual settings will be examined.
I. SPECIAL BENEFITS
The commonplace problem of surface water drainage has been
around for so long that some municipal officials have ignored the
Legislation is needed in most jurisdictions to define "benefit"; see proposal pre-
sented in CONCLUSION infra.
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flood and health hazards which outmoded drainage systems pose to
our growing cities.'
When the above statement was made in 1968 by this author,
it was a reflection of the practical frustration inherent in trying
to use the special improvement district as a funding mechanism
for drainage improvements.' The legal hurdles that have devel-
oped over the years in special assessment cases have been enough
to discourage the most energetic public works official from ever
attempting to solve drainage problems. A brief review of this
method of financing special drainage improvements will show
that the narrow legal interpretation of benefits relates to the
method of financing, not to the need for urban drainage improve-
ments.
Most statutory enactments which relate to the authority of
local governments to construct drainage improvements follow
this general form:
The City and County shall have the power to contract for and make
local improvements, to assess the cost thereof wholly or in part upon
the property especially benefited .. .
[and] the cost shall be assessed in proportion to the benefits
received.'
This method of financing an improvement follows the histor-
ical language contained in the statutory authorization" allowing
farmers to join together in a district to drain their lands by tiling,
building drainage channels, or deepening existing natural water-
ways. Property owners pay the cost of such projects by assessing
a mill levy against properties in the district commensurate to
benefits received.
I Editorial preface to Shoemaker, An Engineering-Legal Solution to Urban Drainage
Problems, 45 DENVER L.J. 381 (1968).
Id. Since that article was published, and to a great extent because of the article,
the Colorado Legislature in 1969 provided for the establishment in the Denver metropoli-
tan area (Adams, Arapahoe, Boulder, Denver, Douglas, and Jefferson Counties) of the
Urban Drainage and Flood Control District with a mill levy authority of one-tenth mill
for planning purposes and authority to seek 2 mills for construction of projects. CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 89-21-22(4) (Supp. 1969), as amended, § 89-21-22(4) (Supp. 1971). In 1973,
the Colorado Legislature added an additional authorization to the Board of four-tenths
mill for construction of drainage and flood control improvements. Ch. 286, § 1, [1973]
Colo. Sess. Laws 996.
' CrrY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, COLO., CHARTER § A2.4.
Id. at A2.6.
" COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-4-1(1) (1963): "The tracts of land which will receive
most and about equal benefits shall be marked one hundred, and such as are adjudged to
receive less benefits shall be marked with a less number denoting its per cent of benefit."
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It is noteworthy that nowhere in the entire 18 sections of the
Colorado statute" is the word benefits defined. This legislative
failure to define benefits has delegated the duty to the courts. The
cases do not directly define benefits, but rather tell what benefits
are not. This narrow negative interpretation of benefit legislation
discourages municipal officials interested in building drainage
improvements. What follows is the putting into perspective of
what appears to be the narrow meaning of benefits in special
assessment cases. In each case a particular property taxpayer, not
the general public, brought the appeal based on the owner's con-
tention that his property was not specially benefited, essentially
meaning that it received no more benefit than anyone else's prop-
erty. All of the following factual situations are matched against
the special improvement financing theory that the basis of the
right to levy an assessment for an improvement is the particular
benefit received by the property charged. 2
A landmark case is Ferguson v. Borough of Stamford, 3 where
the court stated that improvements may not be assessed upon
those benefited only as members of the community at large, nor
may they be assessed to an amount greater than the amount of
benefits conferred. Like all other taxation, improvements should
be apportioned, as far as possible, equitably among all who are
similarly interested. Stated another way, a general benefit alone
will not support a special assessment to help pay the cost of a
drainage project. There must be a special benefit to the specific
property to be charged which increases its value, relieves it from
a burden, or adapts it to a superior or more profitable use. 4
Another case defining the elements of special benefit with
greater certainty is Peterson v. Thurston, ' where it was declared
proper to consider whether a drain would make land more valua-
ble for tillage, or more desirable as a residence, or more valuable
in the general market, the final test being the influence of the
proposed improvement on the market value of the property.
In Hoepner v. Yellow Medicine County," a county in Minne-
sota proposed to convert part of a natural waterway into a public
drainage ditch and outlet. The plaintiff's land was separated
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-4-1 (1963).
2 25 AM. JuR. 2d Drains and Drainage Districts § 45 (1966).
13 60 Conn. 432, 22 A. 782 (1891).
4 25 AM. JuN. 2d Drains and Drainage Districts § 46 (1966).
161 Neb. 758, 74 N.W.2d 528 (1956).
241 Minn. 6, 62 N.W.2d 80 (1954).
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from the natural waterway by about 1,000 feet, and the land had
some sloughs, the largest of which drained through a private open
ditch across a neighbor's land to the natural watercourse. The
Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
[The] question presented . . .is whether a landowner as a matter
of law receives assessable drainage benefits in a drainage improv-
ment proceeding . . . solely by reason of the fact that the surface
water on his land is drained into the public ditch involved even
though he had a right to use, in its natural condition, the outlet
which is to be the public ditch and even though there is no showing
that the public ditch offers a better outlet.7
The county contended that the deepening of the creek would
facilitate tiling of plaintiffs land and give an advantage of sub-
surface drainage. Plaintiff contended that the open ditch pres-
ently used adequately drained the subsurface; and, in fact, that
the open ditch had a greater capacity for drainage than any tile
which could be installed. The county further contended that
plaintiff's outlet to the natural water course was only based on
the oral permission given by the neighbor and that the public
improvement would make the outlet more accessible. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court found the plaintiff not to be specially bene-
fited and based its finding on the language of the statute in-
volved: 8 "L]ands may be assessed for benefits when the con-
struction of the drainage system 'Makes an outlet more accessi-
ble, or otherwise directly benefits such lands or properties.' ",1
The court held neither to be the case here.
In Cirasella v. Village of South Orange,20 the question was
raised whether or not a storm-sewer improvement provided a pe-
culiar benefit to the plaintiffs property which was not contiguous
to the storm-sewer improvement and was not contiguous to any
pipe or pipes carrying surface drainage into the storm-sewer. The
storm-sewer improvement had been built to carry the surface
runoff from the lands of plaintiff and others. The New Jersey
court, in affirming a lower court ruling that plaintiff's lands were
not benefited, stated:
Assessments as distinguished from other kinds of taxation, are those
special and local impositions upon the property in the immediate
vicinity of municipal improvements, which are necessary to pay for
the improvement, and are laid with reference to the special benefit
'7 Id. at 9, 62 N.W.2d at 83.
" MINN. STAT. § 106.151 (1971).
" Hoepner v. Yellow Medicine County, 241 Minn. 6, 10, 62 N.W.2d 80, 84 (1954).
57 N.J. Super. 522, 155 A.2d 134 (1959).
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which the property is supposed to have derived therefrom .... The
foundation of the power to lay a special assessment or a special tax
for a local improvement of any character, whether it be opening,
improving or paving a street or sidewalk or constructing a sewer, or
cleaning or sprinkling a street, is the benefit which the object of the
assessment or tax confers on the owner of the abutting property, or
the owners of property in the assessment of special taxation dis-
trict, which is different from the general benefit which the owners
enjoy in common with the other inhabitants or citizens of the munic-
ipal corporation. Accordingly, it is now well settled in most jurisdic-
tions that adjacent property may be specially assessed to defray, in
whole or in part, the cost of local improvements by which such
property is especially benefited. That doctrine, as stated, is based
for its final reason on enhancement of values. That is to say, the
whole theory of local taxation or assessments is that the improve-
ments for which they are levied afford a remuneration in the way of
benefits. Whether the property has been specially benefited by an
improvement is generally regarded a question of fact, depending on
the circumstances in each case, for the determination of the proper
tribunal. The broad question is whether the general value of the
property has been enhanced, not whether its present owner receives
advantage.2 '
In Frank v. Renville County,22 another Minnesota case, the
factual dispute was set forth in some detail and illustrates in
words the historical conflict in most special assessment drainage
cases. The county constructed a drainage ditch across the plain-
tiff's land and determined that benefits accrued to the land.
1Id. at 525, 155 A.2d at 137 citing In re Public Service Elec. & Gas Co., 18 N.J. Super.
357, 363, 87 A.2d 344, 346 (App. Div. 1952). For purposes of determining whether property
will be benefited by creation of a parking district, "[blenefit is usually considered as
tending to reflect enhancement in the market value of property . . . . Local zoning ordi-
nances are matters which help determine market values . Jeffery v. City of Salinas,
232 Cal. App. 2d 29, 37, 42 Cal. Rptr. 486, 493 (1965).
When the owner of a lot is taxed for municipal improvements, the benefit is not the
benefit to the public at large but to the owner of the lot. The phrases benefits and
increased value are interchangeable terms since, where tax is apportioned according to the
increased value of a lot, they are the same thing as the value of the benefit which the owner
receives from the improvement. Garret v. City of St. Louis, 25 Mo. 505, 511, 69 Am. Dec.
475, 478 (1857).
Benefit is the increment of value to land affected by improvement and represents the
difference between market value of land before improvement and immediately after im-
provement. Assessments for improvements must be such special, pecuniary benefits as
result to a particular landowner by reason of his ownership of land affected, as distin-
guished from general benefits to the public. Maywood Land Co. v. Rochelle Park T., 13
N.J. Misc. 841, 181 A. 696 (1935).
The terms "benefits" and "to be benefited," as used in an act providing for organiza-
tion of flood control districts, mean that a landowner has received, or will receive, by
reason of improvement, an increase in market value of his property. Weyerhaeuser Timber
Co. v. Banker, 186 Wash. 332, 342, 58 P.2d 285, 289 (1936).
242 Minn. 172, 64 N.W.2d 750 (1954).
[VOL. 51
URBAN DRAINAGE PROJECTS
Damages to the plaintiff's land were also established and the
plaintiff appealed both counts, that benefits were assessed too
high, and damages too low. The plaintiff's position was that a
200-acre farm which produced an average annual income of
$12,500 could not be benefited to the extent of $3,000 by any
drainage system when only 3 or 4 acres of crop on his land was
lost in 2 out of 5 years because of inadequate drainage. He further
claimed his land was substantially and materially damaged by
construction of a 40-foot ditch across his land.
The county contended the improvement would necessitate
less maintenance than plaintiff's tile system; result in water mov-
ing more rapidly from the tract; and water would be cleared from
several acres where it was covered most of the time. Plaintiff
further contended that the creation of the banks (caused by in-
creasing the depth of the ditch from 8 to 10 feet), the cost of a
bridge crossing over the ditch, and resulting inconveniences to his
farming operations were damages for which he should be compen-
sated. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the lower court
and remanded the case for a new trial on both issues: The benefits
assessed to the plaintiff and the damages awarded to him.
Colorado's Supreme Court has spoken decisively and consis-
tently on the same issue.23 In Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v.
City & County of Denver,24 a sanitary sewer special improvement
district case, the court found support for special assessments
under the theory that the property against which they are levied
derives some special, immediate, and peculiar benefit by reason
of the improvement, in addition to, and different from that en-
joyed by other property in the community outside of the district
in which the improvement is made. That is, the local improve-
ment peculiarly enhances the value of the property against which
the assessment is levied, to an amount equal to, if not in excess
of, the amount of the special assessment.
In Hildreth v. City of Longmont,"5 upholding a district court
ruling that property was benefited, the Colorado Supreme Court
stated:
Generally speaking, only such benefits are to be assessed as it is
Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922).
Legal practitioners have questioned, however, whether the landmark case of Milheim is a
special benefit case or general benefit case, or whether, because of the novelty of the
subject matter as opposed to a sewer or street improvement case, the court came to its
conclusions using both special benefit and general benefit language.
24 89 Colo. 309, 313, 2 P.2d 238, 239 (1931).
21 47 Colo. 79, 105 P. 107 (1909).
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reasonably apparent the property will receive other than the general
benefit to the community, and nothing is to be considered a benefit
which does not enhance the value of the property. Vacant lots may
have no present use for a sewerage system; but it adds to their value
by giving them a sanitary advantage which renders them salable at
a price which otherwise they could not command, because of their
desirability . . . .
Town of Fort Lupton v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." was an
action by the railroad to enjoin the city of Fort Lupton from
assessing railroad property for street and curb improvement. The
railroad pointed out that the street improvement provided no
additional access for its customer traffic, no increase in revenues
to the railroad, and no physical benefit to the railroad's property.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed a lower court's finding
that no benefit inured to the railroad despite the city's contention
that a declaration of benefits by the city council shall be prima
facie evidence of the fact that the property assessed is benefited
in the amount of the assessments.2 1
It should be apparent at this point that some differences
exist among the various definitions of special benefits, depending
upon whether urban or rural land is involved. The above cases are
in general agreement that urban land is specially benefited if its
market value is increased by the installation of storm or sanitary
sewers. Thus, even vacant urban land may be specially benefited
by such improvements, as its market value and salability in-
crease. It should be noted that the increase in value is a benefit
which may never be converted to cash by a landowner if he never
sells or transfers his land, and thus may never be realized. In the
case of a sanitary sewer, the actual use thereof is a benefit tangi-
ble enough to justify assessment.
When rural land is involved, the above cases seem to imply
that a present special benefit is necessary. Rural land often seems
to require some agriculturally-related benefit, such as drainage of
flooded land for use as crop land, or increasing runoff to promote
earlier planting. These benefits are often balanced against cost
26 Id. at 86, 105 P. at 114 (emphasis added).
11 156 Colo. 352, 399 P.2d 248 (1965). See also District 50 Metropolitan Recreation
Dist. v. Burnside, 167 Colo. 425, 448 P.2d 788 (1968). In Burnside, the Colorado Supreme
Court upheld a statute which excluded railroad property from levy for recreational district
purposes. The court stated: "The section is a legislative declaration of what is obvious -
that the property excluded would not benefit from, or have any use for, playgrounds, golf
courses and swimming pools." Id. at 431, 448 P.2d at 791. It would be helpful if the
legislature were to set forth what constitutes benefits, or criteria for public officials to use.
28 Id. at 354, 399 P.2d at 249.
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and inconvenience to the rural land owner. Increase in land value
may also be a consideration in assessing rural drainage projects.
Special benefits, then, have at least one common denomina-
tor in economic value. If a monetary benefit can be shown to have
accrued to a landowner by reason of an improvement (increased
market value, increased crop production, etc.), then special as-
sessment becomes more feasible. Difficulties may arise where no
value can be assigned to an improvement by a landowner, such
as the drainage of land used as a refuse dump by the owner.
In all cases where the special improvement assessment has
been upheld, the burden was on the assessing government to show
that the improvement had a unique and distinguishable benefit
to the particular land owner assessed, apart from and beyond
benefit to the public at large.
II. GENERAL BENEFITS
It would be most helpful to builders of urban drainage im-
provements if legislative bodies defined potential types of bene-
fits from urban drainage projects, leaving exact dollar amounts
to the facts of each proposed improvement. Thus, if a special
improvement district were determined the best method of financ-
ing the improvement, the types of benefits would have to be
evaluated with respect to each piece of property assessed. On the
other hand, if property were to be assessed generally for the cost
of the improvement, the types of benefits would only have to be
evaluated for the total area covered by the district to answer the
general question of whether benefits equalled or exceeded the cost
of the improvement.
There are several resources to assist legislators in drafting
types of benefits. Benefit has been defined as "[a]dvantage;
profit; fruit; privilege," and also as:
[a] contribution to prosperity; whatever adds value to property;
advantage; profit; whatever promotes our prosperity, happiness, or
enhances the value of our property rights, or rights as citizens, as
contradistinguished from what is injurious.3
Moreover,
"[blenefit" is not limited to pecuniary gains, nor to any particular
kind of advantage; it refers to what is advantageous, whatever pro-
motes prosperity or happiness, what enhances the value of the prop-
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 200 (4th ed. 1951).
BALLENTINF's LAW DICTIONARY 131 (3d ed. 1969). See National Surety Co. v. Jarret,
95 W. Va. 420, 121 S.E. 291 (1924) for a testamentary definition of benefit.
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erty or rights of citizens as contradistinguished from what is inju-
rious.3
Benefit has also been defined in general terms in cases. The
leading Colorado case of Milheim goes into some detail as to what
constitutes a benefit.3 A number of plaintiffs brought suit to
enjoin the defendants from proceeding under a statute creating a
tunnel improvement district, the ground of the action being that
plaintiffs' property would be burdened by an illegal tax. Issues of
law and fact were presented as to the benefit to the property
subject to assessment. The District Court of Jefferson County
heard evidence upon the question of benefits and found for the
defendants. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed.
The Tunnel Improvement District in Milheim was created
for the construction of a transportation tunnel through the conti-
nental divide for transportation between the western and eastern
portions of the state. Properties in nine counties were to be as-
sessed. One of the contentions of the plaintiffs was that the im-
provement was not for public use. The Colorado Supreme Court
stated:
[A] use may be public though not many persons may enjoy it. This
is well established, the requirement being that the improvement be
open to use by all persons who have need of it.
If the business proposed to be carried on is essentially for
public benefit and advantage, then the use is public. In determin-
ing a public use, the criteria followed by the court consisted of (a)
the physical conditions of the country; (b) the needs of a com-
munity; (c) the character of the benefit which a projected im-
provement may confer upon a locality; and (d) the necessities for
such improvement in the development of the resources of a
state. 4
It was further contended by the plaintiffs that the benefits
were unequal. The court stated: "The law does not require that
the benefits should be exactly equal. ' 35 The plaintiffs further
objected on the grounds that no special benefits accrued to the
property owners in Jefferson County because of the tfinnel. The
court noted:
[Tlhe tunnel will make possible the delivery of coal inf Denver at a
3 A. Booth & Co. v. Weigand, 30 Utah 135, 83 P. 734 (1906).
' Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 72 Colo. 268, 211 P. 649 (1922).
Id. at 270, 211 P. at 651.
3, Id. citing Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel, Mining & Reduction Co., 35 Colo. 593, 596,
83 P. 464, 465 (1906).
1 Id. at 273, 211 P. at 653.
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considerably lower freight rate, and hence make it probable that the
growth and prosperity of the city will be materially promoted. That
being true, the lands in Jefferson County within this district will
assuredly increase in value with the growth of Denver.3
A concurring opinion in Milheim further observed that:
The area of the district is one which is cut off from intercourse with
the rest of the world for many weeks in the year . . . .The lack of
easy communication, and, for some periods during the year, of any
communication at all, with other parts of the state, interrupts and
jeopardizes commercial intercourse of all kinds. Products from this
vast and fertile territory cannot be marketed with any degree of
assurance. The proposed improvement is needed and will benefit the




The broad interpretation of benefit by the Colorado Supreme
Court lends credence to a possible effort by the Colorado Legisla-
ture to define benefit.
Courts in other jurisdictions have also expanded upon the
meaning of benefits for purposes of justifying taxation of property
to defray the costs of improvements. In a recent Florida case
involving the ecological impact of a proposed project, Seadade
Industries v. Florida Power & Light Co., 38 it was held that since
the constitution declared the policy of the State as to natural
resources, the protection of resources is an appropriate matter for
consideration in condemnation cases. In Seadade, the plaintiff
maintained that the proposed canal to carry spent cooling water
from a generating plant to the body of water into which it was to
be discharged, was unnecessary because the spent water would
harm the permanent body of water. The Florida Supreme Court
found that the defendant successfully showed that the discharge
would be acceptable and no irreparable harm would result. The
type of benefit under consideration related to preservation of a
permanent body of water.
A case distinguishing assessment for benefits to the general
public from assessments to particular property not specially ben-
efited, is Crampton v. City of Royal Oak.39 Royal Oak had created
a special assessment district in a downtown area for development
of pedestrian malls and plazas, among other improvements.
Plaintiffs contended their property would not be "specially bene-
Id. at 278, 211 P. at 654.
'7 Id. at 290-91, 211 P. at 658.
245 So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1971).
362 Mich. 503, 108 N.W.2d 16 (1961).
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fited" and that the city's method of assessing, i.e., one part on
assessed value of the land for general tax purposes and the second
part based on closeness or remoteness and square footage of each
parcel, was in error.
The Michigan Supreme Court in Crampton reversed a lower
court decision which had upheld the assessor's method. In declar-
ing that special assessments must be based on special benefits to
particular parcels of property and not on assessed valuation, the
court referred to an earlier Michigan decision, Grand Rapids
School Furniture Co. v. City of Grand Rapids,4 in which it was
stated that assessors "are simply to apportion a fixed amount, not
with reference to values alone, but also with reference to needs,
necessities, and advantages."4' The Michigan Supreme Court
also reaffirmed an earlier principle that "future probable advan-
tages may be considered in assessing benefits, and that incidental
benefits may be taken into account as well as those directly re-
ceived by the land."4 The court further stated:
The improvement here involved is not primarily one for the protec-
tion of property but is designed to benefit the city as a whole, and
the property within the assessment district specially, by promoting
the use and enjoyment thereof and enhancing its value....
In a case of this nature, consideration must be given to the
purpose to be attained by the public improvement sought.43
In this case, the assessment was set aside by the court and the
municipality was given the rig&t to substitute a new assessment
based on benefits received by each parcel of land within the as-
sessment district.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black observed that what could
be benefits for some in the assessment district could be detrimental
for others in the district. He quoted from the city's brief as follows:
It takes no great imagination to see that an area easily accessible to
pedestrian and motorist alike in safety, free from fast moving
through traffic and congested local traffic with its attendant noise,
fumes, and general commotion, systematically and conveniently
planned and laid out, generously interspersed with large free park-
ing areas, and beautified with landscaping and decorative malls and
plazas, is to be preferred far and away over its opposite counter-
part.
44
10 92 Mich. 564, 52 N.W. 1028 (1892).
Id. at 569, 52 N.W. at 1029.
42 362 Mich. at 522, 108 N.W.2d at 24.
Id. at 523, 108 N.W.2d at 25-26.
14 Id. at 532, 108 N.W.2d at 29.
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Justice Black then went on to agree with these benefits as
related to some property owners, but pointed out that the di-
verted traffic, fumes and noise could be a detriment to others:
Such a project benefits, yes. The shopper is convenienced and at-
tracted by comfortable ways of spending money, and the adjacent
places of business do more business. But that business, so attracted,
must be taken from other less attractive spots. Such is Confucius'
law of competition. It affords no basis for compulsive contribution
of those adversely affected, or at least those who receive no like
benefit. 5
This case is particularly important because it establishes
types of benefits that may be present. The special assessments
were set aside as a mechanism for financing the proposed im-
provement because there was inadequate evidence to support the
types of benefits as related to specific parcels.
Health and sanitation improvements have also been cited by
several courts as a type of benefit for assessing lands for drainage
improvements. 6 As related to this type of benefit, the cases seem
to indicate that even though it is impossible under the circum-
stances to ascertain the exact monetary benefit resulting directly
to land from an urban drainage project relieving a health and
sanitation problem, the land may nevertheless be subject to as-
sessment on the basis of the improvement to health and sanita-
tion.
I1. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
"[Tihe Legislature is . . . invested with a wide discretion
[in] imposing a tax . .I.'.- A state legislature, in the
absence of any constitutional restriction, may fix the basis of
assessment or taxation, and whenever it does so, such method
must be followed to the exclusion of any other. As was noted
previously,49 the Colorado statutes use the word benefits, but
nowhere do the statutes define the term.5° Since the legislature
has seen fit to relate assessments and taxation to benefits, specifi-
45 Id. at 533-34, 108 N.W.2d at 30.
,1 Garden of Eden Drainage Dist. v. Bartlett Trust Co., 330 Mo. 554, 562, 50 S.W.2d
627, 631 (1932): "What is termed hill land, when contiguous to or surrounded by swamp-
land, may be greatly benefited by draining such disease producing swamps, or the means
of ingress and egress to and from such lands. ... See also Dean v. Wilson, 267 Mo.
268, 183 S.W. 611 (1916).
'7 Bedford v. Johnson, 102 Colo. 203, 210, 78 P.2d 373, 377 (1938).
" Clark v. City of Royal Oak, 325 Mich. 298, 38 N.W.2d 413, cert. denied, 338 U.S.
890 (1949).
,' See text accompanying note 11 supra.
5' No statutory definition of benefit in other jurisdictions has been discovered.
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cally as related to drainage projects, the next step should be the
establishment of criteria for determining what constitutes types
of benefits.
The engineers and planners who are working with urban
drainage projects can provide valuable assistance to the legisla-
ture in defining benefits from drainage improvements by outlin-
ing the particular benefits inherent in such projects.
CONCLUSION
The need for adequate urban drainage and flood control sys-
tems in metropolitan areas is clear. However, implementation of
such systems is being hindered by hesitancy of local officials to
act in light of the statutory requirement that assessments be
made according to benefits received, while the meaning of
benefits remains undefined. The following proposed statutory
definition of benefit would help to clarify the situation, and its
enactment would be a positive step toward encouraging needed
urban drainage improvements.
The term benefit, for the purpose of assessing a particular
property within a drainage district (or special improvement dis-
trict), may include any one or more of the following:
a. Any increase in the market value of the property;
b. The provision for accepting the burden from specific property
for discharging surface water onto servient property in a manner or
quantity greater than would naturally flow because the dominant
owner made some of his property impermeable;
c. Any adaptability of property to a superior or more profitable
use;
d. Any alleviation of health and sanitation hazards accruing to
particular property or of public property in the district if the provi-
sion of health and sanitation is paid for wholly or partially out of
funds derived from taxation of property owners of the district;
e. Any reduction in the maintenance costs of particular property
or of public property in the district if the maintenance of the public
property is paid for wholly or partially out of funds derived from
taxation of property owners of the district;
f. Any increase in convenience or reduction in inconvenience
accruing to particular property owners, including the facilitation of
access to and travel over streets, roads, and highways;
g. Aesthetic, ecological or recreational improvements accruing to
particular property owners as a direct result of the drainage im-
provement.
h. The dollar value or values of any one or more of the above a.
through g. accruing to a specific parcel of property or the total prop-
erty of a taxing entity shall be determined as related to the cost of
the specific improvement.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the fact
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that lands included in a drainage district will receive no direct
benefit is not per se enough to exempt them from assessment."
erefore, assessment according to the above types of benefit is well
within judicial limits.52 The legislature should take the necessary
action to enact such a provision defining types of benefits. It is a
broader definition than most state courts have followed and is a
step toward encouraging the construction of needed urban drain-
age improvements, while at the same time affording protection to
property to be assessed from irresponsible charges.
Miller & Lux, Inc. v. Sacramento Drainage Dist., 256 U.S. 129 (1921).
' See also Morton Salt Co. v. City of S. Hutchison, 159 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1947);
Barten v. Turkey Creek Joint Dist., 200 Kan. 489, 438 P.2d 732 (1968); Curtis v. Louisville
& Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 311 S.W.2d 378 (Ky. 1958).

HEADS: LEX Loci DELICTI; TAILS: LEX Loci DOMICILE
-THE CONFLICT OF LAWS COIN ON EDGE-First




On September 24, 1973, the Colorado Supreme Court aban-
doned the doctrine of lex loci delicti for multistate tort actions in
Colorado. First National Bank v. Rostek' provided the court with
an opportunity to consider whether Colorado courts were com-
pelled to apply lex loci to determine the proper choice of law. The
supreme court reversed the trial court's summary judgment for
the defendant, Rostek, and announced not only the choice of law
rule for the Rostek question, but also the principles to be applied
to all subsequent multistate tort cases in Colorado.
A careful examination of the Rostek decision and its underly-
ing policy is important in assessing its impact on future Colorado
conflict of law multistate tort cases. This article will first analyze
the background of the alternative choice of law approaches which
were available to the Rostek court. Second, the precise choice of
law rules selected and applied in Rostek will be considered.
Third, it is suggested that the Rostek decision is representative
of the governmental interest analysis. And finally, the effect of
the Rostek rules on subsequent choice of law questions in Colo-
rado will be assessed.
I. ALTERNATIVE CHOICE OF LAW APPROACHES AVAILABLE TO THE
Rostek COURT
The Colorado court was not in the vanguard of a novel ap-
proach to conflict of law multistate tort problems in seeking an
alternative to lex loci.' Discontent with the rigidity of lex loci has
been prevalent for the last two decades among both academicians
and judges.' Babcock v. Jackson, a 1963 New York decision, out-
* The author acknowledges with appreciation the initial inspiration, instruction, and
persistence of Professor Samuel D. Cheris, Associate, Yegge, Hall, & Evans, Denver,
Colorado; B.S., 1967, Brooklyn College; M.B.A., J.D., 1971, Stanford University.
** Clerk to Judge Robert H. McWilliams, Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals; A.B.,
1970, Trinity College; J.D., 1974, University of Denver College of Law.
514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973).
See id., at 317 n.3 for a list of state decisions abandoning lex loci.
See Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933),
for an early discussion of theoretical approaches to conflict of law principles. "Modern"
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lined the range of choice of law theories proposed and the difficul-
ties inherent in supplanting lex loci.' Babcock was distinctive as
the first case to reject lex loci and to adopt an alternative rule5
relying on elements of the major policy approaches to choice of
law questions.
Judge (later Chief Judge) Fuld posed the question: "Shall
the law of the place of the tort invariably govern"' the available
relief for that tort? That was the essence of lex loci as incorpo-
rated in section 384 of the Restatement (First) Conflict of Laws
and this rule had been the absolute determinant of the proper
choice of law.
The origin of the lex loci delicti doctrine rested on the con-
cept that where the law of more than one state was, or might be,
involved in a tort action, the law of the state where the parties'
rights vested should control.7 In a tort action the vesting of rights
and the cause of action occurred at the place of the wrong, for only
there did one party acquire a right against the other.' The place
of the wrong was almost always the place where the tortious con-
duct also occurred. Invoking lex loci to select the applicable law
resulted in relative uniformity and predictability, but its me-
chanical application sometimes created inequitable consequences
both for the parties and for the states involved.'
Previously, New York courts and other jurisdictions had cir-
cumvented the harshness of a lex loci application through avoid-
ance techniques.9 By characterizing conflicts problems as proce-
dural rather than substantive questions, for example, the court
could avoid lex loci without squarely overruling it." But the
interest in lex loci substitutes began with Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable
Law, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1952).
12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
Id. at 480-82, 191 N.E.2d 283-84, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 748-49. The court discusses the move
away from lex loci in other areas of law (e.g., contracts), but not, prior to this, in torts.
Id. at 477, 191 N.E.2d 280, 240 N.Y.S.2d 746.
For an excellent discussion of the lex loci doctrinal development beginning with its
origins in 13th century Italy and culminating in the Restatement formulations, see Sedler,
Babcock v. Jackson in Kentucky: Judicial Method and the Policy-Centered Conflict of
Laws, 56 Ky. L.J. 27, 29-63 (1967).
Justice Holmes is credited with articulating the vested rights approach in tort cases
in Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904).
1 One commentator characterized lex loci as not only "mechanical" but also
"wooden" and "ossified." See Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 202, 204 (1969).
'" See Carpenter, New Trends in Conflicts Rules Affecting Torts: A Chronological
Review, 1 LOYOLA U.L.J. 187, 208-09 (1970).
" Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133
(1961).
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Babcock court ventured into new legal territory when it aban-
doned lex loci and held that "the [traditional] rule, formulated
as it was by the courts, should be discarded."'"
Having displaced lex loci, the next problem was what should
determine the proper choice of law when laws conflicted. Prior to
Babcock, agitation to supplant lex loci had resulted in two differ-
ent proposed approaches: either lex loci should be replaced by a
more sophisticated, though flexible, rule; or, alternatively, choice
of laws should not be governed by a priori rules but rather by
reference to policy-oriented approaches.'
3
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws is representa-
tive of the former view, structured on flexible rules which consider
the "most significant contacts" between the interested states and
the parties.'4 The latter approach is best presented by the govern-
mental interest analysis.'5 This theory stresses ad hoc adjudica-
tion and refers to underlying state policies to determine that state
which seems to possess a superior interest in having its law ap-
plied.
These alternatives were both utilized in Babcock which
made the breakthrough from lex loci to policy considerations in
a tort action involving a host and a guest, both New York domici-
liaries, who were injured in an auto accident in Ontario, Canada.
New York had no guest statute, whereas Ontario had a strict
guest law barring recovery. The New York court applied the law
'2 12 N.Y.2d at 484, 191 N.E.2d 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d 751-52.
,3 Sedler, supra note 7, at 41-42.
"1 In an attempt to underline the policy foundations of the definitive Restatement
Second rules, Willis Reese, the Restatement reporter, emphasized that "[riules are the
product of policies, and it is unwise to seek to formulate a rule until the nature and range
of the policies it embodies are well understood." Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach,
57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 333 (1972).
,1 Professor Brainerd Currie was the first to articulate the governmental interests
approach and his writings offer a cogent explanation of the method. See Currie, Survival
of Actions: Adjudication versus Automation In the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REv. 205
(1958); Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958). See also Currie, Conflict, Crisis and
Confusion in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1; Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of
Laws, 13 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1961); Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in
Conflict of Laws Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REv. 227 (1958); Currie, Notes on Methods and
Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171; Currie, The Constitution and the
"Transitory" Cause of Action, 73 HI-Rv. L. REv. 36 (1959); Currie, The Verdict of Quies-
cent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 258 (1961); Currie &
Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Conflict of Laws: Equal Protection, 28
U. Cm. L. REV. 1 (1960); Currie & Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Con-
flict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69 YALE L.J. 1323 (1960).
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of New York, which was not the place of injury, after considering
the facts with direct regard to policies motivating the respective
forums' laws. The jurisdiction which had an overriding interest
in asserting its law was the determining factor. By grouping the
"most significant contacts" which both New York and Canada
had with the incident without isolating and weighing each ele-
ment, the court assessed the competing interests and found:"
Justice, fairness and "the best practical result" . . . may best be
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction
which, because of its relationship or contact with the occurrence or
the parties, has the greatest concern with the specific issue raised
in the litigation. . . .[This rule] thereby allows the forum to apply
"the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned with the
outcome of [the] particular litigation.' ",17
This language indicates that the court concentrated on two fac-
tors: significant contacts and policy. These factors act as the
basis, respectively, of the Restatement Second approach and of
the governmental interests analysis.
The court acknowledged the emphasis it placed on the
Restatement Second by grouping contacts. Specifically, the court
referred to section 145 of the Restatement.8 This section, which
encompasses all tort actions, dictates that the law of the state
"with the most significant relationship" to the occurrences and
parties shall govern. Facts of the particular situation are matched
to a set of broad choice of law principles to ascertain the state
with the dominant interest. Section 6 of the Restatement Second
sets forth the following goals to be attained in isolating the "most
significant contacts":
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems;
(b) the relevant policies of the forum;
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue;
(d) the protection of justified expectations;
(e) the basis of policies underlying the particular field of law;
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of results; and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
Section 145 incorporates these more abstract policy consider-
It is important to distinguish the Restatement Second's use of "contacts" from the
governmental interest's use of the term. Although Babcock looks to the "center of gravity"
or "grouping of contacts," this involves an analysis of circumstances and policies rather
than a counting by number of the state connections. See Carpenter, supra note 10, at 225.
'7 12 N.Y.2d at 481-82, 191 N.E.2d 283, 240 N.Y.S.2d 749.
Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d 283-84, 240 N.Y.S.2d 749-50.
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ations of section 6 by requiring that the rights and liabilities of
the parties be decided "under the principles stated in section
six." However, the means for identifying the proper law is a set
of four precise "contacts.""9 Part 2 of section 145 gives substance
to an otherwise pure policy approach by specifying that each tort
issue be examined with respect to:
(a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and
place of business of the parties; and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
While the Restatement was designed to look to the factual
context only after a proper obeisance to all the policies involved,
the practical approach would be to count contacts and forego the
more difficult policy analysis. Therefore, the Restatement
Second, which was hoped to be a workable coordination of rules
and policy, is highly susceptible of becoming as inflexible as lex
loci. 0
The Babcock court hesitated to use the Restatement as an
absolute rule, but rather regarded the separate contacts only in
comparison to the issue presented and the relative interests of
New York and Ontario. By looking to the scope of interests, rather
than to individual factual elements, the Babcock court relied on
the policy approach alternative to lex loci." After considering the
policy bases of the New York and Ontario legislatures in extend-
ing or denying coverage to guests, the jurisdiction with the
stronger interest was found to be New York. This court's exami-
nation of legislative policy was a clear example of the interest
analysis method.
A policy approach replaces traditional choice of laws con-
cepts with an ad hoc view of the states' policies, parties' expecta-
" Although the incorporation of section 6 in section 145 of the Restatement Second
is an effort to combine abstract and substantive considerations, the comprehensiveness
of section 145 is limited by a notable deficiency. "Although it is printed in black letters,
section 145 is not much of a rule since it fails to offer a definition of the central word
'significant.' Thus the Restatement provisions on tort choice of law appear to be program-
matic rather than normative." Juenger, supra note 9, at 212.
2" Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts,
28 LAw & CONTEMP. PROS. 700, 705 (1963). See also in this issue, Nanda, A Positive but
Uncertain Step Forward for Choice of Law Problems in Colorado: The Rostek Decision,
51 DENVER L.J. 587 (1974).
2, 12 N.Y.2d at 482-84, 191 N.E.2d 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d 749-51.
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tions, or inherent "best" aspects of the law involved in each true
conflicts case.2 The most prominent policy approach is that of
governmental interests analysis which was initially postulated by
Professor Brainerd Currie and later refined by other choice of law
authorities.13 The Babcock decision was the first judicial recogni-
tion of the interest analysis approach."
The foundation for governmental interest considerations was
suggested by decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
1930's. In two cases, the Court held that a state court, applying
its own law in multistate cases, must establish that the facts of
the case bring it within the state's interest to enforce local law.25
Absent such a showing, a court's action violates the due process
and full faith and credit clauses of the Constitution. 6 States were
compelled, therefore, to determine and articulate their own inter-
ests before accepting a choice of law rule. Currie's governmental
interest theory provided some criteria by which to identify true
conflicts problems, to recognize state interests, and to compare
competing state interests.'
The Babcock holding was a recognizable product of the inter-
est analysis technique:
Comparison of the relative "contacts" and "interests" of New
York and Ontario . . . vis-a-vis the issue here presented, makes it
cle'ar that the concern of New York is unquestionably the greater
and more direct and that the interest of Ontario is at best minimal.2
While the Babcock decision did not detail the range of ap-
proaches suggested to supplant lex loci,29 it did represent the two
2 For an early discussion of the theory of policy analysis in general, see Cavers, supra,
note 3.
Note 15 supra. See also Hancock, " In the Parish of St. Mary le Bow, in the Ward
of Cheap," 16 STAN. L. REV. 561 (1964); Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary? 37
TEXAS L. REV. 657 (1959).
24 Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Law, 63
COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1233 (1963).
21 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939);
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
2 The state court may also risk violating the equal protection clause by failing to
enforce its own law where it is the state with the predominant interests. Hancock, Anti-
Guest Statutes and Marital Immunity for Torts in Conflict of Laws, 1 DALHOUS1E L.J. 105,
140-46 (1973).
' See note 15 supra. The governmental interest theory makes a distinction between
a true conflicts case-both states have an interest in carrying out their policy-and a
pseudo-conflicts case-examination shows only one state to have any interest in applying
its law. Interest analysis is necessary only in the "true" conflicts situation.
12 N.Y.2d at 482, 191 N.E.2d 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d 750.
See also Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L.
Rav. 267 (1966); Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CORNELL
L.Q. 215 (1963).
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leading alternatives to the mechanical place of the wrong rule,
i.e., the Restatement Second's "most significant contacts" and
the governmental interests policy approach. Because the New
York court invoked both rules and policy language, the Babcock
decision was a hybrid on the continuum between the inexorable
traditional rule of lex loci and the best of all possible alternatives
to lex loci.30
The Colorado court confronted the issue in Rostek within this
context (or vortex) of choice of law philosophies exemplified by
Babcock v. Jackson and its opinion reflected an awareness of the
various options to lex loci.
3
1
II. THE CHOICE OF LAW RULES SELECTED AND APPLIED IN Rostek
In December of 1969, John Rostek and his wife, Carol, de-
parted from Colorado for Iowa in their twin engine plane. En
route they stopped in Vermillion, South Dakota, to attend a busi-
ness meeting and to spend the night. After a change in plans, the
Rosteks left that evening for Colorado from the Vermillion air-
port. The wreckage of their plane, in which both Rosteks were
killed, was later found at the end of the runway.32 Mr. Rostek,
who had been acting as pilot, and his wife were both Colorado
residents and their aircraft was registered in Colorado.
The guardian of Mrs. Rostek's four children filed a wrongful
death action in Colorado against the estate of the husband-pilot.
The administrator for the estate alleged that South Dakota law
governed. South Dakota's aircraft guest statute barred actions by
a guest against the host-pilot for anything less than willfull or
wanton misconduct.34 Colorado, however, has no statutory bar
against an aircraft guest's claims. Since the parties stipulated
that "at most" the plaintiff could show simple negligence by John
The comprehensiveness of Babcock made it susceptible to being adopted by all of
the various schools of approach. In a footnote to Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 588, 249
N.E.2d 394, 406, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 535 (1969), Judge Burke, concurring, noted:
[Pirofessor Cheatham gave great emphasis to our discussion of the concepts
of "center of gravity" and "grouping of contacts." . . . Professor Currie
believed that the court adopted his theory of "governmental interests."...
Professor Ehrenzweig interpreted the decision as valuable support for his
theory of applying "the law of the state where the insured car is permanently
kept." . . . Professors Cavers, Leflar and Reese were unable to agree with
any of the above-mentioned views.
" See the Colorado Supreme Court's reference to the various commentators' theories,
514 P.2d at 318 nn.4 & 5.
11 Id. at 315.
Id. at 319.
S.D. COMPILED LAWs ANN. § 50-13-15 (1967).
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Rostek,3 it was crucial to determine whether South Dakota or
Colorado law governed. The opportunity to determine the choice
of applicable law was presented when the Colorado Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The trial court had granted defendant's
motion for summary judgment based on the traditional mechani-
cal rule:
The law in Colorado is that the claim is governed by lex loci
delicti, rather than lex fori. Pando v. Jasper [133 Colo. 321], 295
P.2d 229 and Bannowsky v. Krauser, [D.C.], 294 F. Supp. 1204.36
Acknowledging that lex loci appeared in Colorado law "more
by default than by design,"37 the supreme court in a detailed,
documented analysis reversed the trial court and remanded for a
proceeding consistent with its views.
Chief Justice Pringle's opinion represented a step-by-step
analysis-with each step thoughtfully, even gingerly, taken-in
opting for an alternative to lex loci. The cases relied on by the
defendant were distinguished as assuming without questioning
lex loci 3 1 or as being a district court decision not binding on state
appellate courts. 39 Other Colorado cases were characterized as
similarly without precedential effect.4"
Finding no stare decisis barriers, the court noted that lex loci
was a disintegrating doctrine, overruled by many state courts and
criticized by most conflict of laws authorities." While the consen-
sus was that a mechanical deference to the law of the place of the
wrong was no longer viable, there were differing opinions as to
what should be substituted. The Colorado decision alluded to
theories emphasizing the lex fori approach or the law of the
forum,42 the expectation of the parties,4 3 and the governmental
interests considerations." The Rostek decision criticized these
theories as "approaches" requiring ad hoc adjudication rather
1 514 P.2d at 315.
39 Id.
37 Id.
31 Pando v. Jasper, 133 Colo. 321, 295 P.2d 229 (1956). This is the only Colorado case
to mention expressly lex loci.
3g Bannowsky v. Krauser, 294 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Colo. 1969).
I" See, e.g., Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Warring, 37 Colo. 122, 86 P. 305 (1906); Atchison,
T. & S.F.R.R. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 15 P. 821 (1887).
514 P.2d at 318.
42 As an example of the lex loci approach in contrast with other theories, see
Ehrenzweig, supra, note 20.
13 Reese, Conflicts of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
679, 691 (1963).
" Note 15 supra.
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than leading to a comprehensive solution. Whereas a constant
rule provides a predetermined means for resolving the same issue
even though the facts may vary from case to case, an interests
analysis approach requires individual analysis of each issue
within the factual context of a specific case.
The court acknowledged that it sought a rational and equita-
ble approach rooted in predictability and uniformity of result.'5
To end this quest, the court turned to the New York decision in
Neumeier v. Kuehner.1" In that opinion, Chief Judge Fuld
brought three precise rules for choice of law determinations from
the relative obscurity of his concurring opinion in Tooker v.
Lopez47 to the dignity of a majority rule in Neumeier. The Colo-
rado court accepted the first two principles of Neumeier as worka-
ble choice of law rules in the guest-host situation:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in
the same state, and the (vehicle) is there registered, the law of that
state should control and determine the standard of care which the
host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile
and that state does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he
should not be held liable by reason of the fact that liability would
be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state of the victim's
domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state of his
own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come
into that state should not-in the absence of special circumstan-
ces-be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense.'8
Having established what would determine the choice of law,
the Colorado court applied the facts to its selected rule. Since
both John and Carol Rostek, as host and guest, were domiciled
in Colorado and the airplane was registered in Colorado, 9 the first
principle applied. "[T]he rights and liabilities of the parties are
governed by the law of the place of domicile which in this case is
Colorado.,
5 0
Recognizing that the Rostek case was a "comparatively easy
11 514 P.2d at 319.
31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
24 N.Y.2d at 583, 249 N.E.2d 403, 301 N.Y.S.2d 531.
31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d 70.
" The Colorado court changed the term "car" in the New York rules to the more
generic "vehicle." It might be questioned whether this modification makes these rules
applicable to the Rostek facts. Colorado defined "vehicle" as "any motor vehicle" in COLO.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-2(6) (1963) which excludes "vehicles ... that travel through the
air." COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6-2(2) (1963).
51 514 P.2d at 319.
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one" and that the incorporation of two explicit rules would make
subsequent similar cases "reasonably easy for lawyers and judges
to reach,"5 the court nevertheless went beyond the Rostek facts
and extended its decision to all multistate tort controversies. In
dictum fashioned to thwart any resort to ad hoc decisionmaking,
the court announced that tort situations outside the adopted
Neumeier principles would be decided by applying the law of the
state with the "most significant relationship" as defined and ex-
plained by section 145, Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws. 1
2
The Colorado Supreme Court abandoned lex loci for the
"more flexible choice of law rules" of (1) the first two Neumeier
principles for host-guest relationships and (2) section 145 of the
Restatement Second for all other multistate tort controversies.
III. THE Rostek DECISION AS REPRESENTATIVE OF GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS ANALYSIS
Although it sought and announced rules, the Colorado Su-
preme Court's opinion can be viewed as an interest analysis deci-
sion. This is apparent from the court's language and references,
the Neumeier and Restatement Second rules selected, and the
available rules not selected.
A. Language of the Opinion
The court summarized its criticism of the traditional rule by
stating that if lex loci were applied in Rostek, it would be heedless
"of the interests of the states involved or the expectations of the
parties. This we refuse to do." 3 Although discontented with lex
loci, the court sought replacement of the old rule with concrete
guidelines.54 As between rules and an ad hoc approach, rules
seemed to assure "predictability of result and uniformity of appli-
cation."55
The Rostek decision specifically referred to rules, but the
language indicated a strong bias toward the interest approach.
The Neumeier decision was attractive because it "embodies the
11 Id. at 320.
52 Id.
Id. at 318.
' Since the fact patterns of Rostek and Neumeier differ (in Rostek host and guest
had a common state of domicile but in Neumeier they had different domiciles), the
Colorado court was obviously concerned with reaching the Neumeier rules or it would
have turned to a case more in point such as Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967)
or Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
514 P.2d at 318.
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rational underpinnings of the newer approaches to choice of law
problems, emphasizing the expectations of the parties and the
interests of the different jurisdictions involved.""6
In incorporating section 145 to resolve nonhost/guest contro-
versies, the rule aspects of the Restatement Second were deem-
phasized. The court underscored not the "contacts" element but
the determination of the state with the "most significant relation-
ship." Special attention was given to the Restatement's consider-
ation of the issues, the nature of the tort, and the purposes of the
competing tort rules involved. 57 The court approved the policy
analysis factors of section 145 rather than its static rules.
Additionally, it is notable that secondary sources referred to
in the opinion either stressed an interest analysis approach' s or
criticized mechanical rule alternatives to lex loci."
B. The Rules Selected
First National Bank v. Rostek delineated choice of law rules,
but these rules incorporated a consideration of competing state
interests. Undertones in the opinion suggest that the court was
concerned with providing an interests analysis. A close examina-
tion of the Neumeier and Restatement rules which were adopted
seems to support this observation.
Colorado relied upon Neumeier v. Kuehner to govern the
factual pattern presented by the Rostek case. Neumeier, unlike
the Rostek situation, involved a host and guest from different
domiciles (host-New York, guest-Canada) who were involved
in an accident in Ontario. Ontario had a guest statute, New York
did not. Chief Judge Fuld prefaced his guidelines with the caveat
that Neumeier, relying on a series of governmental interest deci-
sions of the New York court since Babcock, was both a culmina-
tion and clarification of these previous opinions.10 Although policy
analysis was contrary to rule formulation, the court's past atten-
Id. at 319.
'7 Id. at 320.
See, in particular, id. at 318 nn.4 & 5 where the court refers to articles by Leflar,
Currie, Traynor, and Weintraub, all of whom favor governmental interests or policy ap-
proaches.
" The references which Rostek made to commentaries on the Restatement Second
are predominantly critical, perhaps indicating the court's basic discomfort with the
Restatement. The articles by Currie and Ehrenzweig are critical of the Restatement posi-
tion and are noted in the comments to section 145. The Colorado court included these
references in footnotes 4 and 5 of its opinion rather than in footnoted discussions more
favorable to the Restatement Second.
11 31 N.Y.2d at 127-28, 286 N.E.2d 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d 69.
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tion to New York interests in automobile guest statute cases al-
lowed the court to suggest three narrow principles to guide future
decisions. Colorado incorporated two of these principles and de-
cided Rostek according to the first one.
Some commentators characterized the Neumeier opinion as
a retreat from the full-bodied interest approach of earlier New
York decisions. Yet these critics agreed that the first principle
which Chief Judge Fuld propounded and the one which Colorado
employed to decide Rostek represented a "pure interest" ap-
proach.' Fuld's rules were not diluted interest analysis. The first
two principles codified previously considered New York interests
without attempting to predetermine future policy." The first
principle of Neumeier, which became the rule for Rostek, was
founded on recognized state interests.
The New York principles which granted recovery in Babcock
and denied recovery in Neumeier are viable in Colorado because
they encourage analysis of the respective competing states' inter-
ests.
3
Interest analysis requires that the court consider the policies
which underlie the competing state laws. Because of the guest
statutes involved, discerning state policies in the Rostek case was
not particularly difficult. Colorado has recently upheld its auto-
mobile guest statute barring claims for any negligence less than
willful and wanton. 4 South Dakota's vehicular guest statute is
similar. 5 The policy against extending a similar limitation to air
situations is also clear. Colorado statutes do not include an air-
craft guest law, expressly defining "motor vehicle" to exclude
"vehicles that travel through the air."6 The legislature carefully
precluded any back door attempt to apply the motor vehicle guest
statute to airplane accidents.
Colorado's policy is to protect fully the rights of aircraft
guests by not limiting a host-pilot's liability. South Dakota, on
the other hand, articulated its policy of restricting guests' rights
, Symposium, Neumeier v. Kuehner: A Conflicts Conflict, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 104
(1973).
" See Traynor, supra note 23 at 667.
"3 Even if Colorado were to abrogate its guest statute, the Neumeier rules would still
carry out Colorado policy, because the rules merely assure evaluation of policy.
" See the exhaustive consideration of the Colorado guest statute, upholding its con-
stitutionality, in Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527, 351 P.2d 851 (1960).
" S.D. CoMPnLn LAWS ANN. § 32-34-1 (1967).
" See the discussion of statutory definitions, supra note 48.
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and limiting pilot liability. In confronting these conflicting poli-
cies, the Colorado court properly chose to enforce Colorado's in-
terests over those of South Dakota. The first principle of
Neumeier allowed Colorado to maintain its well-established pol-
icy in this area.
By implementing New York guidelines, Colorado could bal-
ance competing state interests to protect Colorado's overriding
policies but defer to another state's more significant interest
when necessary. A not improbable hypothetical illustrates this.
Husband and Wife are Colorado domiciliaries and their car
is registered in Colorado. While H is driving in California with W,
he takes Guest, a California domiciliary, for a ride which ends in
a collision caused by H's simple negligence. Suits are filed in
Colorado by both W and G on the issue of H's liability. As noted,
Colorado has an automobile guest statute, but California recently
declared its guest statute unconstitutional."7
As between H and W, who have a common domicile and a
vehicle registered in that state, the Rostek rule (i.e., the first
principle of Neumeier) applies. Colorado law governs and W will
be prevented from recovering against H. As between H and G,
however, the second Neumeier principle adopted by Colorado
governs and requires the application of California law to permit
G's recovery. Since G was injured in his own domiciliary state,
without a guest recovery limitation, H is prohibited from inter-
posing his state's host-guest law as a defense.
Application of the Rostek rules results in Colorado's denying
recovery to the Wife while preserving the liability of the Husband
to the Guest, the party without Colorado contacts. Both Colo-
rado's policy of protecting its drivers and California's policy of
protecting its guests have been preserved without creating an
unexpected boon to or unexpected hardship on any party. 8
The selected Neumeier rules are premised on giving weight
to state interests, regardless of the particular nature of those in-
terests. Colorado's acceptance of Chief Judge Fuld's guidelines
appears to affirm the interest analysis.
The Restatement Second has been praised and criticized as
the injection of manageable rules into choice of law problems. It
7 Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212 (1973).
" See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 580, 249 N.E.2d 394, 400, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519,
528 (1969). Different liabilities from the same accident are not an aberration of choice of
law rules, but they are an anomaly of the federal system as well.
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is significant that section 145, as adopted by Colorado, evidences
a strong tendency toward interests analysis.
Before locating the "most significant relationship," section
145 requires a consideration of policies with reference to section
6 guidelines. Section 6 not only itemizes important factors to be
considered in all policy approaches, but it closely approximates
the governmental interest theory. 9 When section 145 is properly
utilized, policy assessments precede "contacts" counting.
The Restatement Second in conjunction with the first two
Neumeier rules assures that interest analysis will be incorporated
in tort choice of law questions in Colorado. The Neumeier rules
were formulated on the basis of policy considerations and section
145 of the Restatement seems to require such policy exploration.
The Restatement view, as adopted by Colorado, applies only
to nonhost/guest cases. If neither state has a guest statute, there
is probably not a true conflict.70 Counting of contacts then would
indicate the "most significant" state and appropriate choice of
law. But the result is likely to be the same as lex loci because of
the Restatement's emphasis on the place of injurious "contact.",
If either state or both states have guest statutes, a Colorado
forum will apply the Neumeier rules. The Rostek decision demon-
strates that application of the first Neumeier principle preserves
recognized state interests. This rule gives effect to the law of the
domiciliary state where contacts under the Restatement would be
balanced.72 Any attempt. to circumvent state interests or to give
one contact excessive weight is avoided by making Neumeier de-
terminative.
Where contacts would not be balanced because host and
guest were not domiciliaries of the same state, the second
Neumeier principle applies to preserve the superior state interest.
The rules, because they are centered on an "interests" axis, pre-
clude an inappropriate application of "contacts" where state pol-
icy has been formulated.
0 Juenger, supra, note 9, at 213 (footnote omitted): "Section 6(2) of the new Restate-
ment incorporated in section 145 by reference, and the discussion in the comments follow-
ing that section reflect the terminology and thinking of interest analysis."
7o Supra note 27.
" Section 145's continuing deference to the law of the place of the wrong has been
noted by various commentators. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 10 at 226; Comment,
The Second Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CAIIF. L. REv. 762, 777 (1963).
12 In Rostek, the places of injury and of the wrong were both South Dakota, but the
domicile and the origin of relationship of the parties were in Colorado.
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According to the court's decision, multistate tort situations
not within the Neumeier pattern are to be resolved by reference
to section 145 of the Restatement. Such cases will be conflicts
where state policy may not be readily ascertainable. Preliminary
reference of an issue to section 6 requires judicial recognition of
possible state interests. Even these difficult cases are to be con-
sidered initially in a policy approach framework, through section
6, to begin defining the extent of state interests.
The interplay between Neumeier and the Restatement
Second secures both the priority of state interests where that
interest has been recognized, and the analysis of state policy
where such interests have not yet been challenged.
C. Rules Not Selected
The rule not selected by the Colorado Supreme Court also
reveals the court's interest analysis preference. Chief Judge
Fuld's opinion presented three guidelines and the Neumeier facts
made the third principle controlling:
In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled
in different states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally,
the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the
accident occurred but not if it can be shown that displacing that
normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive law
purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state
system or producing great uncertainty for litigants.1
3
Reference to this policy standard led the court to rule that
"the plaintiff has failed to show that this State's connection with
the controversy was sufficient to justify displacing the rule of lex
loci delictus."74
Since the Colorado court was eager to establish choice of law
rules, it is curious that the court avoided this third standard and
referred instead to section 145 which Rostek explicitly adopted.
There are two possible explanations for this avoidance. First, the
narrow holding in Neumeier found that Ontario law governed
-the same result as under lex loci. However, in abandoning the
traditional rule, Colorado sought to avoid any method that might
circuitously terminate at its original point of departure, i.e., lex
loci.
Secondly, the court repeatedly stressed the need for concrete
guidelines. Chief Judge Fuld's third principle was broad enough
31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d 70.
' Id. at 129, 286 N.E.2d 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d 71.
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to allow interest considerations, but it did not provide any basis
for such an analysis. Only a court skilled in interest considera-
tions could wisely manipulate such an imprecise policy approach.
However, adopting section 6 (through section 145) of the
Restatement would provide a surer basis for systematic interest
analysis.
The Colorado court obviously did not rely exclusively on the
Restatement Second. Rostek was itself decided on the basis of the
predetermined guidelines of Neumeier.
If the court had applied section 145 to Rostek, the facts might
have compelled the court to reach a different result-South Da-
kota's law may have prevailed. To identify the state with the
"most significant relationship," the court would have considered
each state's contacts with the occurrence and perhaps found them
balanced. The comments to the Restatement section stress that
only with rare exception will a law other than that of the place of
injury and wrong be the most significant." Willis Reese, the
Restatement Second reporter, described the contacts evaluation
approach as little more than lex loci "in modern apparel."' ,
Therefore, the probable application of section 145 would have led
the Colorado court to South Dakota law. The court would be
obliged either to manipulate section 145 to avoid South Dakota
law, or to accede to the Restatement's choice of South Dakota
law. By adopting the Neumeier rules, rather than the
Restatement view, for the Rostek facts, the court avoided either
unacceptable alternative.
Colorado's adoption of the first two Neumeier guidelines,
and of section 145 for all fact situations not covered by the
Neumeier principles, resulted in a decision in which interest anal-
ysis plays a greater role than is initially apparent. Individually,
the Neumeier rules and section 145 are choice of law rules, but
together they preserve the governmental interests approach in
three ways: state interests previously articulated are codified,
interest considerations once established are not ignored, and in-
terests not previously analyzed are referred to policy guidelines
without a binding result.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE Rostek RULES ON SUBSEQUENT CHOICE OF
LAW QUESTIONS IN COLORADO
Rostek's interest analysis background will have an impact on
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2), comments d & e (1969).
Reese, supra note 43.
[VOL. 51
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN COLORADO
future conflicts questions. Cases within the ambit of the
Neumeier rules protect Colorado's expressed interests while other
tort situations are assured careful interest consideration through
application of the Restatement Second.
The most satisfying aspect of Rostek is that the court
achieved what it sought. Colorado is no longer obliged by preced-
ent to apply lex loci. The court laid to rest the place of the wrong
as an absolute standard and replaced it with definitive, though
flexible, guidelines. The Colorado court's ultimate goal for uni-
formity and predictability of result made it doubtful, absent such
choice of law rules, that the court would have abandoned lex loci.
Coordination of Neumeier and the Restatement Second preserved
the primacy of state interests without requiring an ad hoc deter-
mination of every choice of law problem.
A difficulty of the Rostek decision is that what the court did
so clearly, it did too subtly." Chief Justice Pringle's decision
never directly acknowledged a predilection for interest analysis.
Even though the court's reasoning and results were consistent
with a governmental interest approach, the opinion only ob-
liquely referred to this basis. There is a danger that the Rostek
rules alone, without perceptive analysis, will result in the mere
counting of relevant contacts.
Furthermore, the opinion failed to point out the reference to
section 6 made by section 145 of the Restatement Second. The
court's analysis of the Restatement manifests the implicit inter-
connection between the two sections which the court recognized.
But the court should have mentioned explicitly the relevant in-
terest principles of the Restatement which its own analysis em-
ployed78 and which a proper use of the "most significant relation-
ship" theory requires. To prevent emphasis on the place of the
wrong, the court might have explained the horizontal relationship
between the two Restatement sections.
79
Finally, the emphasis on ad hoc adjudication foreclosed the
71 In fact, the Colorado court followed the same practice it deplored by other courts
"making a choice of law decision without exposing the real choice of law influencing
factors for objective classification and criticism." 514 P.2d at 317.
" Lest this commentary on the Colorado court's adeptness in handling new choice of
law solutions seem too harsh, it should be noted that the court is in good company. Currie
described as "without perception" the conflicts decisions of Cardozo, Holmes, Hand,
Brandeis, and Black. Currie, Justice Traynor and the Conflict of Laws, 13 STAN. L. REv.
719 (1961).
' See Weintraub, supra note 29.
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advantages available from an approach based purely on policy."s
Evolving general rules only after deciding cases enables a court
to modify outdated state laws to reflect local changes in social
policy. A pure policy approach would permit local law and local
policy to develop harmoniously and contemporaneously.
Rostek is, however, the Colorado choice of laws rule for torts
and its interest analysis background can affect subsequent cases
in several ways.
First, to obtain the full benefit of interest analysis, practi-
tioners must precisely and comprehensively define the issues in
each case."' Cases can be decided consistently with state policy
only when the involved policy is identified, and that policy is
recognizable only when the issue is correctly articulated. Percep-
tively and carefully presenting a conflict question in terms of its
underlying issue will enable a court to recognize the relevant
policy and to act to protect that policy. The outcome of a case
may ultimately depend upon the initial characterization of the
essential issue.
82
Secondly, multistate tort problems must be presented to the
court in terms of relevant facts, competing state interests, and
pertinent' Colorado policy. Rostek illustrated this technique by
setting forth the important facts, contrasting the South Dakota
and Colorado guest statutes, and recognizing Colorado's interest
in not limiting an airplane guest's recovery. Extensive explana-
tion in future cases will safeguard against a mechanical reference
to Restatement "contacts." A policy-rooted conflicts rule, as de-
veloped in Rostek, requires more initial analysis by both judge
and counsel, but it results in decisions in furtherance, rather than
in frustration, of state policy.
A third effect of Rostek is an apparent requirement that
briefs and oral arguments place emphasis on interest factors
which Rostek considered but did not articulate. It seems impor-
tant to emphasize consideration of the Restatement section 6
policy principles before the "significant contacts" are identified.
11 Curiously, a court's choice of rules over a straight policy approach leads to less
flexibility. See Hancock, supra note 23; Traynor, supra note 23.
" Insight into the nature of the problem to be solved will determine the sensibility
of the solution rather than any particular rule selected. Weintraub, supra note 29, at 249.
An issue which centers on the relationship between the parties may be decided
quite differently, under the same facts, than an issue which focuses on a party's standard
of conduct. See Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d at 482-84, 191 N.E.2d 284-85, 240 N.Y.S.2d
750-51.
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The more frequently the court engages in this policy determina-
tion prior to rule application, the more natural it will become.
State interest analysis should and will be an inherent part of
every choice of law decision.
Finally, the Rostek opinion suggests that conflicts cases
should be directed toward framing useful rules for choice of law.
The Colorado Supreme Court opted for an interest approach
bounded by concrete guidelines.83 Practitioners litigating multis-
tate torts must demonstrate that policy analysis is operable
within a framework of rules or the innovations of Rostek will be
short lived.
CONCLUSION
In First National Bank v. Rostek the Colorado Supreme
Court abandoned the mechanistic lex loci doctrine and sought a
choice of law system guaranteeing certainty, ease of application,
and flexibility. The court combined host-guest rules from
Neumeier v. Kuehner with principles in section 145 of the
Restatement Second to produce an interests analysis approach
buttressed by concrete rules.
This amalgam of policy evaluation and rules represents the
emergence of an operable system of governmental interest analy-
sis easily manageable by courts who may be hesitant to adjudi-
cate conflicts on an ad hoc basis. In allowing and requiring policy
assessment and reference to competing state interests, the Rostek
decision is not necessarily a uniform, predictable, and totally
consistent panacea to all subsequent choice of law problems. Pro-
perly utilized, the Rostek analytical approach will achieve ex-
actly what a court seeks: protection of the parties' and of the
states' dominant interests. Ineptly employed, the Rostek rules
can become as rigid, inconsistent, and inequitable as lex loci.
11 The desirability of this more particular specification of policy factors was suggested
in Leflar, supra note 29.
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A POSITIVE BUT UNCERTAIN STEP FORWARD FOR
CHOICE OF LAW PROBLEMS IN COLORADO: THE Rostek
DECISION
By VED P. NANDA*
INTRODUCTION
In First National Bank v. Rostek, I the Supreme Court of
Colorado squarely rejected the mechanical application of the con-
flict of laws doctrine of lex loci delicti to multistate tort problems.
Instead, it adopted specific choice of law rules to resolve host-
guest controversies, and, for all other issues, the court announced
the adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts' "general
rule of applying the law of the state with the most 'significant
relationship' with the occurrence and the parties .. ".."I While
the court's rejection of the Bealean-Restatement First3 dogma is
a desirable step to be welcomed by all proponents of modern
approaches to conflicts, the merit of its preference for formulating
choice of law rules is debatable. Since the court's announcement
has implications not only for future multistate tort controversies
coming before Colorado courts, but also for the general develop-
ment of this area of the law, which is still very much in flux, this
brief comment is intended to offer a review and appraisal of the
court's approach in Rostek.4 The court's selection of the choice of
law and its reasoning will be examined in light of the alternatives
available to the court.
I.
Although the Colorado Supreme Court acknowledged that
* Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program, Univer-
sity of Denver College of Law; Visiting Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law,
1974-75.
514 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1973).
2 Id. at 320.
For earlier commentaries on the RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934), see
Lorenzen & Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 555
(1935); Yntema, The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 183
(1936). See also J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935); W. COOK, THE
LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942); Cavers, A Critique of the
Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 173 (1933); Nussbaum, Conflict Theories of
Contracts: Cases versus Restatement, 51 YALE L.J. 893 (1942).
' See also in this issue Walsh, Heads: Lex Loci Delicti; Tails: Lex Loci Domicile -
The Conflict of Laws Coin on Edge - First National Bank v. Rostek, 514 P.2d 314 (Colo.
1973), 51 DENVER L.J. 567 (1974).
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the broad based doctrine of lex loci delicti offered "some predicta-
bility of result and ease of application by courts," 5 it refused to
opt for its application to the facts and circumstances of Rostek
in the face of the demonstrated "injustice and irrationality"
which would result if it were to be applied automatically.' The
stipulated facts in Rostek were uncomplicated. John and Carol
Rostek, husband and wife, both Colorado citizens and residents,
were returning to Colorado after a day-long trip to Iowa and
South Dakota when their twin engine airplane crashed during a
takeoff in Vermillion, South Dakota. The airplane was operated
by the husband and both were killed in the crash. In a wrongful
death action brought in Colorado, the guardian of the natural
children of Carol Rostek, all Colorado residents, alleged that the
husband's negligence caused the death of his guest passenger.
The applicable Colorado law7 would permit recovery; however,
under the South Dakota Aircraft Guest Statute,' such an action
would be barred unless willful or wanton misconduct on the part
of the aircraft operator could be proved.
The trial court considered itself bound by Colorado preced-
ents to apply lex loci and, therefore, granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. The Colorado Supreme Court
granted certiorari "for the sole purpose of determining if Colorado
courts are compelled to apply the doctrine of lex loci delicti (the
law of the place of the wrong)"9 to the facts in Rostek. Chief
Justice Pringle, writing for the court en banc, emphatically an-
swered the question in the negative, observing that the doctrine
''appears in Colorado law more by default than by design."' 0 The
point was illustrated by reference to two earlier cases, one decided
in 1887" and the other in 1906,2 when the place of the wrong rule
was accepted doctrine "and none challenged it or gave any
thought to its justification or its fairness."'"
The reference to lex loci in a 1956 case, Pando v. Jasper, was
514 P.2d at 318.
'Id.
Although Colorado has a guest statute which might bar recovery [CoLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-9-1 (1963)], its definition of "vehicle" as a "motor vehicle" [id. § 13-6-2(6)]
excludes "vehicles . . . that travel through the air" [id. § 13-6-2(2)].
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 32-34-1 (1967).
514 P.2d at 315.
0 Id.
" Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. v. Betts, 10 Colo. 431, 15 P. 821 (1887).
2 Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Warring, 37 Colo. 122, 86 P. 305 (1906).
514 P.2d at 316.
133 Colo. 321, 295 P.2d 229 (1956).
[VOL. 51
CHOICE OF LAW IN COLORADO
disregarded as "unquestionably dicta." Finally, the court as-
serted that it was not bound by a federal court's determination
in a 1969 case, Bannowsky v. Krauser,5 since, while sitting as a
diversity court, it had misread Pando in applying lex loci as Colo-
rado law, "it being well settled that a state court is not bound by
federal court interpretation of state law."'" Thus, the way was
clear for the court to conclude that it "must decide, as a matter
of first impression, whether the broad rule of lex loci delicti
should be adopted and applied to this case, or whether a more
flexible choice of law rule should control."' 7
Next, the court traced the rise and fall of lex loci and the
major reason for its rejection by many other jurisdictions in favor
of a more flexible and rational choice of law approach. To a stu-
dent of conflicts, it is familiar ground. The mechanical applica-
tion of lex loci has "often yielded harsh, unjust results" unrelated
to contemporary state interests or to the parties' realistic expecta-
tions, and it "no longer provided the high degree of predictability
and uniformity which were considered its primary virtues."' 8 In-
fluential publicists had exposed extensively its weaknesses and
the courts which had initially used manipulative devices such as
"characterization" to escape the unacceptable results of its rigid
application eventually abandoned lex loci in their "constant
search for a result which would comport with reason and justice
'19
After rejecting the traditional doctrine, the court examined
the available alternatives in its search for a substitute. It identi-
fied various current approaches to choice of law problems with
their varying emphases on the place of the forum, the expecta-
tions of the parties, and governmental interests by referring to
their major proponents in string citations.2 It noted that all of
these approaches suffered from common deficiencies: they had to
be applied in an ad hoc fashion and they all contained "indeter-
minate language with no concrete guidelines."' 21 The court felt
uncomfortable with the resulting lack of "consistency in applica-
tion" and "predictability of results" and expressed its preference
1 294 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Colo. 1969).
" 514 P.2d at 316 n.1.
'7 Id. at 316.
's Id. at 317.
I d.
Id. at 318 nn.4 & 5.
' Id. at 318.
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for the adoption of rational choice of law rules instead of dealing
with each case on an ad hoc basis. It agreed with Professors Willis
Reese" and Maurice Rosenberg,2 3 two major advocates of formu-
lating choice of law rules, that the adoption of rational rules in
multistate torts is necessary to accomplish the objective of pro-
viding "a concrete and viable system for the equal application of
just laws.''
The die was cast. In the court's words: "While we recognize
that a rational and equitable approach to choice of law is desira-
ble, we now harmonize that approach with the genius of the com-
mon law which always sought to provide to its consumers some
degree of predictability and consistency in application." 5 The
search was thus narrowed for a "workable" choice of law rule to
be applied in the guest-host area. The majority opinion in a 1972
New York case, Neumeier v. Kuehner, written by Chief Judge
Fuld, was found to be eminently suited for that opportunity.
There, Chief Judge Fuld had admitted the lack of consistency in
New York cases ever since that court had adopted the interest
analysis approach in Babcock v. Jackson.27 His concurrence in
Tooker v. Lopez,2" in which he had enunciated specific rules to
resolve host-guest controversies, which eventually became the
majority rule in Neumeier, had received the unqualified support
of Professor Willis Reese, the reporter of the Restatement
Second.29 The court was persuaded that the first two of the three
Neumeier rules ought to be accepted in Colorado and it did so,
finding them "just and equitable. 30 Commenting in general on
the Neumeier formulation, the court said that it "generally em-
bodies the rational underpinnings of the newer approaches to
choice of law problems, emphasizing the expectations of the par-
ties and the interests of the different jurisdictions involved."'"
The two rules adopted were: (1) When the guest-passenger and
the host-driver are domiciled in the same state, and the vehicle
22 The court cited Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315
(1972). 514 P.2d at 319.
11 The court cited Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 551,
641 (1968). 514 P.2d at 319.
2, 514 P.2d at 318-19.
25 Id. at 318.
2- 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
"7 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
2- 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
See Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 548, 562 (1971).
514 P.2d at 319.
31 Id.
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is registered there, that state's law should govern the question of
host-guest immunity; and (2) When the guest-passenger is from
a state which permits recovery and the host-driver is from a guest
statute state, the law of the state where the accident occurred
should apply.2 However, under "special circumstances," a driver
might "be permitted to interpose the law of his state as a defense"
if he causes the accident in the state which permits recovery.3
Rostek was a "comparatively easy" case,34 to which the first
Neumeier rule was applicable. However, since the court had al-
ready rejected lex loci, and since the Neumeier rules applied only
to host-guest controversies, it announced the adoption of the
Restatement Second's most "significant relationship" formula-
tion, "as presented and defined" in section 145, to all other mul-
tistate torts.3 5 Acknowledging that "this Restatement rule is
somewhat broad," the court expressed the hope that "at some
time in the future, as the body of case law develops, we can lay
down more specific choice of law rules governing other areas, as
we have done today in the area of guest statutes."'
II.
The following questions raised by Rostek will be discussed
here briefly: (1) What are the implications of Rostek for Colorado
conflicts law and the law of conflicts in general? (2) Did the court
succeed in its quest for certainty, uniformity, and predictability
by the adoption of the Neumeier-Restatement Second formula?
and (3) Is it desirable to formulate precise choice of law rules for
multistate torts at this stage in the development of conflicts law?
A. Implications of Rostek
The Colorado Supreme Court accepted the responsibility
that lies on the highest state courts to play a major role in the
development of a coherent body of conflicts law, especially in the
choice of law area. The court's discussion of the New York expe-
rience since Babcock and its reference to several other jurisdic-
tions and to leading commentators show the court's awareness
32 Id.
33 Id.
31 Id. at 320.
3Id.
36 Id.
"' State courts have ample freedom in making choice of law decisions since constitu-
tional restraints on such selection are minimal. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd.,
377 U.S. 179 (1964); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S.
143 (1934); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
1974
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and concern with the inconsistencies and tensions of the last de-
cade resulting from the fact that there has been no consensus on
the selection of a substitute for lex loci. However, the court re-
fused to follow the lead of some of its sister states in adopting a
wait-and-see attitude;3 instead, it rejected lex loci and accepted
the challenge to search for a workable solution. It would be a
reasonable observation to suggest that the vested rights approach
would give way in Colorado to modem approaches in other areas
of conflicts as well, especially as applied to contracts.
In deciding Rostek, the court could have adopted any of the
modern choice of law approaches and would have arrived at the
just and rational result which it eventually achieved by applying
the Neumeier rule. The court's reading of the various comments
on Babcock9 had shown it that its choice of any of the contact-
policy variants which would result in the application of Colorado
law would have pleased almost all commentators except a
staunch advocate of vested rights supremacy who might lament
the passing of the good old days. Initially the court began to look
at the contacts with concerned states and the court mentioned
the term "interests" a few times, but it did not further pursue its
analysis of concerned interests to select the applicable law. In-
stead, it sought concrete rules, not only to decide the controversy
in Rostek, but to lay a foundation on which it could build further
with the passage of time. As a result, the court felt uniquely
comfortable with the rules and rationale of Neumeier. In ap-
proaching and accepting the rules, though, the court seems to
have lost options and flexibility which are necessary for further
experimentation and for evolution and growth of the law in a
sound common law setting.
The court viewed the adoption of the Neumeier-Restatement
Second rules as a harmonious blending of "[a desirable] rational
and equitable approach to choice of law . . . with the genius of
Many courts have rejected the new approaches. See, e.g., Landers v. Landers, 153
Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966); Friday v. Smoot, 211 A.2d 594 (Del. 1965); Colhoun v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1972); McDaniel v. Sinn, 194 Kan. 625, 400
P.2d 1018 (1965); Cook v. Pryor, 251 Md. 41, 246 A.2d 271 (1968); Abendschein v. Farrell,
382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969); Peterson v. Dean, 186 Neb. 716, 186 N.W.2d 107
(1971); Oshiek v. Oshiek, 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964); Heidemann v. Rohl, 194
N.W.2d 164 (S.D. 1972); Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 475 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. 1972).
" The court referred in Rostek to two comments on Babcock, one each by Professors
Currie and Reese, from a symposium issue: Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent
Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1212, 1233, 1251 (1963). 514 P.2d at
318 n.4.
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the common law which always sought to provide to its consumers
some degree of predictability and consistency in application."40
The invocation of the "genius of common law" initially sounds
attractive. However, a closer examination of the court's metho-
dology and rationale in adopting narrow rules, not only to resolve
the Rostek controversy but as the applicable law for the future,
leads one to conclude that the court displayed an affinity for legal
positivism by suggesting that only a formulation of narrow, pre-
cise rules would comport with the common law.
Notwithstanding the merits of codification in specific areas
of the law, the fact remains that the common law is not perceived
or known to comprise a system of neat, precise, infallible rules;
it allows for experimentation, evolution, and growth resulting in
a gradual accumulation of wisdom over a period of time which
eventually finds expression in legal propositions, definitions, con-
cepts, principles, and rules.4 In a recent essay,42 Professor Simp-
son of Oxford forcefully refutes positivism by observing that:
[It] consequently distorts the nature of the system to conceive of
the common law as a set of rules, an essentially precise and finite
notion, as if one could in principle both state the rules of the com-
mon law and count them like so many sheep, or engrave them on
tablets of stone."
In addition to the problems of positivism, the discussion in the
next section will suggest that the court's objective of achieving
predictability and consistency by the application of the rules it
has formulated is illusory.
B. Would the Rules Adopted by the Court Achieve Predictabil-
ity, Certainty, and Uniformity of Application?
The application of the first Neumeier rule to Rostek's facts
offers a just and rational solution. In host-guest cases before the
New York Court of Appeals from Babcock to Neumeier, including
Dym v. Gordon," Macey v. Rozbicki, 4" and Tooker v. Lopez," and
40 514 P.2d at 318.
See generally Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOsopHY
25 (R. Summers ed. 1968).
41 Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OxFoRD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
(Second Series) 77 (A. Simpson ed. 1973).
43 Id. at 88. It is a feature of the system that "uniquely authentic statements of the
rules which, so positivists tell us, comprise the common law, cannot be made." Id. at 90.
See also, id. at 88 for a citation to F. POLLACK, A FIRST BOOK OF JUmSPRUDENCE 249 (3d
ed. 1911) where Pollack observes that the common law professes "to develop and apply
principles that have never been committed to any authentic form of words."
," 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
45 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 N.E.2d 380, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591 (19J6).
" 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
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before lower New York courts, such as Kell v. Henderson,47
Arbuthnot v. Allbright,4 8 Weinstein v. Abraham,4" and Bray v.
Cox,510 the courts undertook extensive analysis of the policies un-
derlying the statutes and the interests of concerned jurisdictions
in the application of their respective laws to the specific issues
involved in the controversies. The courts in Dym and Macey re-
lied on the now discarded "seat of the relationship" test,5' to
apply Colorado law and deny recovery in the former case but to
apply New York law and permit recovery in the latter.
Whatever the objective of the guest statute-the protection
of insurers and the maintenance of low insurance rates, the pro-
tection of hosts from ungrateful guests, or the prevention of fraud-
ulent claims by passengers in collusion with drivers5 -it seems
desirable that if both parties are domiciliaries of a state where the
vehicle is also insured and garaged, and that state permits recov-
ery, that state's law should apply even if the state of injury as the
forum has a guest statute. Conversely, when the state of the in-
jury permits recovery and the state of the parties' domicile where
the vehicle is insured has a guest statute, the forum should apply
the latter law, notwithstanding the former's interests in encour-
,1 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270
N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966).
35 App. Div. 2d 315, 316 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1970).
64 Misc. 2d 76, 314 N.Y.S.2d 270 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1972).
The majority in Tooker explicitly rejected the seat of relationship test, stating that
"[w]here the guest-host relationship 'arose' or is 'centered' is wholly irrelevant to poli-
cies reflected by the laws in conflict. Any language in our earlier opinions lending support
to a contrary view has . ..been overruled." 24 N.Y.2d at 579 n.2, 249 N.E.2d at 400 n.2,
301 N.Y.S. 2d at 527 n.2.
For a convincing criticism of the seat of relationship test see Rosenberg, Two Views
on Kell v. Henderson-An Opinion for the New York Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REV.
459, 462-63 (1967).
11 The California Supreme Court invalidated California's 44-year-old automobile
guest statute in Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855,506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
See generally Baer, Two Approaches to Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws: Mechani-
cal Jurisprudence Versus Groping for Contacts, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 537 (1967); Ehren-
zweig, Foreign Guest Statutes and Forum Accidents: Against the Desperanto of State
"Interests", 68 COLUM. L. REV. 49 (1968); Ehrenzweig, Guest Statutes in the Conflict of
Laws-Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under "Foreseeable and Insurable
Laws": I, 69 YALE L.J. 595, 599-602 (1960); Hodges, The Automobile Guest Statutes, 12
TEXAS L. REV. 303 (1934); Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U. CInc. L. REV. 24 (1937); Note,
Guest Statutes: Have Recent Cases Brought Them to the End of the Road?, 49 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 446 (1973); Comment, Judicial Nullification of Guest Statutes, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 884 (1968); Comment, The Future of the Automobile Guest Statute, 45 TEMP. L.Q.
432 (1972). See also Pahmer v. Hertz Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 119, 122, 296 N.E.2d 243, 245, 343
N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (1973).
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aging highway safety, compensating accident victims, protecting
the economic interests of its vendors dealing with accident vic-
tims, and ensuring that nonresident accident victims do not be-
come public charges. An analysis of the advancement of relevant
state policies should point to these suggested results. 3 The same
results would also be reached by applying any of the other modern
approaches such as principled preferences,54 most significant rela-
tionship,5 and functional analysis.5" It should be added that, al-
though predictability in multistate torts is mostly irrelevant, it
is of consequence when questions concerning the parties' relation-
ship giving rise to their rights and duties and questions of insu-
ror's liability are in issue.57
It should be noted that in one recent case," the Supreme
Court of Minnesota applied Minnesota negligence law, rejecting
the Ontario guest statute even though all of the parties involved
in an accident in Minnesota were Ontario residents and the auto-
mobile was registered, insured, and garaged in Ontario. During a
1-day trip from Ontario to Duluth, Minnesota, the car went off
the road in Minnesota, seriously injuring the plaintiff-guest. The
court adopted the "better law" approach, suggesting that Minne-
sota as a "justice-administering state" would have its govern-
mental interests furthered by the application of its own "better
law." It was "firmly convinced of the superiority of the common
53 For a brief but incisive discussion, see R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT
OF LAWS 237-44 (1971); Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided for Case: Reflec-
tions on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 125, 133-34 (1973) and the authorities
cited therein. Professors Ehrenzweig and Rheinstein consider interest analysis
unworkable. See generally Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From
Beale to Covers, 80 HARV. L. REV. 377 (1966); Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper
Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach", 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965);
Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better Rule": Threat and Promise in Multistate
Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 847 (1967); Rheinstein, How to Review a Festschrift, 11 Am. J.
COMp. L. 632 (1962). See also Rosenberg, supra note 51, at 463-64.
" See generally D. CAVERS, CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS LAW IN MODERN PERSPECTIVE
(1970); D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 139-203 (1965); Cavers, The Value of
Principled Preferences, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 211 (1971).
" See Note, Most Significant Contacts Method: An Empirical Analysis, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 575, 591-97 (1972).
56 See generally A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS
76-79, 102-25 (1965).
" Professor Weintraub, however, considers the "talk of 'surprising' the insurer [as]
• ..very likely to be talking nonsense." R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 206 (1971), citing McNamara, Automobile Liability Insurance Rates, 35 INS. COUN-
SEL J. 398 (1968), and Stern, Ratemaking Procedures for Automobile Liability Insurance,
52 PROC. CAS. ACTUARIAL SOC'Y 139 (1965).
" Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973).
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law rule of liability to that of the Ontario guest statute,"5' and
preferred to apply the Minnesota law consistent "with our own
concept of fairness and equity."60 Professors Leflar' and Ehren-
zweig were quoted extensively by the majority to lend support
to its decision. Among cases relied upon by the court were Kell
v. Henderson,63 Clark v. Clark," and Conklin v. Horner.5 Other
supportive cases included Bray v. Cox," Arnett v. Thompson,7
and Gagne v. Berry.6 This combination of lex fori and the better
law approach could serve as an escape mechanism, permitting
courts to apply their own law without facing hard choice of law
questions. This is lex loci in a different, albeit more palatable
form. But the risk of parochialism and of mechanical application
render this combination even more dangerous than the already
discarded rule.
Under the second Neumeier rule adopted by the Colorado
court, the law of the state where the accident occurred would
apply when the guest-passenger is from a state which permits
recovery and the host-driver is from a guest statute state. The
court was not obliged to adopt this rule to resolve the controversy
presented in Rostek. Why then did it adopt the second rule, espe-
cially when it did not adopt the third Neumeier rule which is
applicable to other situations where the passenger and the driver
are domiciled in different states? As stated by Chief Judge Fuld,
the third rule will normally apply the law "of the state where the
accident occurred, but not if it can be shown that displacing that
normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive
law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-
state system, or producing great uncertainty for litigants."69
51 Id. at 417.
60 Id.
" The court cited Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U.L. REv. 267, 279 (1966), and Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584 (1966). Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at 412, 414.
62 The court quoted extensively from Ehrenzweig, "False Conflicts" and the "Better
Rule": Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 847, 853 (1967).
Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at 414.
11 47 Misc. 2d 992, 263 N.Y.S.2d 647 (Sup. Ct. 1965), aff'd, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270
N.Y.S.2d 552 (1966), cited in Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at 411.
64 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966), cited in Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at 411.
65 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579 (1968), cited in Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d at
416.
66 39 App. Div. 2d 299, 333 N.Y.S.2d 783 (1972).
67 433 S.W.2d 109 (Ky. 1968).
68 290 A.2d 624 (N.H. 1972).
66 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
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Both the second and third rules which are strongly territori-
ally oriented are reminiscent of the First Restatement philoso-
phy. Neumeier involved the application of the third rule. It was
a difficult case for Professor Currie's governmental analysis ap-
proach,70 since it involved the "unprovided for" case,7' in which
neither contact state had an identifiable, legitimate governmen-
tal interest in the application of its law. The defendant, a New
York resident, drove to Ontario, Canada, where he picked up his
guest, an Ontario resident, and, on a trip between two points in
Ontario, collided with a train, resulting in the death of both the
guest and the host. Ontario had a guest statute requiring willful
negligence to be proved for recovery while New York had no guest
statute which would bar recovery. Thus, New York's policy favor-
ing compensation would have no application since the plaintiff
was a nondomiciliary. Similarly, regardless of the rationale un-
derlying Ontario's guest statute7 it would not be applicable to
the issue of guest-host immunity in a case involving a New York
defendant and a New York insuror.73 The court concluded that,
because the defendant was a New York resident, it would not
serve the substantive law purposes of New York to displace lex
loci in this case, since the application of New York law would only
result in the "exposure of this State's domiciliaries to a greater
liability than that imposed upon resident users of Ontario's high-
ways."'7' New York, the court said, "has no legitimate interest in
ignoring the public policy" of Ontario and "in protecting the
"' Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J.
171, 178 presents Professor Currie's original theories which he subsequently modified. See
generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963); Currie, Comments
on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1233 (1963); Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent Years: Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws,
28 U. CHI. L. REV. 258 (1961); Hill,Governmental Interest and the Conflict of Laws-A
Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (1960); M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws:
Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 845 (1961); R.
Traynor, Is this Conflict Really Necessary? 37 TEXAS L. REV. 657 (1959).
"' Professor Currie discussed the dilemma in Currie, Survival of Actions: Adjudica-
tion versus Automation In the Conflict of Laws, 10 STAN. L. REV. 205, 229 (1958). See also
Baade, Judge Keating and the Conflict of Laws, 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 10, 30 (1969); Baade,
The Case of the Disinterested Two States: Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HoFSTaA L. REV. 150,
165-67 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Baade]; Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROS. 754 (1963); Sedler, Interstate Accidents and the Unprovided For Case:
Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HoFsTRA L. REV. 125 (1973).
7 Section 105(2) of the Highway Traffic Act of Province of Ontario, REV. STAT. ONT.
ch. 172 (1960), as amended by Ontario Statute of 1966, ch. 64, § 20(2). For a thorough
and incisive analysis of the statute see Baade, supra note 71, at 150-56.
" Baade, supra note 71, at 161-62; Sedler, supra note 71, at 137-38.
" 31 N.Y.2d at 129, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
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plaintiff guest domiciled and injured there from legislation ob-
viously addressed, at the very least, to a resident riding in a
vehicle traveling within its borders."75
It is not the purpose here to analyze the New York court's
justification for the application of Ontario law on the immunity
issue. Others have done that extensively and meticulously, point-
ing to the need for the identification of a common policy of New
York and Ontario in compensating the victim." However, the
point is that if the Colorado court deliberately refused to adopt
the third Neumeier rule because of the rule's strong territorial
bias and the court's distaste for it, it would also seem that the
second Neumeier rule is as heavily oriented toward lex loci. Fur-
thermore, if the prior case law in other jurisdictions" and the
recent New York wrongful death case, Rosenthal v. Warren,"
offer any insight, the goal of consistency and uniformity in result
is still an illusory ideal.
In all tort controversies not involving the host-guest relation-
ship the Rostek court has announced that Colorado will follow the
Restatement Second's section 145, which is a characteristic black
letter formulation:
The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in
tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect
to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence
and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.11
It further delineates "factual" contacts to be identified in select-
ing the state with the most significant relationship to the tort. Of
primary significance among the specified contacts is the place
where the injury occurred. This is followed by: the place where
the conduct causing the injury occurred; the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation, or place of business of the
parties; and the place of the center of relationship between the
parties. 0 The Restatement Second sections applying section 145
to specific torts8 place heavy reliance upon lex loci to identify the
state with the most significant relationship.
Section 6 identifies factors relevant to the choice of the appl-
7' Id. at 125-26, 286 N.E.2d at 456, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
76 Baade, supra note 71, at 161-67; Sedler, supra note 71, at 137-42.
See, e.g., Bennett v. Macy, 324 F. Supp. 409 (W.D. Ky. 1971); Foster v. Leggett,
484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. 1972); Schneider v. Nichols, 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254 (1968).
78 342 F. Supp. 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), afj'd, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1969).
'o Id. § 145(2).
SI Id. §§ 146-55.
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icable law. These principles which courts are asked to consider 2
include: the needs of interstate and international systems; the
relevant policies of concerned states and basic policies of the
particular field of law; the protection of justified expectations;
certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.83
The major criticism of the Restatement Second approach' is
that it does not offer sufficient guidelines and criteria for the
selection of the state of the most significant relationship. Its
major emphasis on physical contacts, giving priority to the place
of injury, is likely to lead a court to the application of lex loci,
which the Restatement Second apparently took great pains in
discarding. This concern is especially serious for two reasons:
first, the Restatement Second does not emphasize the need for
analysis of the nature and content of the physical contacts with
a view to identifying relevant contacts, and especially those con-
tacts which advance the interests of concerned states and parties
mentioned in section 6; and second, courts have yet to develop
criteria for the weighing of these factors and contacts. Hence, the
results are likely to be erratic, arbitrary, and less certain. 5
C. Is the Formulation of Choice of Law Rules at This Stage of
the Development of Torts Conflicts Desirable?
There seems to be a consensus that the formulation of all-
embracing, broad rules of the lex loci genre will stifle the evolu-
tionary process begun by Babcock. But beyond that there is lack
of agreement on the desirable course of action. For instance, Pro-
fessors Reese" and Rosenberg, 7 and Chief Judge Fuld" advocate
1' Id. § 6(2).
3 Id. § 6. See also Cheatham & Reese, Choice of the Applicable Law, 52 COLUM. L.
REv. 959 (1952).
K The major critic of this approach is Professor Ehrenzweig. See, e.g., Ehrenzweig,
The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of Torts, 28 LAw & CoNrrEMP.
PROB. 700 (1963); Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: A Last Appeal For Its
Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1235-36 (1965). See also Leflar, The Torts Provisions
of the Restatement (Second), 72 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 269 (1972); Comment, The Second
Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 762 (1963). But see Reese,
Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963);
Morris, Book Review, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 322 (1973).
A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICTS IN A NUTSHELL 26-28 (3d ed. 1974).
86 Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and the Choice of Law, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 548 (1971);
Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNEL L. REv. 315 (1972).
'7 Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 551, 641 (1968);
Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson-An Opinion for the New York Court of
Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1967).
11 Chief Judge Fuld's imprint is seen in Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d
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narrow choice of law rules; Professor Cavers5 offers his principled
preferences; and Professors Leflar 0 and Ehrenzweig" suggest bet-
ter law and lex loci respectively. Their main concern is that, in
the absence of narrow rules, ad hoc interest analysis will create
further confusion in the already chaotic state of affairs, especially
in conflicts involving multistate torts.
In the wake of demolishing the vested rights concept,
Babcock left many questions unanswered. What exactly was to
be substituted for lex loci was not clear then and still is not.
However, a decade is not such an intolerably long period for ex-
perimentation with various approaches that one should equate
the lack of any precise rules of law with chaos and anarchy. It is
a salutory development that courts in this country92 and abroad 3
have sought just and rational results by the application of various
approaches which demand an appraisal of varying state and gov-
ernmental interests and the parties' interests with a view to arriv-
ing at just, rational, and equitable results.
In seeking workable choice of law rules Chief Justice Pringle
is in good company. The Reese-Rosenberg-Fuld coalition has for-
mulated the New York law and many jurisdictions are likely to
follow the New York-Colorado model, for courts are hesitant to
conduct ad hoc analysis and usually are comforted by the ease of
394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969), and Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454,
335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972). See also Reese, Chief Judge Fuld and the Choice of Law, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 548 (1971).
" See note 54 supra. See also Baade, Counter-Revolution or Alliance for Progress?
Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-of-Law Process, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 141 (1967);
Ehrenzweig, A Counter-Revolution in Conflicts Law? From Beale to Cavers, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 377 (1966).
1* R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 233-65 (1968); Leflar, Choice-Influencing
Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267 (1966); Leflar, Conflicts Law: More
on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1584 (1966); Leflar, The "New"
Choice of Law, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 457 (1972).
", A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 85, at 39-52; Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper
Forum: A "Restatement" of the "Lex Fori Approach", 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965);
Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REv. 637
(1960).
92 A summary of significant cases is contained in R. WENTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 234 n.36 (1971).
" See, e.g., Lipstein, Conflict of Laws 1921-1971-The Way Ahead, 31 CaMB. L.J. 67
(1972); International Developments in Choice of Law Governing Torts, 19 AM. J. CoMp.
L. 1 (1971). For comments on the House of Lords decision of Chaplin v. Boys, [1969] 3
W.L.R. 322, [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085, see Karsten, Foreign Torts and English Courts: II.
Chaplin v. Boys: Another Analysis, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 35 (1970); North & Webb,
Foreign Torts and English Courts: L The Effect of Chaplin v. Boys, 19 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
24 (1970); Reese, Choice of Law in Tort Cases-Chaplin v. Boys-(England: Court of
Appeal and House of Lords), 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 189 (1970).
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applying precise rules to cases and controversies before them.
There is no denying that rules can serve a useful purpose; but the
point is that in order to be just, rational, and equitable they
should reflect community consensus, and the timing at which a
consensus has emerged in any one area is of the essence. In torts
conflicts the formulation of precise rules remains premature. The
Restatement Second's guidelines show remnants of the First Re-
statement's vested rights philosophy. However, if courts properly
understand and apply the principles contained in section 6, al-
ways keeping in perspective the interests of parties and of con-
cerned states, and always mindful of the danger that physical
contacts could be manipulated with ease to favor the application
of lex fori or lex loci, the most significant relationship would
merely be another way of identifying a just and rational resolu-
tion of controversies.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Colorado has assumed the role of a
forward-looking state court in charting a new course in choice of
law for multistate torts. Since it has recently taken a similarly
enlightened approach in other areas of the law as well, it is ex-
pected and hoped that it will watch with a keen eye the operation
of the rules it adopted in Rostek and that it will not hesitate to
review and revise them if and when the need to do so is demon-
strated. The role of the highest state courts in fashioning rational,
just, equitable, and workable choice of law approaches with a




ENVIRONMENTAL LAW-Requirement of Notice in Visual
Opacity Readings-Air Pollution Variance Board v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974)
INTRODUCTION
On June 4, 1969, an inspector from the Division of Adminis-
tration of the Colorado Department of Health made observations
on the premises of Western Alfalfa Corporation without notice,
warrant, or consent. Approximately two weeks later Western re-
ceived a cease and desist order from the Division notifying it that
three of the corporation's plants in northern Colorado were in
violation of the Air Pollution Control Act.' A subsequent Air Pol-
lution Variance Board hearing found that a violation had oc-
curred, but the District Court of Weld County set aside this deter-
mination.2 In affirming the district court judgment, the Colorado
Court of Appeals held that the observations made by the State
Health Inspector constituted an unreasonable search and that the
failure to notify Western that observations were being made on
its premises led to a denial of due process at the hearing before
the Air Pollution Variance Board.' The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari and, speaking through Justice
Douglas, concluded that no violation of the fourth amendment
had occurred, and remanded the case to the Colorado Court of
Appeals for rulings on any other issues.4
' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-29-1 to -6 (Supp. 1967), as amended, COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 66-31-1 to -16 (Supp. 1971). All observations were made for a period in excess of
3 minutes, and all readings were alleged to be darker in shade than a No. 2 on the
Ringelmann Chart and equivalent to an opacity of 40 percent, in violation of the provisions
of COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(2) (Supp. 1967). The Ringelmann test, a visual mea-
surement of the density of black smoke, has been incorporated into air pollution enforce-
ment statutes in the United States since 1910 when it appeared in the Boston Ordinance.
See Kennedy & Porter, Air Pollution: Its Control and Abatement, 8 VAND. L. REV. 854,
866 (1955). Many statutes like the Colorado statute allow for equivalent opacity readings
which correlate the percentage of obscuration of white smoke (visual opacity) with that
of black smoke (under the Ringelmann test). See City of Portland v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co., 3 Ore. App. 352, 357, 472 P.2d 826, 828 (1970), for a collection of cases approving the
use of the Ringelmann Chart.
Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 19974 (Colo. Dist.
Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1971). COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-13 (Supp. 1967), as amended,
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-17 (Supp. 1971), provides for judicial review of a final order
of the Air Pollution Variance Board.
3 Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 510 P.2d 907 (Colo. Ct. App.
1973).
Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S.Ct. 2114 (1974).
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Western's challenge to the Division's investigatory proce-
dures brought into focus significant constitutional issues in the
enforcement of environmental quality laws. The purpose of this
comment is to analyze the fourth amendment doctrines which led
the Supreme Court to conclude that visual opacity readings are
not constitutionally prohibited searches and to further explore
this yet unsettled due process/notice issue. It is concluded that
the open fields and plain view doctrines properly exclude observa-
tions such as the Ringelmann test from the protection of the
fourth amendment, but that due process requires notice to be
given to potential violators shortly after such readings are made.
I. THE COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The Air Pollution Control Act as it existed when the inspec-
tion occurred, allowed Division personnel to enter and inspect
any property for the purpose of investigating an actual or sus-
pected source of air pollution.' Neither notice nor a warrant was
specifically required. The cease and desist order of June 16 was
the first notification Western received that tests had been con-
ducted on its premises and that its emissions had been found to
be in excess of the statutory maximum. After filing a denial with
the Variance Board that a violation had occurred,6 Western re-
tained an independent engineering firm to make a particulate
study of its plant emissions.' Though both the district court and
the court of appeals considered the particulate study more sophis-
ticated than the Ringelmann test,' the Variance Board refused to
accept the study.'
' COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1967) provided authority for entrance
on the premises to make inspections. This section was amended in the 1969 session of the
legislature to require that a warrant or consent be obtained before entry on the premises.
See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1969). This provision now appears in
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-10(2)(d) (Supp. 1971).
6 COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-10(4) (Supp. 1967), as amended, COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 66-31-13(4) (Supp. 1971).
This test was made in August, 1969.
The district court termed the particulate study a "more precise test of pollutant
emissions." Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 19974 (Colo.
Dist. Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1971). The court of appeals called the study a "sophisticated test."
Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., 510 P.2d 907, 909 (Colo. Ct. App.
1973).
' COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(2)(e) (Supp. 1969) requires that the method of
testing used by independent engineering firms be acceptable to the Division. Division
personnel must be present at the time of testing to determine the acceptability of the test,
but in this case Western did not notify them. There is, however, no reciprocal provision
which allows company representatives to be present when the Division makes inspections.
[VoIL. 51
NOTICE IN VISUAL OPACITY TESTS
Citing Camara v. Municipal Court"0 and See v. City of
Seattle, I the court of appeals concluded that "the act of conduct-
ing tests on the premises of Western without either a warrant or
the consent of anyone from Western, constituted an unreasonable
search." 2
The court of appeals also found a violation of due process in
that Western was unable to present rebuttal evidence at the hear-
ing before the Variance Board due to the "secret nature of the
investigation."' 3 The Air Pollution Control Act provides that vio-
lations of the kind Western was accused may be based upon the
aggregation of emissions in three minutes of any hour.'4 As ap-
plied by the Variance Board, this provision of the Act is of critical
significance in determining whether a violation of the Act has
occurred. The Board in this case focused attention on the three
minutes of the hour in question and excluded, for probative pur-
poses, evidence collected at any other time. Thus, the Board did
not consider Western's evidence of its emission levels in August
as probative rebuttal evidence to the Division's conclusions of the
emission levels in June. 5
The court of appeals pointed out that the evidence by its
nature was continually dissipating." Implicit in this observation
was the realization that since Western had no knowledge of the
tests made on June 4, it had no opportunity to gather evidence
that could successfully rebut the findings of the Division. The
failure of the Division to notify Western that tests were being
conducted resulted in a lack of due process at the hearing level
because Western was foreclosed from presenting rebuttal evi-
dence. The court concluded that it is mandatory in cases of this
kind that the accused party be made aware of the taking of tests
and measurements on its premises at the time they are made. 7
10 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Camara upheld a citizen's right to refuse a warrantless inspec-
tion of his home for possible violations of city housing regulations in non-emergency
situations. This decision overruled Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), which had
held that warrantless searches designed to enforce health regulations were not subject to
fourth amendment prohibition provided they were conducted at a reasonable time and
place.
11 387 U.S. 541 (1967). A companion case to Camara, See applied the Camara rule to
administrative searches of commercial premises.
12 510 P.2d at 909-10.
IS Id. at 909.
CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(a) (Supp. 1967), as amended, CoLo. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 66-31-11(1) (Supp. 1971).




The court did not limit this mandate to the facts of Western,
where the observer was on the defendant's premises, but implied
that notice should be given even if the observer conducts the tests
from off the premises.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court was handed down
on May 20, 1974.18 Justice Douglas quickly cleared the air sur-
rounding the issue of whether an unreasonable search occurred at
Western. Citing Hester v. United States,9 the Court determined
that tests of this kind fall within the open fields exception to the
fourth amendment.20 Comparing this inspection to those under
the Noise Control Act of 197221 (where an inspector may enter a
railroad right-of-way to determine whether noise standards are
being violated), the Court found that this kind of inspection can-
not be said to constitute an invasion of privacy. "The invasion of
privacy . . .if it can be said to exist, is abstract and theoreti-
cal. ' '22 Confining the Camara and See cases to their facts, Justice
Douglas found them inapplicable to the factual situation in Air
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp.:
The field inspector did not enter the plant or offices. He was not
inspecting stacks . . .boilers, scrubbers, flues, grates, or furnaces;
nor was his inspection related to respondent's files or papers. He had
sighted what anyone in the city who was near the plant could see in
the sky-the plumes of smoke.13
Having settled the fourth amendment issue, the Court chose
to sidestep the due process question, noting that perhaps the air
surrounding this issue is not as clear.
Whether the Court [of Appeals] referred to Colorado "due process"
or Fourteenth Amendment "due process" is not clear. If it is the
former, the question is a matter of state law beyond our purview.
Since we are unsure of the grounds of that ruling we intimate no
opinion on that issue. But on our remand we leave open that and
any other question that may be lurking in the case.2"
Justice Douglas left unsettled what is probably the more nagging
issue in the case. Contrary to newspaper reports at the time the
Is 94 S. Ct. 2114, 2115-16 (1974).
" 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
- 94 S. Ct. 2114, 2116 (1974).
21 42 U.S.C. § 4901-18 (Supp. II, 1972).
" 94 S. Ct. at 2116.
21 Id. at 2115.
2 Id. at 2116 (footnotes omitted).
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decision was handed down, 5 the Supreme Court did not settle for
all purposes the question of whether notice should be given when
visual opacity readings are made.
While the statute as it existed on June 4, 1969, permitted
entry onto an alleged violator's premises to make an inspection, 6
this section was amended in the 1969 session of the Colorado
Legislature to require a warrant or consent before entry is made
on the premises. 7 This amendment seems to satisfy any notice
problem as long as the inspection is conducted on a person's
property, premises, or place as was the case in Western. But what
if the inspection is made from the property of an adjoining
landowner or property owned by the public such as an adjacent
public highway or right-of-way? The mandate of the court of
appeals that searches of this kind (meaning visual opacity inspec-
tions) be made only with notice seems capable of compassing all
such searches whether made from on or off premises. But neither
the statute nor either of the opinions has squarely confronted the
issue.
III. DID THE INSPECTION CONSTITUTE AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH?
The warrantless administrative inspections in the Camara
and See cases involved attempts to enter enclosed structures to
recover evidence contained therein. The Western inspection, by
contrast, was not an attempt to enter an enclosed structure but
was confined solely to the premises or grounds surrounding the
plants. The issue was, then, does the entrance of an inspector
upon the grounds surrounding a commercial structure for the
purpose of obtaining evidence open to the public eye constitute
an unreasonable search prohibited by the fourth amendment?"
" The Denver Post, May 20, 1974, at 4, col. 2 stated: "Authorities needn't obtain
search warrants or give advance notice to go onto the property of potential polluters to
make inspections, provided they make the inspections from areas open to the public, the
Supreme Court ruled Monday." The Rocky Mountain News, May 21, 1974, at 1, col. 1
concluded, "the high court rejected the view that state officials must obtain either a search
warrant or consent of the owner before taking pollution readings at a commercial or
industrial site. Inspectors may enter the property of suspected pollutors as long as they
don't invade areas normally closed to the public, the court ruled."
" COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1967).
27 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1969) "except that if such entry or
inspection is denied or not consented to and no emergency exists, the division is empow-
ered to and shall obtain from the district or county in which such property, premise or
place is located, a warrant to enter and inspect any such property, premise, or place prior
to entry and inspection."
U The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
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The fourth amendment's provision for protection of one's
person, house, papers, and effects amounts to protection of one's
privacy against unreasonable governmental intrusion., There-
fore, the fourth amendment offers protection only to those activi-
ties in which one has a reasonable expectation of privacy. This
principle was announced in Katz v. United States,3" a case which
attempted to remodel traditional methods of applying fourth
amendment problems. Prior to Katz, courts were consistently
troubled by the requirement that a trespass-a physical penetra-
tion of a constitutionally protected area-was necessary before a
search could be found unreasonable."1 With the development of
sophisticated electronic aids, it became apparent that one's pri-
vacy could be invaded without an actual physical intrusion.
32
Katz purported to offer a solution to the trespass requirement in
search and seizure cases. At issue were the activities of govern-
ment agents who electronically listened to and recorded the de-
fendant's telephone conversation in a public telephone booth.
Under the traditional requirements of trespass, no unreasonable
search had taken place because there was no physical invasion of
a constitutionally protected area. Nevertheless, it was apparent
that the defendant's privacy had been invaded. Discarding the
trespass requirement, the Court found that once a person's justifi-
able reliance on privacy had been invaded, an unreasonable
search had taken place. 3 The concurring opinion indicated that
there must be an actual subjective expectation of privacy, and
that expectation must be recognized as reasonable by society .3
Relieving future courts of the outdated trespass requirement,
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
" McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 587 (1946); Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).
"o Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
"' Since the common law was unexposed to non-trespassory (electronic) intrusion of
one's privacy, it was not unusual that an actual physical invasion was thought necessary
under the traditional analysis. See Mascolo, The Role of Functional Observations in the
Law of Search and Seizure: A Study in Misconception, 71 DIcK. L. REV. 380, 381 (1967).
31 Note, From Private Places to Personal Privacy: A Post-Katz Study of Fourth
Amendment Protection, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968, 972 (1968).
u 389 U.S. at 353. Here it was held:
[Ellectronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words violated
the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth
and thus constituted a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
31 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Katz concluded that the protection offered by the fourth amend-
ment was for people (and their privacy), not places. 5 Subsequent
decisions, however, indicate that it is almost impossible to deter-
mine whether a person's privacy has been invaded without taking
account of the place. The problem is expressed by one writer who
said:
[Tihe mechanics of applying the fourth amendment must of ne-
cessity be concerned with protecting private places .... [Tihe
courts, despite contrary assertions, have uniformly continued to
treat searches and seizures as violations of private places .... A'
One's reasonable expectation of privacy is then, at least in
part, a function of the nature of the invaded area. If the invaded
area is not one which has been traditionally considered constitu-
tionally protected, then it is very difficult to successfully argue
that an officer's intrusion into that area violates the privacy of the
person, activity, or other evidence found within the area. Any
consideration of the protection offered by the fourth amendment
to the person must of necessity take into account the nature of
the place. The observations made at Western must be measured
against this background.
A. Open Fields Doctrine
Hester v. United States37 established the rule that "the spe-
cial protection accorded by the fourth amendment to the people
in their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' is not extended to
the open fields."3 In Hester, officers conducted initial observa-
tions from and entered onto an open field without a warrant to
seize evidence of concealed distilled spirits from the defendant.
According to Hester, open fields are not "constitutionally pro-
tested areas." There, in contrast to Katz, the area, not the person,
defined the boundaries of fourth amendment protection.
The officers in Hester were trespassers, but the Court de-
clared it immaterial that a trespass was committed in the seizure
of the evidence in the open field.3 Under the Hester rationale,
' Id. at 351.
" Note, Concept of Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REv. 154,
175-76 (1972). See also Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968); United States v.
Kahan, 350 F. Supp. 784, 791-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp.
425, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Zamora v. People, 175 Colo. 340,344,487 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1971);
People v. Ortega, 175 Colo. 136, 139, 485 P.2d 894, 896 (1971).
265 U.S. 57 (1924).
Id. at 59.
" Id. at 58. See also Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450, 456 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958) which held: "When the performance of his duty requires an
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then, it is of no significance that the Division Health Inspector
.in Western may have committed a trespass while on the property
of the corporation.
The commercial nature of Western's operations does not
remove it from the open fields doctrine since the doctrine has
been applied successfully to the open fields of commercial prem-
ises.40
The nature of an open field had been defined through a series
of cases, several of which were decided after Katz.4 The grounds
surrounding a plant were found not subject to fourth amendment
protection,*" nor was the chimney of a barbecue in a backyard,4"
or the top of a foundation block only a foot or two removed from
the open fields."
The inspection at Western was made from the grounds sur-
rounding the plant, an area which is not cloaked with constitu-
tional protection. Nor was the evidence which the inspector
viewed within a constitutionally protected area since the emis-
sions were in the atmosphere immediately above the plants, not
unlike evidence discovered in an open field. Therefore the inspec-
tion made by the Division on Western's premises did not consti-
tute an unreasonable search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment.
The open fields doctrine was not superceded by the Katz
decision, for, as stated above, courts cannot analyze one's reason-
officer of the law to enter upon private property, his conduct, otherwise a trespass, is
justifiable." Koth v. United States, 16 F.2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1926) held: "The fact that
the officers may have been trespassors does not exclude the evidence ....
4 McDowell v. United States, 383 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1967) held:
Although the Supreme Court has recently expanded the Fourth Amendment
protection of the business enterprise, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 87
S. Ct. 1737, 18 L. Ed. 2d 943 (1967), it has not expanded such protection
beyond that which a private dwelling and the curtilage thereof is likewise
entitled. Therefore, a search of open fields, without a search warrant, even
if such fields are construed as part of a commercial enterprise, is not consti-
tutionally "unreasonable."
,1 The concept of curtilage has often controlled the decision of where the constitu-
tional protection of an area ends and the open fields begin. Curtilage is a small area of
land around a dwelling house, not necessarily enclosed, including the buildings used for
domestic or family purposes. See James v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 239, 234 P.2d 422 (1951).
The curtilage of a dwelling is entitled to the protection of the fourth amendment. How-
ever, manufacturing plants such as Western are said to have no curtilage. See United
States v. Vlahos, 19 F. Supp. 166, 170 (D. Ore. 1937).
42 Monnette v. United States, 229 F.2d 847, 850 (5th Cir. 1962).
,4 People v. Alexander, 253 Cal. App. 2d 691, 61 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1967).
" Giacona v. United States, 257 F.2d 450 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873 (1958).
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able expectations of privacy without taking into account the na-
ture of the place investigated. The 1973 decision of United States
v. Brown 5 declares: "[T]he 'Open Fields Doctrine' still prevails.
Search of open fields without a search warrant is not unreasona-
ble and is not constitutionally impermissible."4
The amended Air Pollution Control Act of 1970 7 which re-
quires a warrant or consent prior to entry upon any property,
premises, or place for inspection purposes," affects the open fields
doctrine in that inspections made from any part of a company's
property must be pursuant to a warrant or consent. The statute
does not, however, address the question of whether inspections
made from open fields of an adjoining property owner or an ad-
joining public right-of-way may be made only pursuant to con-
sent or warrant. Under the open fields doctrine, the adjacent
public right-of-way is not a constitutionally protected area, and
observations of emissions from such a location would not be viola-
tive of the fourth amendment.
B. Plain View Doctrine
The plain view doctrine holds that evidence fully disclosed
and open to the eye is not subject to fourth amendment protec-
tion because no search is required to obtain such evidence.
49
People v. Rosenthal0 distinguished the warrantless search by a
building inspector of the interior of an apartment house from his
observations of the exterior of the apartment house. The court
explained that a "'[s]earch' implies a prying into hidden places
for that which is concealed and it is not a search to observe that
which is open to view."'" Evidence relating to the garage and
porches of the apartment house was found to be admissible while
evidence discovered on the interior of the same building was con-
stitutionally inadmissible. Expressing similar conclusions about
evidence found in plain view, United States v. Vilhottill held:
"The two most important variables in deciding whether a visual
search contravenes the Fourth Amendment are accessibility to
473 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1973).
46 Id. at 954.
'1 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-1 to -26 (Supp. 1971), as amended, ch. 212-13,
11973] Colo. Sess. Laws 736-43.
" Id. at § 66-31-10(2)(d).
" Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968); United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F.
Supp. 425 431 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 210, 47 N.E.2d 56, 59 (1943).
59 Misc. 2d 565, 299 N.Y.S.2d 960 (1969).
, Id. at 964.
, 323 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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view and the nature of the premises.""3 Katz verified the continu-
ing validity of the plain view doctrine by stating, "[wihat a
person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection."54
The inspection made at Western was a plain view observa-
tion since the emissions were visible whether one was on or off the
premises. 5 Katz held that one's expectation of privacy must be
reasonable for there to be an unconstitutional search." Such an
expectation cannot be justified when the objects or activities
viewed are knowingly exposed to the public.57 Western therefore
had no justifiable expectation of privacy, and the evidence which
was in plain view was not constitutionally protected.
The amendment to the Air Pollution (Control Act" does not
affect the operation of the plain view doctrine as long as observa-
tions of this kind are made from a point outside of the property,
premises, or place owned by the party being inspected.
IV. WAS DUE PROCESS VIOLATED?
It has been well established that due process extends to ad-
ministrative hearings such as the one Western was given before
the Air Pollution Variance Board. 9 Equally well settled is the fact
that corporations such as Western are entitled to the protection
of due process of law.6 0
The Division's claim in Western was supported by the uncor-
roborated testimony of one individual who observed emissions for
approximately ten minutes. Western had no knowledge of this
inspection until 2 weeks later when it received the cease and
desist order. The Variance Board permitted Western to introduce
0 Id. at 431.
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
0 Brief for Petitioner for Certiorari at 13, Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western
Alfalfa Corp., cert. denied by the Colorado Supreme Court, June 25, 1973.
, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
Id. at 351.
See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-31-10(2)(d) (Supp. 1971), amending, COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 66-29-8(2)(d) (Supp. 1967).
11 Shoenberg Farms, Inc. v. People ex rel. Swisher, 166 Colo. 199, 212, 444 P.2d 277,
283 (1968); Puncec v. City & County of Denver, 28 Colo. App. 542, 544, 475 P.2d 359, 360
(1970); People v. Belcastro, 356 Ill. 144, 146-47, 190 N.E. 301, 303 (1934).
' Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928); Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Para-
mount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 550 (1923); Covington & Lexington Turnpike Rd.
Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 592 (1896); Beatrice Creamery Co. v. Cline, 9 F.2d 176,
177 (D. Colo. 1925). Due process as used in this comment refers to either the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution of the United States or Section 25, Article 2 of the Consti-
tution of the State of Colorado, unless one or the other is specified.
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evidence of an independent engineering test conducted 2 months
after the Division inspection, but the report was objected to be-
cause the test was conducted without notification to the Depart-
ment of Health. This resulted in the Division's not having person-
nel present to determine if the method of testing was acceptable."'
The transcript from the hearing indicates that even had Western
notified the Division that a test was being conducted, the Vari-
ance Board would not have considered the results probative. The
Variance Board focused its attention primarily upon the evidence
gathered by the Division on June 4. The transcript illustrates:
MR. HEATON: When you made your visit on June 4, 1969 and
made these observations, and you as a certified air pollution ob-
server, these emissions did or did not exeed the state standards and
the state air pollution control act?
MR. CAWELTI: They did exceed.2
MR. HEATON: The violation, I think, is June 4. You did not pres-
ent evidence that you were not in violation on June 4.
MR. CAWELTI: Of course, I think we all have to realize that it is
physically impossible, because we didn't even know that we were
being examined on June 4, and it wasn't until some 20 days later
that we had been examined on that day, because it is a matter of
history by the time we heard we were being charged for it."
MR. HEATON: Let me talk about the law on June 4. The specific
law on June 4. As the law on that date, and as it reads on June 16.
Could you have been in violation on those dates?
MR. CAWELTI: Yes. Our own view is that we were not, and our own
testimony is that we were not.
MR. HEATON: No your testimony was that you were not in viola-
tion in August. I don't have the date of that report, but it was
August."
Paragraph 2 of the Air Pollution Variance Board's Findings
of Fact states:
Ringelmann and Opacity readings for a period in excess of three
minutes were taken by personnel of the Colorado Department of
Health on June 4, 1969, and all such readings were in excess of a
Ringelmann 2 and an Opacity of 40%.11
Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 19974 (Colo. Dist.
Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1971). CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(2)(e) (Supp. 1969) requires that
in order for a person to avail himself of the independent testing, the method of such testing
be acceptable to the Division.
62 See State of Colorado Department of Public Health, Air Pollution Variance Board
for transcript of proceedings in the Air Pollution Variance Board hearing records from In
re Western Alfalfa Corp., Sept. 11, 1969, at 33.
Record, Oct. 16, 1969, at 8-9, In re Western Alfalfa Corp.
64 Id. at 12.
Air Pollution Variance Board, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in In re
Western Alfalfa Corp., Jan. 30, 1970, at 2.
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The preceding illustrates that the Variance Board rendered
exclusive probative value to the evidence submitted by the Divi-
sion inspector of the test made June 4.
Morgan v. United States6 states that "in administrative pro-
ceedings of a quasi-judicial character the liberty and property of
the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements
of fair play. These demand 'a fair and open hearing. .'.. ," Due
process "secures the individual 'from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles
of private rights and distributive justice.' ,,18 Several facts must
be considered in assessing the fairness of the investigation and
resultant trial of Western Alfalfa Corporation.
A. The Ringelmann Test: Notice and Certification
The district court noted that the Division objected to the
independent engineering test of Western because it was done
without notification to the Department of Health, and as a conse-
quence the Division had no personnel present to determine if the
method of testing was acceptable. The district court concluded,
"If this be objectionable, then it is likewise objectionable if the
Department of Health makes its examination of opacity and pol-
lutants without the presence of personnel of the person or com-
pany being examined for possible violations of the Air Pollution
Control Act.""6 Implicit in the court's comment is the notion of
fairness. While the statute suggests protection of the Division
against the self-justifying instincts of the citizens, nothing in the
statute protects the citizens against the unhampered zeal of an
administrative officer intent upon discovering, and possibly in-
venting, violations of the Air Pollution Control Act.
Another fact to consider is that the State of Colorado permits
certification of experts in the use of the Ringelmann Chart, but
certifies only persons employed by the State.70 This certification
of the State employees authenticates their credentials. Though
an individual not employed by the State may have gone through
the very same training as a certified expert, his qualifications lack
the aura of authentication implied by the credentials of a State
e 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
'7 Id. at 14-15.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co. v. Hinderlider, 93 Colo. 128, 132, 25 P.2d
187, 188 (1933), appeal dismissed, 291 U.S. 650 (1933).
,1 Western Alfalfa Corp. v. Air Pollution Variance Bd., Civil No. 19974 (Colo. Dist.
Ct., filed Nov. 18, 1971).
70 Id.
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employee. While the fact of certification may not preclude chal-
lenge to the testimony of a State-employed expert, it would cer-
tainly increase the burden one must bear in challenging such
testimony. Certification adds credence to the testimony of the
State's witness. One must question whether the testimony of a
"non-certified" smoke reader would have inherently been at some
disadvantage simply because of the "non-certification"? The un-
fairness of such a situation is palpable.
B. The Evidentiary Quandary
Since the Act permits a decision of the Variance Board to be
based exclusively upon evidence obtained in three minutes of any
hour,7 there was no opportunity for Western to verify or challenge
what the enforcement officer actually saw on June 4. Further, the
Variance Board refused to accept the evidence gathered on dates
other than the date of the Division inspection. Without an oppor-
tunity to monitor the State test and simultaneously make its own
readings, a company under investigation is at an insurmountable
disadvantage. Thus, the entire case of the Division rested upon
the unsubstantiated and unverified testimony of a single individ-
ual of an observation lasting no more than ten minutes. In these
circumstances, the sole defense remaining to Western was to im-
peach the expert witness by challenging his qualifications or the
manner in which he conducted the test.7 2 Since the witness' quali-
fications were validated by his certification and his method of
testing was unverified by other witnesses, the burden resting
upon Western was very heavy. It is no exaggeration to suggest,
as did the court of appeals, that Western was absolutely fore-
closed from negating the testimony of the Division.
Counsel for Western claimed that the investigatory and no-
tice procedure followed in this case was not unlike a motorist
receiving notice that he had violated a traffic ordinance by receiv-
ing a citation in the mail 2 weeks after the alleged violation had
"1 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 66-29-5(2)(a) (Supp. 1967), as amended, CoLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 66-31-9 (Supp. 1971).
11 Apparently Western was unable to prove the nature of its emissions on June 4
by submitting evidence of the amount of alfalfa processed, the day's fuel consumption,
or other records of the day's operations. Testing in this manner is not specifically author-
ized by statute, and it is questionable whether records of operations on that day or a
similar day would even begin to withstand a challenge based upon evidence gathered in
an actual physical inspection on June 4. Any attempt to simulate the actual conditions
existing as of June 4 would probably be doomed to countless variables such as wind
direction and speed, time of day, amount of alfalfa processed, etc.
1974
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occurred. 3 The Division argued that the "only way a company
can stay in continuous compliance with the Pollution Control
laws is to constantly monitor its own emissions."' The Division
reasoned that since the law required Western to be in compliance,
it should have known of any 3-minute interval when it was not
in compliance. In answer, Western argued, "By the same logic, a
driver of a car should be able to recall and to specifically testify
as to what speed he was driving at a particular time on a day two
weeks in the past." 5 Moreover, any role Western might have
attempted at constantly monitoring its emissions would have
been seriously undermined by the fact that its own experts were
not certified.
The procedure used against Western was not unlike an ex
parte investigation by an administrative hearing board where evi-
dence is collected without notice being given. In such instances,
courts have held that the aggrieved party was deprived of his
right, under due process of law, to refute, test, or explain the
opposing party's evidence." Basic fairness dictates that Western
should have been entitled to a "reasonable" opportunity to refute
the Division's evidence. Even assuming there was a violation on
June 4, there should have been some way Western could have
known sooner that it was committing such a violation. In addi-
tion, the 2-week delay, in itself, seems inconsistent with the Act's
manifest intention to curb air pollution. By its remissiveness in
failing to notify Western immediately, the Division itself may
have contributed to a continuing violation of the Air Pollution
Control Act.
C. An Evidentiary Analogy
Since the evidence in cases like this is continually dissipating
into the atmosphere, a comparison may be made to the evidence
sought when a blood-alcohol test is administered. With the pas-
sage of time, the intoxicating effect of alcohol in the blood dimin-
ishes as does the evidence of pollutants in the sky. The efficacy
of the blood test depends upon its being made in close proximity
to the time of the offense. Similarly, the probative value of an air
pollution test depends upon a close proximity in time to the al-
" Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 14, Air Pollution Variance Bd. v.
Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974).
" Brief for Air Pollution Variance Board for Certiorari as Amicus Curiae at 15-16, Air
Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974).
," Brief for Respondent in Opposition to Certiorari at 14, Air Pollution Variance Bd.
v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974).
" English v. City of Long Beach, 35 Cal. 2d 155, 217 P.2d 22 (1950).
[VOL. 51
NOTICE IN VISUAL OPACITY TESTS
leged violation. In the blood test cases, it has been held that the
accused party "should be entitled to a reasonable opportunity to
attempt to procure a timely sample. . . . [T]o refuse him such
reasonable opportunity is to deny him the only opportunity he
has to defend against the charge."77 If denied the opportunity
upon request to see his own doctor, "it may be said that the
[defendant has been] denied the essentials of governmental fair
play."" In the same manner, a party suspected of an air pollution
violation should have the benefit of his own timely witness. To
deny him that witness is to curtail his only opportunity to effec-
tively rebut the evidence gathered against him.
D. A Secret Investigation
In essence, what was conducted by the Division on June 4
was a secret investigation. It has been held in cases under the
fourth amendment that "[slecret searches have never been a
part of our system of government. . . . [T]he secret search is
such an extraordinary procedure under the Fourth Amendment
that basic decency and the prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures embodied in that Amendment require that
prompt and adequate notice after the search must be given to
[the enforced parties]."" While the type of investigation con-
ducted at Western is not proscribed by the fourth amendment,
the rationale underlying the notice requirements is still directly
applicable. In either case it makes no difference to the aggrieved
party whether the inspection is termed a search or simply an
inspection. What is important is that timely notice be given after
the inspection has been made. "[T]o delay notice to the subject
of the search for a substantial period of time because it might
hamper an investigation is in our view well beyond the bounds of
the Constitution. ' 80 By delaying notice of the investigation at
Western's plant the Division seriously impaired Western's de-
fense, perhaps suppressing evidence that would have "cleared"
Western.
[Liaw enforcement agencies also have a responsibility to protect as
well as to prosecute; . . . when in the exercise of their power to
arrest, the police deprive the arrested person of the opportunity to
obtain evidence that might establish his innocence, they are sup-
pressing it just as effectively as if it did exist and they withheld it;
11 In re Newbern, 175 Cal. App. 2d 862, 866, 1 Cal. Rptr. 80, 83 (1959).
79 Id.
7' United States v. Whitaker, 343 F. Supp. 358, 368 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
Id. at 369.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
• . . evidence should be equally available to prove innocence as well
as guilt .... 11
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this comment is not to propose a detailed
outline of the manner and timing of what would constitute ade-
quate notice to a party being investigated for possible violation
of the Air Pollution Control Act, but only to emphasize that the
2-week delay in the present case was too long under any circum-
stance. It is not urged that notice must be given prior to or at the
same time as the Division conducts a test, but only within a
reasonably short period of time thereafter so as not to deprive the
party of his right to a fair trial.
Counsel for the Division has argued that surprise is a crucial
element in conducting tests of this kind, and that notice would
unnecessarily restrict the prosecution of air pollution violations.
82
Contrary to this assumption is the fact that most violations which
the Division cites are the consequence of'a malfunction in the
mechanical operation of a plant which, unless corrected, tend to
be of a continuing nature.13 Surprise therefore plays little role in
the day-to-day enforcement of the Air Pollution Control Act.
The requirement of notice in this context does not mean that
such notice is required in other regulatory contexts. "There is a
tendency to think that there is and should be one type of proce-
dure and review for all administrative agencies. This is a great
mistake founded on insufficient understanding of the field of
administrative law."" What constitutes adequate due process in
each situation depends upon "the purposes of the procedure and
its effect upon the rights asserted and all other circumstances
which may render the proceeding appropriate to the nature of the
case. '" When visual opacity readings are made, notice should be
a requisite element of the procedure envisioned by law. Without
notice, the rights of the affected parties are seriously impaired.
The fact that this evidence is, by its nature, continually dissipat-
-1 78 A.L.R.2d 906 (1961). For a full discussion of this point see the cases collected at
Annot., 78 A.L.R.2d 905 (1961).
82 Brief for Petitioner for Certiorari at 9, Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 94 S. Ct. 2114 (1974).
u Interview with John Spiegel, Air Pollution Control Specialist, Stationary Sources
Section, Air Pollution Control Division, Colorado State Department of Health, in Denver,
December 17, 1973.
" Crow v. Industrial Comm'n, 104 Utah 333, 343, 140 P.2d 321, 325 (1943) (Wolfe,
C.J., concurring specially.)
" Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944).
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ing, renders the notice element crucial to a fair investigation.
Administrative agencies are instruments of power. They rep-
resent the possibility of great public good, but also the possibility
of public evil."' The procedure under which the State Health
Department is now permitted to enforce air pollution regulations
in the State of Colorado has inherent potential for great abuse.
The statute does not require notice in all situations. Without
notice, accused parties after an inspection may be left with the
impression they have been raided by government agents. Instead
of promoting an atmosphere of cooperation, the current procedure
nurtures a climate in which distrust and antagonism can readily
develop.
Fair play must be assigned an active role in the daily enforce-
ment of the air pollution regulations. While it is necessary to
protect the quality of the environment and particularly the air we
breathe, we must guard against the unfettered zeal of administra-
tive agencies. Such zeal, unchecked, could easily transgress the
rudimentary safeguards guaranteed by due process of law.
Leland P. Anderson




COPYRIGHT LAW-Copyright of Fraudulent Material
Belcher v. Tarbox, 486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973)
The Constitution does not establish copyrights, but provides
that Congress shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks
fit. Not primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the
benefit of the public, such rights are given. Not that any particular
class of citizens, however worthy, may benefit, but because the pol-
icy is believed to be for the benefit of the great body of people, in
that it will stimulate writing and invention to give some bonus to
authors and inventors.'
INTRODUCTION
The Copyright Act of 1909, the predecessor of the present
Title 17,1 was passed with the intention of providing the greatest
benefit for the public. Congress derived its authority from the
Consitution which empowers Congress "[t]o promote the Prog-
ress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." 3 The sole object of the Constitution,
and the primary purpose in conferring copyright protection, "lie
in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of
authors."4 It is predicated on the concept that the public benefits
from the creativity of authors, and that the copyright protection
is necessary to encourage such creative activities.5
In the recent case Belcher v. Tarbox,' the Ninth Circuit al-
lowed copyright protection to material which was considered
against the public interest, and, therefore, contrary to the avowed
purpose and intent of the Copyright Act. The case involved a
written handicapping system designed for winning at the horse-
races. The author had acquired copyright privileges by affixing
the proper notice to his works and by applying for registration
with the copyright office pursuant to the Copyright Act.7 The
defendant was the publisher of a magazine which reproduced
H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909), accompanying the bill embodying
the Copyright Act of 1909, Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
2 17 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 215 (1952).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932).
1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER].
486 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1973).
The procedure for obtaining copyright protection is codified in 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11,
13, 19, 20, 21 (1970).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
various sytems for betting on horses. The defendant reprinted
several of the author's systems, and the author instituted an ac-
tion for copyright infringement. As a defense, the defendant
argued that the plaintiff's works were not entitled to copyright
protection since they, and the advertising associated with them,
made fraudulent representations to the public. The trial court
found, in fact, that one of the works was fraudulent and not
entitled to protection from infringement. The issue which the
appellate court resolved was whether "false and fraudulent mate-
rial [is] entitled to copyright protection or does the clean hands
doctrine preclude it?"' The Ninth Circuit, not following the
weight of precedent law, asserted that fraudulent material was
copyrightable and, in this case, had been infringed.
The purpose of this comment is to explore the implications
of the Belcher decision by examining the historical precedents of
copyright protection for fraudulent material; by drawing analo-
gies to the copyrightablility of immoral and illegal works and to
the relation of fraud in trademark and patent law; and by analyz-
ing the court's opinion in the present case. Finally, the implica-
tions of Belcher on the field of copyright law will be discussed to
determine whether fraudulent works should be the subject of co-
pyright protection.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Fraud in Copyright Cases
1. Copyright Law in England
Early copyright protection consisted of printers' licenses
granted by the King about the time the printing press was devel-
oping.9 The primary purpose of these licenses was to restrict cir-
culation of anti-government and anti-Church literature. In 1662,
Parliament passed the Licensing Act requiring licensing and reg-
istration of every published book with the Stationers' Company.
This act prohibited the printing of "heretical, seditious, schis-
matical or offensive books or pamphlets,"'" and required a licens-
ing notice in each copy which was enforceable against pirates by
criminal penalties. The Licensing Act expired in 1679, however,
and new legislation was not enacted until 1709 with the passage
486 F.2d at 1088.
W. COPINGER & E. JAMES, COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT § 21 (11th ed.
1971) [hereinafter cited as COPINGER].
11 13 & 14 Car. 2, c. 33, § 2 (1662).
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of the Copyright Act" wherein authors were granted a 14-year
monopoly on their works published after 1710. The 1709 Copy-
right Act remained the law in England until revisions were made
in the 19th century.'2
The preamble to the 1842 Act to Amend the Law of Copy-
right expressed the object of copyright protection "to afford
greater Encouragement to the Production of literary Works of
lasting Benefit to the World."' 3 This theme pervades early Eng-
lish copyright law and the court's concern with the public interest
is demonstrated in Wright v. Talis, '4 an early case on fraud in
copyright. Wright involved an action for appropriating a work of
devotional character which falsely professed to be a translation
from an esteemed German author. The plaintiff intentionally
deceived the purchasers in order to receive a higher value for his
work than it was worth. In denying copyright protection, the
court drew an analogy from the prior immorality cases stating:
The cases in which a copyright has been held not to subsist
where the work is subversive of good order, morality, or religion, do
not, indeed, bear directly on the case before us; but they have this
analogy with the present inquiry - that they prove that the rule
which denies the existence of copyright in those cases, is a rule
established for the benefit and protection of the public. And we
think that that the law can afford to the public against such a fraud
as that laid open by this plea, is, to make the practice of it unprofita-
ble to its author."5
The English courts again denied copyright protection in
Slingsby v. Bradford Patent Truck, Co.'" The plaintiff published
an illustrated catalogue of trucks and trolleys which he allegedly
manufactured. The catalogue suggested that he was the inventor,
patentee, and sole maker of the vehicles, but in fact he held no
English patents for them. The plaintiff was denied an injunction
against the infringing defendant since his statements about being
a true patentee were calculated to deceive the public and increase
his trade.
Although the copyright law in England is devoid of any sta-
tutory restriction on fraudulent material, the few early cases indi-
cate the judicial concern for the public interest, the stated pur-
" 8 Anne, c. 19, § 1 (1709).
12 COPINGER, supra note 9, §§ 21-30.
5 & 6 Vict., c. 45, § 1 (1842).
" 135 Eng. Rep. 794 (C.P. 1845).
Id. at 800.
[1905] W.N. 122; [1906] W.N. 51.
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pose of the Copyright Acts, by denying copyright protection
where the public was injured by the works of the copyright holder.
2. Copyright Law in the United States
The early development of copyright law in the United States
followed the precedent set in England. The United States Consti-
tution adopted existing common law at the time and granted
Congress the authority to legislate copyright law.' 7 The first
American statute was entitled An Act for the Encouragement of
Learning. 8 This act provided protection similar to that existing
in England, and did not specifically deny or allow copyright pro-
tection on fraudulent material. American copyright law has un-
dergone several statutory changes including expansions to extend
protection to the arts of designing, engraving, and etching
prints;1 musical compositions;20 dramatic compositions;2' photo-
graphs; 2 and paintings, drawings, and statues.23 The copyright
law was finally revised in 1909 with the Copyright Act 2' which
substantively became Title 17, enacted in 1947. Nowhere in this
statutory law is there an express limitation on copyright protec-
tion on fraudulent matter.
Turning to early American case law, copyright protection
was denied in Davies v. Bowes,25 an infringement action where the
defendant constructed and produced a play based on a fictional
story which the plaintiff-reporter had written in his newspaper
column. The court said that copyright does not exist in news,
since facts are public property. The plaintiff presented the story
to the public as if it were news, in order to attract attention and
interest, and the court denied protection as a matter of morals
saying that, "he who puts forth a thing as verity shall not be
heard to allege for profit that it is fiction.
'2 6
The major precedent-setting case dealing with the copyright
of fraudulent material is Stone & McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano
Co.2 Stone involved an instruction manual for the selling of pi-
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171.
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436.
21 Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138.
22 Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540.
1 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
24 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075.
209 F. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
" Id. at 55.
11 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915).
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anos which contained advertisement forms for special sales to be
held by the dealers. The forms contained sales statements which
could not be true for all cases. In denying copyright protection to
the manual the court stated that "the law should extend its pro-
tection to those advertisements only that speak the truth, and
certainly not to that class of advertising matter the effect of which
is to mislead and deceive the public." 8 This case, as are most in
this area, was not decided on a principle of copyright law, but
instead on a doctrine of equity. The court said, "It is a familiar
maxim of equity that one who applies to a court of equity for relief
should come in with clean hands . .."" The effect of this appli-
cation is not really to deny the copyright, but only to refuse to
enforce the copyright by not enjoining the one who has infringed
it.
Deutsch v. Felton3 1 took a different view. Deutsch involved
the infringement of a graphology chart used to predict character
traits through handwriting analysis. The court held that the co-
pyright had been infringed and issued an injunction against the
defendant despite the fact that neither the plaintiff nor the defen-
dant claimed that the charts were based on scientific or other
fact. The court declined to consider whether this was adverse to
the public interest.
In Advisers, Inc. v. Wiesen-Hart, Inc. 31 a coupon book, which
offered discounts on jewelry purchases, was produced and distrib-
uted by the plaintiff. The coupon book was advertised as being
worth $100, but the discounts which it offered were available to
any customer. An action for infringement was brought against the
defendant who published a similar book. The court found the
material to be fraudulent, 3 but proceeded to conclude that it was
Id. at 841. The court continues:
It is only necessary to glance at the matter of the advertisements . ..to
satisfy the mind that their tendency, by the extravagant puffing of the wares
of the dealer and misrepresentations of sales, is to mislead and deceive the
public . . . .Extravaganzas may be indulged by a writer for the purpose of
illustration and to accomplish the end in view . . . .But advertisements by
dealers of their wares, in order to insure the protection of the law, should
reflect the truth and avoid representations which mislead and deceive the
people. If their tendency be misleading and deceptive, they will find the
doors of a court of equity barred against their admission.
Id. at 842-43.
Id. at 841.
27 F. Supp. 895 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
161 F. Supp. 831 (S.D. Ohio 1958).
32 The court stated:
The Court finds as a fact that the plaintiffs "Cash $100 Book" is fraudulent
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the proper subject matter for copyright protection and issued an
injunction against the defendant. The court stated, however, that
the statutory damages of $1 per copy provided for in the Copy-
right Act were not intended to be awarded to material which was
fraudulent. The court did, nevertheless, grant general damages.
Two recent cases have also dealt with fraud in copyright; one
applying the clean hands doctrine of equity to deny copyright
protection, 33 and the other finding the conduct inconsequential to
warrant application of the doctrine .3 The above discussion dem-
onstrates the fact that there is no clear authority in the United
States dealing with copyright protection for fraudulent material.
In fact, the authority is very limited since only two cases, Stone
and Advisers, deal with actual fraudulent content, as distin-
guished from fraudulent representations made surrounding the
work. Furthermore, even Stone and Advisers are split as to the
effect of such fraudulent content in relation to the Copyright Act.
3. The Status of Copyright Law for Fraudulent Material
The question of whether a copyright should be granted to
material having fraudulent content which is, therefore, contrary
to the purpose and intent of the Copyright Act in protecting the
public interest, as discussed above, has rarely been confronted.
The most common method for approaching this problem by the
courts has been not to deny the granting of the copyright but
rather to refuse enjoining the copyright based on the equitable
doctrine of clean hands. This apparent granting of a token copy-
right with a judicial denial of statutory rights and remedies does
not follow the principles of equity. One authority on equity, Kerr,
has stated the rule of equity thusly:
in nature in that it is used for the sole and express purpose of enticing the
gullible into those business establishments whose merchandise is advertised
in the book under the guise that the book is worth $100 in cash, where in
fact the same discounts specified in the book are given to all members of the
public in the ordinary course of business.
Id. at 834.
m International Biotical Corp. v. Associated Mills, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 511, 514-15
(N.D. Ill. 1964). The plaintiff's design patent and copyrights were unenforceable because
he had made prior misrepresentations to the court and the copyright office about prior
publications, and to the public through fraudulent advertising.
u Ideal Toy Corp. v. J-Cey Doll Co., 290 F.2d 710, 711 (2d Cir. 1961). The plaintiff
was granted an injunction against the infringing defendant on a copyrighted doll with a
distinctive head despite the claim that the doll's body had been previously published
without copyright notice, and the plaintiffs copyright notice on the torso of the new doll,
therefore, was an attempt to extend protection to the torso, rather than the whole doll,
and constituted a fraud upon the public.
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If a publication be of an immoral, indecent, seditious, libellous,
or irreligious nature, there can be no copyright. The labor expended
on a work of this nature is not labor in respect of which a right of
property can exist. Upon an analogous principle no copyright exists
in a book, though its contents be innocent, which purports falsely
to have been written by an author of reputation, and seeks . . .
[intentionally] to defraud the public and make a profit by a false
representation .5
Kerr, therefore, states that copyright simply does not exist in
such fraudulent works. The courts continue, however, to apply
the clean hands doctrine of equity to deny enforcement, while
recognizing the existence of copyright. This irony underscores the
conflict which exists in the administration of copyright law. It is
noteworthy that Kerr uses the Wright case based on fraud to
support the other bars to copyright which he enumerated.
A more recent copyright commentator narrows the scope of
the clean hands doctrine by stating that the transgression by the
plaintiff must be of serious proportions and relate directly to the
subject matter of the infringement action before the courts will
apply the doctrine and deny protection.
3
Despite this apparent fear by the courts to confront the fraud
in copyrighted works, there is a pervasive theme throughout the
case law that suggests that works which defeat the purpose of
copyright law by defrauding, rather than benefiting, the public
should not be protected from infringement. The courts have used
the clean hands doctrine to accomplish this purpose. Not all
courts have followed this theme, however, and, absent any clear
authority which states that copyright does not exist in fraudulent
material, the question remains unsolved. Analogies to other areas
of copyright law and to the handling of fraud in trademark and
patent cases, therefore, may offer insights and guidelines for solv-
ing this issue.
B. Immorality and Illegality in Copyright Analogies
No specific statutory authority exists for denying copyright
protection to works which are immoral or illegal, but the case law
abounds with instances where, in the interest of benefiting the
public, courts have denied such protection. The rule of law gener-
ally used is:
The publication of an immoral, seditious, blasphemous, or libellous
W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS 1N EQurry, 452
(American ed. 1871) (footnotes omitted).
1 2 M. NIMmER, supra, note 5, at § 149.2.
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work, is looked upon as unlawful; and for that reason it has been
held that such a work cannot be the subject of statutory copyright.
Hence, when the author has published a work of this kind, he is
powerless to prevent any other person from republishing it, and he
is not entitled to recover for damages sustained through loss of prof-
its by such unauthorized publication 7
1. Obscenity and Immorality
The cases dealing with immorality can be divided into two
groups: those which offend public decency with obscenity and
those which are used for immoral purposes. In the first group
copyright protection has been denied for the infringement of a
book which the court found to be highly indecent and slander-
ous; 38 for the infringement of a dramatic composition which the
court found to he ".rossly indecent, and calculated to corrupt the
morals of the people";3 9 for the infringement of a song whose verse
was held to be indelicate and vulgar;" for the infringement of a
performance containing moving pictures of a woman making
quick costume changes and exhibiting portions of her anatomy
which the court found to be lascivious and immoral;" and for the
infringement of movies which the court found to be indecent and
disgusting. 2 In an English case, the court stated in dictum that
indecent films would have been equally disentitled to protection
of the court because of their offensive character. 3 As this discus-
sion indicates, the courts have been quick to deny copyright pro-
' E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES 112 (1879) [hereinafter cited as DRONE]. See also
COPINGER, supra note 9, at § 224, where he uses the words, "libellous, immoral, obscene,
or irreligious" to describe works not protected as a matter of public policy.
' Stockdale v. Onwhyn, 108 Eng. Rep. 65 (K.B. 1826). Abbott, C.J. stated: "In order
to establish such a claim, he must, in the first place, shew a right to sell; for if he has not
that right, he cannot sustain any loss by an injury to the sale. Now I am certain no lawyer
can say that the sale of each copy of this work is not an offense against the law." Id. at
176, 108 Eng. Rep. at 66.
3' Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920, 922 (No. 9,173) (C.C. Cal. 1867). The court
stated: "Now, it cannot be denied that this spectacle of the Black Crook only attracts
attention as it panders to a prurient curiousity or an obscene imagination by very ques-
tionable exhibitions and attitudes of the female person." Id. Accord, Shook v. Daly, 49
How. Pr. 366 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1875).
'0 Broder v. Zeno Mauvais Music Co., 88 F. 74 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898). The vulgarity
involved the word hottest as used in the song verse, "She's the hottest thing you ever
seen." Id. at 79.
41 Barnes v. Miner, 122 F. 480 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903). The court stated: "Society may
tolerate, and even patronize, such exhibitions, but Congress has no constitutional author-
ity to enact a law that will copyright them, and the courts will not degrade themselves
when they recognize them as entitled to the protection of the law." Id. at 492.
42 Bullard v. Esper, 72 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Tex. 1947).
' Glyn v. Western Feature Film Co., [1916] W.N. 5.
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tection where the copyrighted work offends public decency. The
major problem with this analogy is that changing social standards
of morality result in fluctuating definitions of obscenity. The cri-
teria used to assess morality in one year are obsolete in the next
year." The analogy is not lost, however, since the motivation of
the courts in these obscenity cases was a protection of the public
interest. Protection of the public interest was the same motiva-
tion used in copyright fraud cases, and is entirely in keeping with
the intent of the Copyright Act to benefit the public.
The second group of immoral works deals with those things
which are used for immoral purposes. The rule in this situation
is best stated in Richardson v. Miller4" where the court said that
in order to deprive a work of its protection under law, "it must
appear either that there is something immoral, pernicious, or
indecent in the things per se, or that they are incapable of any
use except in connection with some illegal and immoral act.""
Richardson involved the infringement of a copyright on playing
cards. Despite the assertion by the defendant that playing cards
have only the immoral and illegal use for gambling, the court
upheld the copyright since playing cards also have a legitimate
use. A similar result was attained in two other cases wherein form
charts of data about race horses and trotting horses were found
to have a legitimate purpose besides the obvious immoral one.
7
In a later case, 8 however, the court refused to give copyright
protection to a card which was allegedly infringed since it was
used exclusively in theaters to conduct lotteries during intermis-
sion. Thus, it is apparent that immorality associated with the use
of a thing may be the cause for the denial of copyright protection.
2. Libel, Sedition, and Blasphemy
Cases involving illegality as a cause for denial of copyright
primarily deal with something in the content of the work which
could create a disturbance of the public peace. Here again the
courts are primarily concerned with the public interest, as in-
tended by the Copyright Act, rather than the interests of the
" See Rogers, Copyright and Morals, 18 MICH. L. RaE. 390, 398 (1920), and Comment,
Immorality, Obscenity and the Law of Copyright, 6 S. DAK. L. Rav. 109, 115 (1961).
" 20 F. Cas. 722 (No. 11,791) (C.C. Mass. 1877).
4e Id. at 723.
" Egbert v. Greenberg, 100 F. 447 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900) involved form charts of past
performances of race horses which in theory could be used by breeders and trainers;
American Trotting Register Ass'n v. Gocher, 70 F. 237 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1895) involved lists
of trotters and pacers with a certain speed or better.
11 Kessler v. Schreiber, 39 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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parties in litigation. These cases may be viewed in three groups:
libel, sedition, and blasphemy.
An early English libel case49 involved an action to restrain the
defendant from publishing the plaintiff's works in violation of an
agreement between them. Lord Eldon withheld an injunction
until he was satisfied that the works were not libelous, stating a
rule that equity should not offer relief until it is proved than an
action at law will lie.50 This opinion has been severely criticized
as creating the doctrine that judges must screen all material for
which injuctions are sought to determine if there is a right to an
action at law." The denial of legal protection for libelous works
was demonstrated in a later English case, Du Bost v. Beresford.2
Though not dealing with copyright, Du Bost involved the destruc-
tion of a painting in public exhibition which the defendant
claimed was a libel. The court restricted damages to the value
of the canvas and paint claiming that the picture had no legal
value as a work of art.
The major concern in sedition cases, as with libel, has been
the disturbance of the public peace by the publication of a work
which may expose the government to peril or serious embarrass-
ment. In such instances, the courts have been reluctant to grant
copyright protection.53 One early case 4 involved a song which
satirized the system of justice in England by suggesting that the
courts were corrupted by bribes. The song used the name of the
chief cashier of the Bank of England, whose signature appeared
on all bank notes, to infer that justice was not blind to money.
In an action for piracy, the defendant argued that the song was a
"nefarious libel upon the solemn administration of British jus-
tice,"55 and the court stated that, "[i]f the composition appeared
on the face of it to be a libel so gross as to affect the public morals,
I should advise the jury to give no damages."56 The court found,
however, that this song was not so gross a libel. Another English
case57 involved a poem written, but not published by the author.
" Walcot v. Walker, 32 Eng. Rep. 1 (Ch. 1802).
10 See Comment, supra note 44, at 110 and 111 n.6, for a discussion of Dr. Priestley's
Case from which Lord Eldon extracted his rule.
11 10 UVEs OF THE CHAcm.LoRs 254 (5th English ed.), quoted in DRONE, supra note
37, at 183-85 n.1.
52 170 Eng. Rep. 1235 (N.P. 1810).
DRONE, supra note 37, at 182.
54 Hime v. Dale, 2 Camp. 27 n.(b), (M.T. 1803).
Id. at 30 n.(b).
Id. at 31 n.(b).
57 Southey v. Sherwood, 35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1817).
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It was later acquired and published by the defendant. When the
author brought an action to restrain publication by the defen-
dant, the court, in dictum, stated that no relief was forthcoming
until the plaintiff proved that the publication was innocent since
the defendant had asserted that the poem was seditious.
The sedition of libel required to deny copyright protection
must be such as to justly threaten a breach of peace, or to inter-
fere with the functions of government. In the United States, the
first amendment protects satire, censure, and ridicule, and the
court's interpretations of that amendment define the extent to
which such works will be protected under law and, therefore,
copyrightable without being seditious or libelous.58 Libels on an
individual are considered as an offense against society and
treated in the same way.59 It is noteworthy that the recurrent
theme in the above discussed English cases is that copyright pro-
tection is based on the public interest and benefit.
The final group of cases involves blasphemy, an issue which
was a crime against society in Great Britain. In 1822, three cases
were decided in England and, in each case, the injunction to
restrain publication of pirated works was denied or dissolved be-
cause the works were suspected of being contrary to the Scrip-
tures. 0 The courts specifically stated that the law does not give
protection to those who contradict the Scriptures. In the United
States, however, where religious freedom is constitutionally guar-
anteed, such works would not cause a denial of copyright protec-
tion unless such works would interfere with the public order or
undermine the public morals."
3. The Analogy to Fraudulent Works
Early English case law supports the proposition that a
claim of copyright in a work of libellous, immoral, obscene or irreli-
gious tendency will not be enforced .... [and] the ground for
refusal by the courts to intervene is that it is against public policy
to protect rights of publication and sale of works, where publication
and sale would be against the public interest .... 12
The same rationale should apply equally to fraudulent material
since publication of such material is adverse to the public inter-
1 NIMMER, supra note 5, § 36 at 146.30.
5, DRONE, supra note 37, at 185.
' Lawrence v. Smith, 37 Eng. Rep. 928 (Ch. 1822); Murray v. Benbow, 37 Eng. Rep.
929 (Ch. 1822); Murray v. Dugdale, 32 Eng. Rep. 2 (Ch. 1823).
" DRONE, supra note 37, at 195.
62 COPINGER, supra note 9, § 224.
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est. At least one authority, Howell, has included fraudulent with
libelous, seditious, immoral, and indecent as the enumeration of
works which are unprotected. 3 Such inclusion was based on rea-
soning that for a work to be entitled to copyright it must be "free
from illegality or immorality."" Clearly, fraud is illegal. Ergo,
although there is scant authority, by analogy to other forms of
immoral and illegal works, it could be concluded that fraudulent
works are not subject to copyright.
C. Fraud in Trademark and Patent Law
Trademarks and patents are considered intellectual property
along with copyrights. Patent law 5 derives its authority from the
same source as copyright law."8 Although trademark law67 derives
its authority from the commerce clause, there are sufficient simi-
larities to make the analogy valid. The case law in both of these
areas abounds with examples of the court's use of the clean hands
doctrine to deny protection to one who has acted against the
public interest. Here again the concern of the law is to benefit the
public by granting limited monopolies to the authors and inven-
tors whose creativity produced works of value to the public.
1. Trademark Cases
As early as 1883, the Supreme Court denied protection in a
trademark infringement case involving medicine which had
fraudulent misrepresentations on its label.6 8 A similar case in-
volved a label which claimed the contents were "bottled at the
spring" when in fact it. was not. The court denied trademark
protection for a misdescriptive label which was against the public
interest. 9 A medicine with the trademark, "Syrup of Figs", was
denied protection in an infringement action when the defendant
proved that the plaintiff's constipation remedy actually con-
tained no extract of figs.7" The Supreme Court in that case refused
63 A. LATMAN, HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW, 45 (4th ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as
HOWELL].
', Hoffman v. Le Traunik, 209 F. 375, 379 (N.D.N.Y. 1913).
Codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 293 (1954).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
U Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427.
Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218 (1883). The Court denied protec-
tion to a medicine which made a misrepresentation on its label as to the manufacturer
and the place where it was manufactured declaring that the court of equity would not
protect one who practices a fraud on the public.
'5 Bear Lithia Springs Co. v. Great Bear Spring Co., 71 A. 383 (N.J. Ch. 1906).
70 Worden v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516 (1903).
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relief to the plaintiff because he was guilty of deceit and misrepre-
sentations to the public. Two similar cases were cited therein.
One involved a product label which advertised "fruit puddine",
but no fruit was included in the ingredients.7' The other involved
a product claiming to be pure "pepper whiskey" but, in fact, was
a mixture of several whiskies including inferior grades.7" In both
cases, the courts denied an injunction on the ground that the
products were deceiving the public. In an 1897 case,73 trademark
protection was denied where the defendant produced a cigar with
a similar label as that of a well-established cigar. The defendant
argued that the label on the established cigar was deceiving since
it claimed to be pure Havana tobacco, but, in fact, contained
mostly tobaccos from other sources. The court, though finding the
defendant guilty of unfair competition, refused to aid the plaintiff
who was guilty of making materially false statements in connec-
tion with the property he sought to protect. Thus, the courts have
been unwilling to protect one who has abused his trademark priv-
ilege by making fraudulent misrepresentations to the public. In
an attempt to protect and benefit the public, courts have utilized
the same clean hands doctrine to refuse to grant injunctions and
damages as was used to deny copyright protection in the immo-
rality and illegality cases, and as used in Stone, the case involving
copyright fraud. More recently trademark law has drawn closer
to the copyright decisions by precluding registration of trade-
marks consisting of "immoral, deceptive, or scandalous mat-
ter."74 This statutory authority offers protection of the public
interest where copyright and patent statutory authority is still
lacking, but the case law analogy is strong evidence that the
public interest to be preserved is the same.
2. Patent Cases
In the patent area the clean hands doctrine is freely used to
protect the public interest. Although the cases do not deal neces-
sarily with fraud, the rationale has been to deny protection where
abuse of the patent privilege has been detrimental to the public
interest. Two cases involve an attempt by the manufacturer of a
patented device to license the use of such device only to those
consumers who agree to buy an unpatented product from that
Clotworthy v. Schepp, 42 F. 62 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1890).
72 Krauss v. Jos. R. Peebles' Sons Co., 58 F. 585 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1893).
Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 F. 896 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1897).
15 U.S.C. § 1052(a) (1970).
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company.75 The result is the use of a patent privilege to create a
monopoly in an unpatented product. This abuse of the patent
privilege was considered unclean hands by the Supreme Court
which denied protection in the infringement action saying:
The grant to the inventor of the special privilege of a patent
monopoly carries out a public policy adopted by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, "to promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to. . . Inventors the
exclusive Right . . . " to their "new and useful" inventions ....
It equally forbids the use of the patent to secure an exclusive right
or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office and which it
is contrary to public policy to grant.
It is a principle of general application that courts, and espe-
cially courts of equity, may appropriately wifthhold their aid where
the plaintiff is using the right asserted contrary to the public inter-
est. 0
The clean hands doctrine is not only used where the given
privilege is abused, but also to protect the public interest from
patents which do not benefit the public. Two cases, for example,
involved infringement of patented devices which the court found
to be used exclusively for gambling." The courts refused patent
protection because the devices were not "useful" as per the Con-
stitution and were against the public policy since their only use
was an immoral one. The courts did state that the patents would
be upheld if a legitimate use was found for the devices.78 This is
similar to the copyright cases discussed above.
The clean hands doctrine has also been employed, in the
public interest, where the conduct of the patentee has been de-
ceitful or fraudulent. In Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excava-
tor Co.79 the plaintiff held a patent on a device used in ditch-
"' Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942). The manufacturer of a
patented salt dispensing machine required the licensees of the dispenser to use its salt
tablets which were unpatented. The Court stated:
A patent operates to create and grant to the patentee an exclusive right to
make, use and vend the particular device described and claimed in the
patent. But a patent affords no immunity for a monopoly not within the
grant . . . . and the use of it to suppress competition in the sale of an
unpatented article may deprive the patentee of the aid of a court of equity
to restrain an alleged infringement by one who is a competitor.
Id. at 491; B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
7' Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942).
7 Reliance Novelty Co. v. Dworzek, 80 F. 902 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1897); National Auto-
matic Device Co. v. Lloyd, 40 F. 89 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1889).
11 The patent definition of immorality has undergone a transition similar to that in
obscenity.
71 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
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cutting machinery. The plaintiff discovered that the device had
been previously used and experimented with by another. The
plaintiff then went to this other person and colluded with him to
assign his rights to the plaintiff so the plaintiff could prosecute
an infringement action. The plaintiff suppressed the evidence of
the prior use and, instead, claimed they were abandoned experi-
ments. The court, after uncovering the misrepresentations of fact,
denied relief stating that the plaintiff must have a good faith
claim and come into equity with clean hands. A similar case was
International Biotical Corp. v. Associated Mills, Inc.s0 wherein
the plaintiff held a patent and a copyright, but made misrepre-
sentations to the court and the copyright office, and to the public
through his copyrighted material. Relief was denied on the
grounds of the plaintiff's unclean hands and inequitable conduct.
Another principle case in this area was Precision Instrument
Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive M.M. Co."' In that case the
plaintiff attempted to enforce a patent which the plaintiff knew
to be tainted by fraud and perjury. The plaintiff had entered into
agreements to assign the patent rights to itself and to settle an
interference proceeding to prevent revealing to the Patent Office
the true nature of the patent claim. The Supreme Court refused
to enforce this patent claim, stating:
These facts all add up to the inescapable conclusion that [the
plaintiff) has not displayed that standard of conduct requisite to
the maintenance of this suit in equity. That the actions of [the
defendants] may have been more reprehensible is immaterial. The
public policy against the assertion and enforcement of patent claims
infected with fraud and perjury is too great to be overridden by such
a consideration .2
The Court, in applying the clean hands doctrine to deny patent
protection in this case, emphasized the public interest involved
in such an application of the doctrine:
Moreover, where a suit in equity concerns the public interest as
well as the private interests of the litigants this doctrine assumes
even wider and more significant proportions. For if an equity court
properly uses the maxim to withhold its assistance in such a case it
not only prevents a wrongdoer from enjoying the fruits of his trans-
gression but averts an injury to the public. The determination of
when the maxim should be applied to bar this type of suit thus
becomes of vital significance. ...
239 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Il1. 1964).
81 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
" Id. at 819.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
' * * A patent by its very nature is affected with a public inter-
est . . . . The farreaching social and economic consequences of a
patent, therefore, give a paramount interest in seeing that patent
monopolies spring from backgrounds free from fraud or other ine-
quitable conduct and that such monopolies are kept within their
legitimate scope. The facts of this case must accordingly be mea-
sured by both public and private standards of equity. ....
3. The Analogy to Fraud in Copyright
Both trademark and patent law are concerned with the pub-
lic interest, and where an individual threatens that public inter-
est through fraudulent reprsentations or fraudulent conduct, the
courts have been quick to deny him any relief. The nature of
either'trademark or patent law is very akin to copyright law in
this respect. Hence, the treatment of fraudulent material in each
of these areas of the law should be analogous. The Supreme Court
recognized such an analogy in Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger
Co. 14 stating:
It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful in-
fringement suit, in conjunction with the patentee's course of con-
duct, which disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of
whether the particular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the
patent. Similarly equity will deny relief for infringement of a trade-
mark vhere the plaintiff is misrepresenting to the public the nature
of his product either by the trademark itself or by his label. [case
citations omitted]; see also, for application of the like doctrine in
the case of copyright, Edward Thompson Co. v. American Law Book
Co., 122 F. 922, 926; Stone & M'Carrick v. Dugan Piano Co., 220 F.
837, 841-43. The patentee, like these other holders of an exclusive
privilege granted in the furtherance of a public policy, may not
claim protection of his grant by the courts where it is being used to
subvert that policy.5
Despite the precedent set by previous copyright fraud cases,
and the overwhelming parallels from immoral and illegal copy-
right cases, and even the strong analogies to fraudulent trade-
mark and patent cases, the court produced a curious turnabout
in Belcher by granting copyright protection to a work which was
allegedly fraudulent. An analysis of the rationale of the court in
Belcher is necessary to shed some light on this issue.
II. ANALYSIS OF Belcher v. Tarbox
The issue in Belcher was the same issue which plagued ear-
lier courts, that is, whether false and fraudulent material was the
11 Id. at 815-16.
314 U.S. 488 (1942).
0 Id. at 494.
[VOL. 51
COPYRIGHT OF FRAUDULENT MATERIAL
subject of copyright protection or whether the equitable clean
hands doctrine should be applied to deny such protection. The
majority based its decision to grant copyright protection on three
rationales. First, the majority stated, "There is nothing in the
Copyright Act to suggest that the courts are to pass upon the
truth or falsity, the soundness or unsoundness, of the views em-
bodied in a copyrighted work.""6 As was indicated in the discus-
sion above, no specific statutory authority exists to grant courts
the power to review the content of any given work and then deny
it copyright on the basis of such content. The constitutional au-
thority granted to Congress requires that the protected works
"promote the progress of science and the useful arts," but a literal
application of this rule might destroy protection in many works
now copyrighted. 7 In this respect, the majority is accurate in
declining to deny protection on the basis of content. The dissent,
however, points out that, despite a dearth of authority, the courts
have frequently supported the spirit of the copyright law, the
avowed purpose to benefit the public, and have denied protection
to immoral or illegal works by using equity principles without, in
fact, denying the copyright. By analogy, then, the court should
protect the public interest by prohibiting protection of fraudulent
works, absent statutory authority to do so.
Secondly, the majority states:
The gravity and immensity of the problems, theological, philosophi-
cal, economic and scientific, that would confront a court if this view
[the use of the clean hands doctrine to deny protection] were
adopted are staggering to contemplate. It is surely not a task lightly
to be assumed, and we decline the invitation to assume it."
This presents two issues. First the court is fearful of opening the
floodgates of litigation. The majority assumes that adoption of a
policy of censuring works to determine if they benefit the public
will invite parties to bring actions to test the validity of a copy-
right. The dissent counters with the argument that such a fear is
unfounded since only two cases have actually challenged the
fraudulent content of a work in this century, i.e., Stone and
Advisers. Furthermore, it can be asserted that it is a weak court
and weak argument that rejects the opportunity to seek justice
in the face of an onerous task in terms of work volume. It is
interesting to note, however, that the Attorney General recog-
486 F.2d at 1088.
HOWELL, supra note 63, at 12. See also 1 NIMMER, supra note 5, § 3.2 at 6.7.
486 F.2d at 1088.
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nized the inability of the Register of Copyrights to screen every
application his agency receives because of the sheer volume of it."5
If this administrative agency would encounter such problems, it
is a fair argument that the courts would have the same problems.
The second issue is that the courts would have to be prepared to
listen to a great variety of cases. This would require: (1) that
judges be knowledgeable enough in many areas to recognize
fraud; and (2) that courts create a uniform and practical criterion
for judging what is, and is not, fraudulent. This would indeed be
a great burden on the courts, but not an insurmountable one. As
the dissent points out, courts hear cases of fraud every day. Why
should it be difficult or different to hear cases of fraud in copy-
right? On the other hand, such criteria are not so easily fixed. If
the development of obscenity law in this country offers any indi-
cation, then changing social values result in changing criteria for
assessing the social morality. This has been demonstrated in
court decisions from the 19th century, where courts refused pro-
tection to indecent plays and books, to the present, where courts
apply criteria like "utterly without social redeeming value" and
"appealing to prurient interests."" ° Perhaps the analogy is over-
drawn since fraud is a legal concept that is enduring while ob-
scenity is a moral concept which changes with society. Or is fraud
so enduring?
The third rationale of the majority is based on the intent of
the Copyright Act. The majority expressed its concern for the
public interest by seeking the best manner possible to protect
that interest. The court states:
Copyright protection restricts permissible publication. We fail
to see what public policy would be served by eliminating this restric-
tion in the case of fraudulent matter and permitting it to be re-
printed and circulated freely."
This argument seems sound, but the dissent offers an equally
sound counterpoint:
" 41 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 396 (1958). The opinion states:
The Register has advised me that facilities of the office make intensive
screening of works presented practically impossible. It has a staff of some
thirty-five examiners which receives more than 1,000 applications daily.
Therefore, examinations of any more than the question whether the works
involved meet the specific statutory requirements of the act may be regarded
as not feasible admisistratively.
Id. at 401-02.
" See 1 NIMMER, supra note 5, § 3.2 at 6.7-6.8, and § 36 at 146.29; Comment, supra
note 44, at 124-26. See also 41 Op. ATT'y GEN. 396, 401 (1958).
1, 486 F.2d at 1088 n.3
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A copyright is in the nature of a privilege . . . . Such a privilege
should not be abused by granting copyright protection to material
which is used to defraud the public ....
. . . The public interest is to protect members of the public
from being defrauded. While granting copyright protection of fraud-
ulent material will assure that only one person will defraud members
of the public with a single fraudulent scheme . . . it will not insure
that any fewer members of the public will be defrauded by this
single scheme. By allowing copyright protection to such material,
the law is not only condoning fraud but is placing its power, endorse-
ment and support behind fraudulent works."
The majority suggests that the best way to serve the public inter-
est is to grant the copyright protection against the infringer, while
the dissent suggests that the public is benefited most by denying
copyright protection to the deceiving author. This dichotomy be-
tween the majority and the dissent is based on differing views of
the nature of copyrights. The majority views copyright in the
nature of a restriction on publication and, therefore, seeks to
promote the public interest by restricting publication of fraudu-
lent material. The dissent, meanwhile, views copyright in the
nature of a privilege to the author and, therefore, seeks to pro-
mote the public interest by denying the privilege to one who
would abuse it by defrauding the public.
These divergent views leave a basic issue unresolved. If the
purpose of copyright law is to encourage works which will benefit
the public, and the purpose of the courts is to protect the public
interest within copyright law, then how do the courts best serve
that purpose? Should the court grant an injunction preventing
the defendant from reproducing the plaintiffs work, and thereby
encourage the plaintiff to defraud the public by granting him the
court's endorsement, or should the court deny protection, and
thereby encourage the defendant to freely reproduce the fraudu-
lent work? Clearly the courts do not want to endorse'a fraudulent
scheme, but following the denial of an injunction in Southey v.
Sherwood, 3 Lord Campbell commented, "So the injunction was
refused; and hundreds of thousands of copies of Wat Tyler, at the
price of one penny, were circulated over the kingdom." 4 This
illustrates that a denial of copyright protection does not protect
the public from dissemination of the material, but may in fact
foster it. So, the dilemma remains. The purpose is to serve and
Id. at 1090.
35 Eng. Rep. 1006 (Ch. 1817).
10 LivEs OF THE CHANCELLORS 257, (5th English ed.), quoted in DRONE, supra note
37, at 113 n.1.
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protect the public interest, but there is no clear path. It might
be said, therefore, that it is impossible to discern whether the
court in Belcher adhered to the spirit of the Copyright Act and
the Consitution by permitting copyright protection.
III. IMPLICATIONS OF Belcher
Belcher does not represent a radical shift in the development
of copyright law. Its result is not unlike that of Advisers. The
importance of Belcher, however, stems from its value as a re-
minder that serious problems exist in copyright law to which no
definite solutions have been made. Three related issues lurk be-
hind this case and all similar cases. The first issue deals with the
problem of using equity principles to solve copyright law ques-
tions. As was pointed out above, the courts have been reluctant
to deny copyright in any work which was immoral or illegal. In-
stead, the courts have utilized the equitable clean hands doctrine
to merely deny copyright protection to such works by refusing to
grant an injunction or damages against the pirate of the work.
This is done under the pretext of protecting the public interest.
The clean hands doctrine, however, must be asserted as an af-
firmative defense before the court will act upon it. This is the
irony. It is the defendant, guilty himself of pirating a work which
he believed had sufficient value to earn him a profit, who asserts
the affirmative defense of the plaintiff's unclean hands. Then the
court punishes the plaintiff for having labored to create such an
immoral or illegal work by denying the injunction, while the de-
fendant continues to perpetrate the obscenity or fraud for profit.
The court, of course, has acted in the public interest, but the
defendant has not. One solution to this illogical inequity is that
if equity is the game, it should be played both ways. The court,
therefore, should also apply equitable principles to the conduct
of the defendant who is guilty of piracy. If this were done, the
defendant would then be estopped from asserting the affirmative
defense of unclean hands against the plaintiff. 5 This solution,
though equitable, is not satisfactory since the purpose of copy-
right law is to protect the public interest.
Another solution might be to stop using equity principles and
simply deny the copyright to any such work, but this may be
unsatisfactory because of the burden imposed by the need to
screen every potential copyright work.
,1 Comment, supra note 44, at 111 n.8.
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This leads to the second problematic issue. In any copyright
case should judges sit as censors to determine what is immoral
or fraudulent? This issue has raised much debate. Justice Story
brought up the problem that every judge passing judgment on a
work would be tempted to stifle the free exchange of new ideas if
he found such views opposed to his own views." Justice Holmes
elaborated in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.97 by ex-
plaining that judges censoring works might deny copyright to a
work which might appeal to a public less educated than the
judge, but which still had sufficient value to the public. Failure
to grant such copyright would not serve the public interest and,
therefore, be contrary to the intent of the Copyright Act." If
equity in copyright cases is inequitable, then who but the judges
could determine the copyrightability of each published work? Yet
2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 938 (5th ed. 1849).
The soundness of this general principle can hardly admit of question.
The chief embarrassment and difficulty lie in the application of it to particu-
lar cases. If a Court of Equity, under color of its general authority, is to enter
upon all the moral, theological, metaphysical, and political inquiries, which,
in the past times, have given rise to so many controversies, and in the future
may well be supposed to provoke many heated discussions, and if it is to
decide dogmatically upon the character and bearing of such discussions, and
the rights of authors, growing out of them; it is obvious, that an absolute
power is conferred over the subject of literary property, which may sap the
very foundations, on which it rests, and retard, if not entirely suppress, the
means of arriving at physical, as well as metaphysical truths. Thus, for
example, a Judge, who should happen to believe, that the immateriality of
the soul, as well as its immortality, was a doctrine clearly revealed in the
Scriptures, (a point, upon which very learned and pious minds have been
greatly divided,) would deem any work anti-christian, which should profess
to deny that point, and would refuse an injunction to protect it. So, a Judge,
who should be a Trinitarian, might most conscientiously decide against
granting an injunction in favor of an author, enforcing Unitarian views; when
another Judge, of opposite opinions, might not hesitate to grant it.
Id. at 268.
,7 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
" Id. at 251-52. The Court stated:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, out-
side of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some
works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would
make them repulsive until the public had learned the new language in which
the author spoke. It may be more than doubted, for instance, whether the
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been sure of protec-
tion when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be denied
to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if
they command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value-it
would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational
value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
Id. at 251.
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under such a system, is there not the great peril that our coveted
freedom of speech, the backbone of democracy, might be compro-
mised by the natural biases of individual judges?
If equity fails and judicial censorship fails, then is there fault
in the system? Yes. The problem lies in the fact that in all the
cases wherein copyright is in issue, the action is brought by the
plaintiff-author or publisher of the questioned work against the
defendant-pirate who infringed such work. Yet, the court which
purportedly sits as the mediator between these two litigants, in
fact, sits as the representative of the public who joins in the
action as a third party protecting its own interests. Rather than
seeking justice as between the parties at bar, the court seeks only
to protect the public interest, that trust which was granted in the
Copyright Act. The result is that when the guilty defendant con-
fesses his guilt but pleads that the work in question has a suspi-
cious nature, the court, in its role as public protector, punishes
the plaintiff for his sins against society. Then the defendant,
guilty as he is, is rewarded for uncovering the plaintiff's crime. It
is, therefore, the system which is at fault, and the Belcher case,
with its majority and dissenting opinions, is nothing more than a
representation of the struggles of the system attempting to deliver
justice and protect the public simultaneously.
CONCLUSION
The purpose and intent of copyright law is to benefit the
public, yet there is no statutory authority granting the courts the
power to restrict or permit the copyright of fraudulent material.
The case law offers no concrete precedent in this area, though by
analogy to copyright of immoral or illegal works and analogy to
fraud in trademark and patent law, the indication is that courts
are reluctant to protect any work which tends to adversely affect
the public interest. The problem with these precedents, however,
is that the application of equity principles to copyright law un-
justly permits one guilty party to continue his inequitable con-
duct while failing to provide the greatest public benefit. This
problem results from the structure of copyright litigation which
places the court in the dual role of mediator between the litigants
and representative of the public interest. It is the system, there-
fore, which creates injustice. The conclusion is simple. The sys-
tem must be altered in some way to allow the public, as its own
representative, to bring to bar any author or publisher who seeks
to perpetrate immorality, illegality, or fraud upon it. But where
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the court is called upon to sit as arbitrator between an author and
the pirate who is profiting from the author's labors, the court
must seek only justice as between those individuals.
Charles S. Kamine*




ANTITRUST QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS By EDWIN S. ROCKEFELLER
Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, 1974. Pp. 683. $18.50.
For the past 13 years, the members of the Advisory Board of
the Bureau of National Affairs' Antitrust and Trade Regulation
Report have met to discuss important developments in this area
of the law. The Board is comprised of many of the most highly
respected scholars and practitioners in the field, and analyses of
the most significant topics are published in the weekly reports.
This book, a compilation of these analyses, rewritten, updated,
and put into a question and answer format by the chairman of
the board, should prove a valuable addition to any lawyer's li-
brary.
Antitrust Questions and Answers is not a critique of the anti-
trust laws or their social or economic impact. It is a practical,
objective description of the current application of the Sherman,'
Clayton,2 and Federal Trade Commission Acts3 to various busi-
ness problems. The economic philosophies underlying these laws
and the judicial and administrative decisions thereunder are im-
portant only as aids to interpretations of the law. The book con-
tains very little criticism of the cases. However, an attorney rep-
resenting a client in an antitrust case (not to mention the client
himself) is not particularly interested in the validity of the eco-
nomic theory adopted by the Antitrust Division of the Depart-
ment of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission-he wants to
know if and how he can win his case.'
The answers focus, at all times, upon the particular question
posed. They are fairly comprehensive, but quite naturally in a
single volume covering such a vast area no topic can be treated
exhaustively. Yet Mr. Rockefeller does manage to give most view-
points on open questions, indicating where ambiguities and in-
consistencies exist, and attempting to resolve them. In so doing,
he does not limit the answers to views held by members of the
Advisory Board, but refers freely to works of other groups and
individuals.
1 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-7 (1973).
2 Id. §§ 12-27.
Id. §§ 41-51.
See Bork, The Supreme Court Versus Corporate Efficiency, 76 FoRTUNE, Aug. 1967,
at 92, 158, for a strong criticism of the antitrust bar for its failure to challenge the
government's economic assumptions. It is doubtful, however, that any large corporation
is willing to be a guinea pig in the public interest.
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The book does not deal with antitrust law in general, but
only with specific problems. Attorneys and their clients do not
want to know, when faced with the antitrust implications of a
business decision, what actions may constitute a violation of a
particular statute, but whether that particular decision may have
any antitrust repercussions. Thus, there is no attempt to cover
any topic in this area in a broad sense. Nevertheless, the book
covers all aspects of the subject, and its organization adequately
permits a comprehensive view of the entire field.
Mr. Rockefeller does not limit himself to a static interpreta-
tion of the law. Such an approach would scarcely be adequate in
an area subject to such continuous change as antitrust. The possi-
bility of changes in the law is always brought to the forefront. For
instance, at the beginning he gives warning that the present lack
of any coherent policy of enforcement of the prohibition against
interlocking directorates under section 8 of the Clayton Act5 is no
guarantee that governmental agencies will continue to ignore the
problem.6 Similarly, in his discussion of merger guidelines put
forth by the Federal Trade Commission7 and the Department of
Justice,8 respectively, he makes it clear that these are only indica-
tions of present thoughts on the subject and will not be binding
as to future events. One area in which the author can do little
more than identify the issue, is the section covered by the ques-
tion, "Is a 'combination' different from a contract or conspir-
acy?" This problem, caused initially by Justice Brennan's rather
obscure opinion in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co. '0 has been
further obfuscated, instead of clarified, by subsequent opinions of
the Supreme Court."
Approximately one-third of the book is devoted to an excel-
lent coverage of all aspects of antitrust litigation. All phases of
practice in cases initiated by the Antitrust Division and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission are covered in detail. Private actions for
treble damages are treated comprehensively, with very useful
analyses of attorney's fees'" and class action suits.' 3 Because of the
15 U.S.C.A. § 19 (1973).




0 362 U.S. 29 (1960).
11 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1962).
72 ANTITRUST QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 614-26 (1974).
Id. at 626-44.
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objective approach throughout the book, this last part may make
it more valuable to potential antitrust victims than to possible
offenders. A useful aid to businessmen, as well as to practicing
attorneys, this volume's practical approach to the impact of anti-
trust law on everyday business decisions should render it almost
indispensable to any corporate executive whose area of responsi-
bility extends beyond the walls of his place of business.
William A. Altonin*
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